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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to develop an understanding of the evolution of 
state policy towards Africans in Cape Town, and to document the 
resistance engendered by discriminatory and oppressive laws. 
Utilizing both primary and secondary sources, the thesis describes 
and analyses complex social problems and political struggles which 
originated and developed in the period before 1936. By 
emphasizing the material and political dimensions, as well as the 
class interests and social categories involved in this uneven 
process of struggle, the thesis attempts to transcend the 
limitations not only of functionalist and "conflict pluralist'' 
perspectives, but also of the more simplistic Marxist 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis traces the origins and early development of state 
policy towards Africans living and working in Cape Town. It 
also begins to explore the popular resistance engendered by 
this developing policy. The historical analysis begins by 
tracing the emergence of a "Kaffir Problem" in Woodstock in the 
early 1880 1 s, and ends in 1936 with the contested demise of the 
government location that had been ~stablished earlier in the 
century at Ndabeni. More broadly, these temporal parameters 
mark on the one hand the first stirrings of industrialization 
in what was later to become the Union of South Africa. On the 
other, they delineate the emergence of a coherent and codified 
"Na ti ve Policy11 (embodied in the two "Hertzog Laws" of 1936 and 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Act Amendment of the following year) , 
which sought to establish effective control over a growing and . 
increasingly urbanized African work force. 
The historical mode of analysis adopted in this study, as well 
as the manner. in which its constituent empirical material is 
organized and presented in the followin~ chapters, are best 
explained and justified in the context of an overview of the 
relevant literature. This introductory chapter therefore 
examines South African urban studies in the broadest sense. 
Until recently, the particular combination of historical 
perspe~tive and sociological analysis adopted in this thesis 
found little place in South African urban studies: To a large 
extent, these works could be divided into three categories: 
firstly functionalist ''cultural pluralist" approaches r secondly 
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Weberian "conflict pluralists11 ; and lastly Marxist historical 
materialist perspectives. Although this overview thus 
utilizes a tripartite typology, it should become clear in what 
follows that the basic dichotomy is between pluralists (of either 
11 cul tural'' or "conflict" persuasion) who conceptualize South 
African society as basically comprising a number of "racesrr, 
"ethnic groups" or ethnic ''nations 11 ( 1) and historical 
materialists who favour class-analysis. 
The Cultural Pluralists: Functionalist Approaches 
Wilson and Mafeje's study of social groupings in the local Langa 
location (which replaced Ndabeni) is the earliest available 
academic work dealing specifically with Africans in Cape Town. 
Clearly influenced by Mayer and Mayer's earlier seminal study of 
Africans in East London(2), Wilson and Mafeje addressed as their 
central issue the adaptation of local Africans, through a variety 
of voluntary and ascribed associations, to life in a segregated 
and racially-oppressiye city. They sought in their study firstly 
to identify "the effective social groups in Langa", and secondly 
to discover the basis for the coherence of these groups(3). For 
reasons which are avowedly pragmatic, political organizations 
and trade unions were excluded from the analysis, although the 
authors conceded that "A very large number of the people of 
Langa take a lively interest in politics, and readers must make 
allowance for this fact 11 (4). The study concluded somewhat 
tautologically that value-consensus is the basis of group 
solidarity(5). 
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Mafeje has since distanced himself from this study, which he 
admits is fundamentally flawed by its a-historical and 
functionalist methodology(6). Similar criticisms have been 
levelled by Magubane at the functionalist school (7). In order 
to understand these criticisms, it is clearly necessary to provide 
a brief outline of the central tenets of sociological functionalism. 
These are best surrnnarized by Van den Berghe(8) whose discussion of 
the main elements of functionalism is reproduced almost verbatim 
by Swingewood(9). 
Functionalism is predicated on a view of society as a system of 
inter-related parts. Social causation is viewed from this 
perspective in terms of multiple and reciprocal interactions, in 
which social process and institutions are explained teleologically 
in terms of their effects or functions. Functionalism furthermore 
embodies a view of human action that is clearly deterministic(10). 
The social system is considered to evince a dominant tendency 
towards stability and inertia. Society is thus considered to be 
in a constant state of 11 moving11 or "dynamic" equilibrium, which 
is guaranteed by a basic value-consensus produced by mechanisms 
of ,socialization. Dysfunctional elements are said to be 
neutralized and institutionalized by mechanisms of social control. 
As this view of man/woman and society is predicated on a 
conception of social order being maintained by the diffusion of 
norms, values and collective goals, and dysfunctional elements 
that do exist are seen to be themselves "largely cultural in 
character11 (11). Functionalist overtones are clearly evident in 
the work of Wilson and Mafeje and of Mayer and Mayer. Both these 
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studies neglect history and politics, stressing instead 
functionalist conceptions of adaptation, values and culture. 
Their stress on culture, which is largely subsumed within racial, 
ethnic and tribal categories, justifies their characterization 
as "cultural pluralist" studies. 
An earlier example of work within this paradigm is the study of 
the "racial ecology'' of Durban, which was conducted by Kuper, 
Watts and Davies in 1958. The "residential ecology of the 
races" outlined in chapters 4 and 5 of Kuper et al's work 
provided a measure of "natural'' segregation, which is a concept 
originally developed by American functionalists of the "Chicago 
School''· According to Mellor, the Chicago School's Park and 
McKenzie saw racial segregation as a natural phenomenon 
resulting from processes of ''racial" invasion and succession( 12), 
while their colleague Burgess maintained that 
in the expansion of the city, a process of 
distribution takes place which sifts and sorts and 
relocates individuals and groups by ~esidence and 
occupation •••• Segregation offers the group, and 
thereby the individuals who compose the group, a 
place and a role in the total organization of city 
life(1.3). 
Kuper, Watts and Davies did not explicitly mention the Chicago 
School in their study of Durban's development, but they 
conceded that 
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the distinction between pure c~natura1r or 
voluntary) segregation and applied (planned or 
compulsory) segregation may be clear in theory: 
it is often ambiguous when related to a concrete 
situation(14). 
These authors briefly outlined 11 two opposite theories (which) 
are held in regard to the consequences of contact between races". 
They qualified their acceptance of the "theory" which "asserts 
that contact promotes harmony 11 by stressing the importance of 
"level", "type", "source" and 11 context 11 of inter-racial contact, 
and ascribed to the South African government the erroneous 
opposite view or ·•theory" that 
contact breeds friction. The customs of people of 
different races are considered to be incompatible, 
and harmonious relations can therefore be secured 
only by reducing points of contact to the 
minimum(15). 
This segregationist viewpoint has been explicitly stated by 
Afrikaner nationalist intellectuals such as Strauss(16), 
Marais(l7) and Koornhof(18). Although apparently 
diametrically opposed to the views discussed above, the 
segregationist perspective may clearly be considered as a 
variant of"cultural pluralism". 
The last important author who needs to be discussed under the 
rubric of cultural pluralism is Swanson. In an early approach 
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to the question of urban racial segregation in South Africa he 
argued'that "because of the nature of the urban poor", health 
hazards and problems of sanitation and overcrowding in South 
Africa's developing cities at the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century were "usually perceived in terms of rl3.cial or ethnic 
differences"(19). This is a descriptive statement rather than 
a serious attempt at analysis, for it accepts as given factors 
such as poverty and racis~which surely demand explanation. 
Swanson eventually abandoned this inadequate conceptualization 
of the "sanitation syndrome", clearly perceiving that "urban 
native policy" in the Cape Colony during the first decade of 
the present century embodied a rational programme designed 
to organize society to provide for the mutual 
access of black labourers and white employers in 
the coming industrial age, without having to pay 
the heavy cost of urbanization or losing the 
dominance of white over black(20). 
These formulations marked a definitive break with the 
functionalist ''cultural pluralist" perspective, and signified 
the adoption of a Weberian'~onflict pluralis~1 analysis in South 
African urban studies. This particular development is discussed 
in the next section. 
6 
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The Conflict Pluralists: Weberian Anproaches 
Functionalist cultural pluralism has been largely superseded 
within South Africa's English-language universities by a second 
form of pluralism in which Weberian influences are for the most 
part readily apparent. 'rhe term "conflict pluralism" is used 
here to refer to approaches which retain the cultural pluralist 
emphasis on "racer' while introducing the ~·Jeberian notion of 
"domina tion'.I ( 2·1). 
Weber himself never addressed the modern urban question. His 
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pioneering classic The City dealt with the mediaeval city in { 
terms of domination or legitimated power(22). The Weberian ! 
approach in modern urban sociology was first developed by Rex 
and Moore in their analysis of housing and ''race relations" in 
the S~arkbrook area of Birmingham. This study concluded that 
there is a class struggle over the use of houses 
and that this class struggle is the central 
process of the city as a social unit. In saying 
this, we follow Max Weber who saw that class" 
struggle was apt to emerge wherever people in 
a market situation enjoyed differential access to 
property; and that such class struggles might 
therefore arise not merely around the use of the 
means of industrial production, but around the 
control of domestic property ••• there will 
therefore be as many housing classes in the city 
' 
as there are kinds of access to the use of 
housing(23). 
Summarizing his work with Moore, Rex explained that the concept 
of "housing classes11 arose out of a (typically Weberian) 
endeavour to provide 
an account in terms of the action frame of 
reference which explains particular kinds of 
land-use and building-use in terms of the action-
orien ta tion of typical residents(24). 
This quest subsequently led him into a growing preoccupation 
with the concept of :rrace" and the phenomenon of racial 
prejudice and antipathy. 
Thus in a book entitled Race 1 Colonialism & the City(25), he 
argued that the central dynamic of the modern imperialist world 
is the "race war" raging in many cities in the advanced 
capitalist countries (where the oppressed black underclass is 
rising in revolt) and in the countryside in various parts of the 
exploited and deliberately underdeveloped Third World (where 
armed struggle against neo-colonialism has become the order of 
the day). He forsaw the suppression of the revolutionary 
movement (from which he maintained that the co-opted organized 
workers are excluded) in the metropolitan countries and the 
defeat of the guerillas in the Third World. Nevertheless, he 
predicted that 
the ideal of Third World and black revolution 
will survive and will be the determining factor 
in world history for many years to come. Compared 
to it, the revolution of European Marxism will 
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appear sociologically as little more than a 
little local difficulty(26). 
This line of thinking was further developed in another of Rex's 
publications, which opened with the assertion that "racial 
discrimination and racial prejudice are phenomena of 
colonialism11 (27). Here he argued that 11 certain forms of poverty 
and underprivilege are built into the structures of urban 
industrial society11 (28) and that black people are forced into 
these structurally disadvantaged positions (alongside the 
"native 11 sub-proletariat) by racial prejudice and discrimination. 
In many metro~)oli tan cities (including those in certain "settler 
societies 11 such as South Africa), the ''black underclassn 
consists, he said, large1y of in-migrants from devastated 
underdeveloped regions(29). 
He further argued. that the degree to which "black-white 
relations" resulted in an 11 urban crisis'' depends largely on the 
level of employment and on the nature of relations between the 
black community and the police. ~ith high levels of 
unemployment and bad relations with the police, the insulated 
black "colonies" in the metropolitan cities could become "the 
breeding ground of racial revolution:"(30). He envisaged three 
possible lines of development: racial integration, militant 
black separation, and segregation with suppression (as in South 
Africa). 
Here Rex was building on his suggestion that a general theory 
combining insights derived from'~ultural pluralis~'with those 
derived from Marxism would facilitate the understanding of 
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South African society. He saw the'~ultural pluralis~'a~alysis 
as being too narrowly political and the Marxist analysis as 
being too narrowly economic, and his'~ain contention •••• is 
that all the various groups and segments in this society are 
held locked together, albeit in bitter conflict, not solely by 
the institution of government, but by a rapidly expanding 
economy and the exploitative labour system on which it depends 11 (3.1). 
He argued that this system 11 might be said to be the 
theoretically most perfect system of labour exuloitation yet 
devised''( 32), and in another essay he discussed 11 The Compound, 
The Reserve and the Urban Location: The Essential Institutions 
of Southern African Labour Exploitation"(33). 
This form of analysis of South African society thus opened up a 
new dimension to the study of urban history and politics. So 
far as the position of Africans in Cape Town is concerned, four 
works deserve special mention. Firstly, there is the South 
African Institute of Race Relations analysis of ~he Squatter 
Problem in the Western Cape(34), which is clearly predicated on 
a supply and demand perspective. The demand for housing (due to 
natural. population grow
1
th and in-migration stemming from economic 
pressures) was said to be far greater than the forthcoming 
supply, which is limited by a lack of government housing funds 
and by administrative action such as the implementation of the 
Group Areas Act, as well as natural factors such as obsolescence 
and decay which necessitate the demolition of slums. The 
government· attempts to evade responsibility for African housing, 
sheltering behind the apartheid policy of rihomelands", migrant 
labour, ·influx control and "Coloured Labour Preference", which 
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weakens the national and regional economics both directly, 
(through high administrative costs and by increasing the 
population density on the land in the Reserves), and indirectly 
by limiting productivity and restricting skills. 
Not only is broader government policy sa~d to be exacerbating 
the economic ills of the system, but policy with regard to the 
housing crisis, in which existing townships become increasingly 
overcrowded until a spill-over into similarly overcrowded 
squatter camps results, was seen as ineffective. To solve the 
problem, a comprehensive programme was advocated, including the 
upgrading of squatter areas through self-help schemes with expert 
inputs; a large-scale housing programme in which limited State 
resources should be supplemented by funds from well-meaning 
individuals, commerce.and industry, and bodies such as the Urban 
Foundation;' and the achievement of zero population growth 
through a family-planning policy, which should include the 
raising of the socio-economic status of the underprivileged and 
the provision of training and employment for young woman to delay 
childbearing age. 
More fundamentally, such manifestations of apartheid as the 
migrant labour system, influx control, the Group Areas Act and 
the Western Gape Coloured Labour Preference Policy should be 
phased out, as 11 there is no group in South Africa that is 
benefitting from these policies'', which merely conceal rather 
than confront social problems by tackling symptoms instead of 
real structural causes. Once influx control and the migrant 
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labour system have been phased out, and the population density 
in the Reserves or "homelands" consequently lowered, (although 
the influx to Cape Town would not be excessive once the families 
of existing contract workers are allowed in), an urgent 
programme for the development of homeland agriculture should be 
drawn up, centering on "appropriate technology" and administrative 
flexibility(35). 
The Urban Problems Research Unit analysis of the African housing 
question in Cape Town(36) was identical in intent to that of 
the SAIRR, even containing a yellow-paged section entitled 
"Implications of the Study for Policy-Makers". This focused on 
the impracticality of effecting influx control through apartheid 
measures, and the functionality of squatting and the "informal 
sector" of the economy in providing shelter and income for 
immigrants from the rural areas and for township residents who 
cannot afford to pay rent. Devolution of decision-making 
power to the regional level was advocated, as this would . 
facilitate the formulation of a policy that could take these 
realities into account. 
A more radical brand of liberalism was evident in the late Andrew 
Silk's journalistic account of the struggle against government 
policy waged by the squatters of Modderdam (one of a number of 
local squatter camps that sprang up and were soon razed during 
the second half of the 1970 1 s). Silk showed how 
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the story goes beyond the camp's narrow boundaries. 
For the contradiction which forms the central 
thread in the life of the squatters is also woven 
through South African history. The economy's huge 
appetite for black labour is in conflict with white 
fears of being "swamped11 , then ruled, by blacks. 
Modderdam was a microcosm of this classical 
struggle(37). 
He warned' that 
chaos and strife is inevitable as long as the 
government clings to apartheid's fundamental 
principle and refuses to grant blacks full rights 
to travel, settle, work, buy land, and ultimately 
vote in the city(38). 
The first section of the book provided insights into the lives 
of Modderdam's residents, with some of whom Silk obviously 
enjoyed a degree of intimacy. The second was historical, 
starting with the conquest of South Africa's indigenous people, 
and tracing the development of segregation and apartheid both 
in the broader society and in Cape Town. Silk mentioned, but 
did not develop, the idea that separatism is the means whereby 
blacks· are ''prevented from acquiring the aspirations of a 
settled working class 11 , thus preserving white supremacy( 39). 
The account of local history was superficial, as Silk failed to 
make use of any academic work in this field. The third section 




mid 1970 1 s. Silk discussed the manner in which, from small 
beginnings, this movement grew rapidly during the 1976 anti-
apartheid revolt, which spread to Cape Town in August. With the 
authorities preoccupied suppressing the uprising, many thousands 
of families moved out of Cape Town's overcrowded urban locations 
and the desolate rural locations of the Xhosa homelands, into 
the bush on the outskirts of the city to secure themselves 
homes. He showed how the squatters were caught in the middle of 
the brutal conflict fostered by the authorities between the 
compound-based migrants and the permanent residents of the 
locations; and how the Modderdam squatters committee became 
dependent on support from liberal (mainly white) lawyers and 
community workers, resulting in conflict within the camp. The 
final chapter described Hodderdam's violent demise. 
The last work considered here is Western's account of the impact 
of the segregatory Group Areas Act on the "Coloured" community 
in the Cape Town suburb of Mowbray. The situation was seen in 
terms of "the attempts of a racial oligarchy to maintain its 
hegemony by as many means as possible - including spatial 
means 11 (40). Western argued that ''the most effective policy for 
the government has to be one of continual removal, one that does 
not permit the a_9pearance of place-s9ecific solidarity"( 41). 
He provided a rudimentary outline of the development of Cape Town 
as a segregated city, concluding that "segregation means 
domination. It is one tool by which the increasingly outnumbered 
white ruling group can maintain social distance from, and 
hegemony over, other groups in South African society 11 (42). An 
"ideal Apartheid City" was conceptualized, and Western then 
considered (with the aid of maps) how closely Cape Town actually 
approximates to this ideal-type. 
Here We.ber's influence was readily apparent, as it was in\feste;rnis 
stress on subjectivity. He argued that "humanistic geography •••• 
implies looking at the city through the texture of the lives 
of its inhabitants 11 (43) and showed how peoples' lives were 
shattered by their removal to the instant slums of the Cape Flats, 
where social dislocation gives rise to rampant crime and 
insecurity. 
He considered "very premature'' the contention that 11 the 
government's plan will backfire" because 11 the Sand Flats are 
natural'breeding grounds for revolution". He seemed to envisage 
the townships achieving "a measure of social cohesion11 (44) not 
through such allegedly "reactive" forms of organization as 
protest movements and political parties, but through the 
establishment of crime-busting "peacemaker" vigilante groups(45). 
He gave a schematic account of the squatter movement that 
developed in Cape Town in the mid-1970's, and of the (apparently 
unrelated) "civil unrest" which flared up at that time. His 
"uncertain conclusion!' was that 
in the longest term, then, it would seem that 
exacerbation of intrasocietal tension by 
the institution of group areas may actually be 
undermining the security of that shrinking 
minority in South Africa - the Whites(45a). 
15 1 
He dealt in a postscript with the local resurgence of "civil 
unrest" in 1980, concluding that ''it seems that ~ is becoming 
a more important element of self-definition, especially for many 
among the young"(46), despite the fact that apartheid has 
historically created self-sustaining barriers between members of 
different 11 racial" groups(47). 
Western, and the other "conflict pluralists'' discussed above, have 
clearly advanced considerably beyond the functionalist 
conceptions of the "cultural pluralists". But despite their 
Weberian emphasis on domination, they nevertheless retain the 
basic "racial" assumptions of pluralism. This consideration 
renders their accounts of social control and social conflict 
problematic. The following section discusses theorists who have 
attempted to dispense with pluralist racial assumptions, while 
simultaneously relating social control and social conflict to 
the underlying dynamics of the capitalist economy(48). 
Marxist Approaches 
The international urban crisis of the late 1960 1 s stimulated the 
development of Marxist urban studies. Prior to that date, 
historical materialist conceptualizations of the social processes 
underlying urban phenomena had barely advanced beyond Engels' 
embryonic formulations(49). Unfortunately failing to engage with 
the developing "conflict pluralist" perspective, the new 
twentieth century school of Marxist analysts of the urban question 
initially adopted a self-conscious programme of conceptual mapping 
in order to clear the way for concrete analysis. This end was 
however soon forgotten in the prevailing atmosphere of 
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heady abstraction. 
At the forefront of this intellectual movement was the influential 
Castells, leaning methodologically on the French structuralist 
Althusser and politically on Althusser's protege Poulantzas. 
Castells' efforts to delineate a field of urban studies and to 
develop concepts with which to analyse the urban question are 
chronicled in a series of works spanning a full decade(50). His 
work, however, was increasingly criticized for its formalism(51) 
and idealism(52) and for its neglect of history(53). 
Scholars such as Foster in Britain(54) and Dawley in the United 
States(55) t~rned to.the.writing of theoretic~lly~informed local 
histories to remedy the imputed scholasticism of Castells and 
his followers. But se~ious charges of economism(56) were levelled 
at Foster's seminal study of Class Struggle and the Industrial 
Revolution, and a new school of "culturalist" local urban history 
found expression in the pages of the History vJorkshop Journal 
and elsewhere. South African scholarship has been profoundly 
affected by these developments. 
Marxist approach~s to the urban question in South Africa attempt 
to move beyond what are seen as the tautological limitations of 
all forms of pluralism. Radical scholars maintain that the 
"racial" question is best explained in terms of the exigencies 
of capitalist development. This approach proceeds from the 
conviction, best expressed by Johnstone, that the system of racial 
domination in .South Africa is not a doomed 11 dysfunctional intrusion 
upon the capitalist economic system, ste~ming from non-material 
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factors outside it such as prejudice, racism, nationalism and 
'social and cultural pluralism'" but a "product of the system 
of production of which it form [sJ a part, and is determined in 
its specific forms, functions and nature by this system"(57). 
Rich was the first South African scholar to publicly take issue 
with the pluralist pers9ective on the urban question. In a paper 
published in 1978, he castigated Davenport for stressing the 
irrationality of urban residential segregation(58). Rich called 
for a class-analysis of urban segregation, which he sa1d had 
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been largely ignored by Marxist scholars, who tended to concentrate 
rather on the role played by the Reserves in the development of 
South African Capitalism(59). He concluded that "segregation 
cannot be solely located in the cheap labour basis of the Reserves 11 , 
as this view overlooks the role played in the development of 
state policy by the clash of interests in the urban areas. Urban 
residential segregation was, he argued, a 
rational ideological resnonse by certain groups 
within the white policy, namely white labour and 
urban commercial capital, to what was perceived 
as an economic threat to their livelihood •••• 
In addition, however, the growth of a distinctly 
segregationist movement in the urban areas checked 
the power of international capital that would 
have reduced the white labour aristocracy in its 
power to reserve certain jobs to itself, 
due to llthe desire by international capital for a stabilizing 
petty bourgeois class among Africans in the urban are::i.s' 1 (60). 
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Rich failed in this paper to show exactly how urban segregation 
benefitted capitalists, and he also neglected to analyse 
resistance to state policy. Subsequent work within this 
tradition has attempted to remedy these lacunae, and thereby to 
develop a more coherent Marxist account of the South African 
urban question. Proctor's history of Sophiatown from 1905 to 
1940 addressed these questions, but in a rather superficial and 
' unsatisfactory manner. He argued that 
government labour policy in this period then 
seems to have been to encourage the free flow of 
labour to that sector of industry (i.e. manufacturing) 
which was able to benefit most from the minimal 
government regulation, and which was rapidly 
assuming a position of hegemony within the state(61). 
Segregatory legislation and the pass laws, he said, may in theory 
have been directed towards the maintenance of the migrant labour 
system and the safeguarding of the labour supply of the 
agricultural sector, but in practice 11 they were deliberately 
worded and applied so as to enable the creation of an increasingly 
stabilized industrial workforce in the urban areas in the late 
twenties and early thirties 11 ( 62). He maintained that "the State 
allowed a virtually uninhibited flow of African families into 
Johannesburg throughout the thirties and early forties 11 (63) and 
that prior to 1948 (and the subsequent implementation of the 
apartheid policy), "the labour market •••• was structured more by 
the operation of economic forces than by deliberate 
regulation11 (64). 
This was however the era of segregation, when state policy, as 
far as the African population was concerned, was directed primarily 
towards "class-levelling", as opposed to the post-1948 apartheid 
era in which the state increasingly fosters the natural process 
of 11 class-polarization11 among the Africans(65). Proctor 
conceptualized segregation as the 11 means by which an ·aspirant 
black petty bourgeoisie could be successfully contained11 (66), yet 
he argued that the state's response to the upsurge of worket 
militancy immediately before, during and after the First World 
War "seem [s] to have been characterised by an intention towards 
the further fractionalisation of the black working class through 
an incorporation of its aspirant middle class leadership 
elements11 ( 67). 'fheorists such as Innes and Flaut argue far more 
convincingly and pertinently that 
in the face of this offensive by the working class 
in South Africa •••• the most important element of 
the capitalist strategy was to seek to develop the 
division which had already been established 
historically between white and African workers(68). 
Proctor did mention "the racial polarization of class forces 11 (69), 
but he seemed largely to overlook the fact that this was a period 
of ever-increasing 11 racial 11 repression. 
His account of the resistance to this repression was therefore 
unconvincing. He contended simply (without providing any 
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evidence for this assertion) that "by 1923 the African petty 
bourgeoisie had accepted the notion of segregation in principle"(70). 
Ignoring the massive growth of the industrial and Commercial 
Workers' Union during the 1920 1 s, the emergence of the Communist -
inspired Non-European Trade Union Federation in 1928, the 
radicalization of the African National Congress, and the ''White 
Terror'' which smashed this growing African working-class 
militancy, Proctor asserted simply that ''Black radicalism had 
always been met by severe repression, and the only African 
political organizations allowed to operate relatively freely 
were those dominated by petty bourgeois leadership elements 11 (71). 
Thus very little was made of the resistance of the residents of 
Sophiatown to the planned destruction of their community (which, 
due to this resistance, only began in 1955). Here Proctor 
stressed not organization but apathy. He said that 
for a black worker living under such conditions, 
where life presented one long continual battle for 
survival, circumstances must have seemed to have a 
dead-weight permanen~e, entirely beyond his power 
to change or control(72) 
and that ''South African capitalism for these people must have 
seemed as immovable and as crushing as the hard, sharp quartzite 
of the Jitwatersrand itself 1'(73). There may be an element of 
truth in his contention that the residents of Sophiatown, in the 
face of the hopelessness of their situation, resorted more to 
backyard shebeens and dance parties than to "overt political 
action 11 (74). Yet he acknowledged the Communist Party's 
extensive presence (including regular public meetings on Sunday 
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afternoons) in Sophiatown during the 1930's, and he could not 
completely ignore the fact that there was "a profusion of public 
meetings and rallies over various issues at various times in 
Sophiatown" - but this was simply ascribed to "petty bourgeois 
influence"(75). 
Proctor had begun in this paper to develop a Marxist perspective 
on such crucial and neglected issues in South African 
historiography as state policy and popular resistance. His 
rudimentary explanation for the quiescence of the oppressed and 
the ~onsequent generally low level of intensity of resistance to 
state policy is of particular significance, for his formulations 
in this regard were to be taken up and developed in the ensuing 
years by scholars such as Koch and La Hausse (whose work is 
discussed below). Before this could be accomplished, however, a 
necessary process of conceptual mapping had to be concluded. 
In 1979 the Development Studies Group published a collection of 
papers which attempted to develop a Marxist perspective on "the 
complex but crucial set of intertwined relationships which 
revolve around squatting, population removals and resettlement, 
'homeland' activities, housing shortages and unemployment"(76). 
Here Mare argued that analysis of the 11 housing problem/squatter 
problem11 should begin at the level of production, focusing on 
the primary contradiction between capital and labour. According 
to Mar~, 
squatter movements, food organizations, transport 
boycotts are some working class responses in the 
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class struggle. Influx control, provision of 
housing by the State, the 'homeland' policy and 
urbanization within these regions, bulldozing of 
squatter communities, low-cost housing, the 
Urban Foundation, represent some of the responses 
by capital(77). 
He maintained that 
it is necessary to look at the pres~nt 'squatter 
problem' against the background of the history 
of proletarianization in South Africa - a history 
that has led to specific economic, political and 
ideological measures by the State to aid the 
process of ac9umulation, and also to 'maintain 
and create the conditions for social harmony 1 (78). 
Mare discussed five periods in this proletarianization process, in 
which the value of labour-power and hence the rate of surplus-
value shifts continuously with the class struggle. The cost of 
housing is an important factor in determining the value of labour-
power and the different periods (which seems somewhat arbitrary) 
have different housing policies, culminating in the two-pronged 
policy adopted in the mid-1970's. This involves firstly 
urbanization of the "homelands 11 near "white" industrial development 
centres, so that a section of the workers become commuters from 
these ''homeland 11 townships, which also house the resettled 
relative surplus population. The other as~ect of the present 
~ I -
housing policy, he said, is the provision of improved services for 
a stabilised petty bourgeoisie and part of the 
workforce (those in permanent employment, and with 
'skills' related to production under monopoly 
capitalism) within black urban areas in 'white• 
areas. It is in this field that the direct 
involvement of monopoly capital through the Urban 
Foundation (UF) and indirectly through changes in 
State policy can be seen(79). 
Mar& sketched a theory of housing in the capitalist mode of 
production, in which it has a 11 dual nature": as a commodity, 
i.e. luxury housing (the exchange-value aspect of housing) and 
also as a necessity for the reproduction of labour-power, 
i.e. workers' housing (the use-value aspect). This dual nature 
of housing gives rise, ~e said, to two contradictions: firstly 
between building capital and industrial capital, which for obvious 
reasons demand high-priced and low-priced housing respectively, 
and secondly between the owners and the non-owners of land. The 
acrimony between local and central government over responsibility 
for the cost of public housing was said to reflect a conflict 
between fractions of capital, specifically between the monopoly 
and competitive fractions of industrial capital. This suggested 
theoretical framework for an analysis of the 11 squatter problem/ 
housing problem11 ended with an exposition of 0 1 Connor's theory 
of state expenditure, as Mar6 argued that 
the enormity of state involvement in the 
provision of housing demands that a theory of 
·housing in South Africa also be a theory of the 
state in peripheral capitalist social formations 
and of state expenditure(80). 
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In a paper first published in 1980, Wilkinson contributed to the 
further development of Marxist urban studies in this country. He 
started off by defining and establishing relationships between 
concepts such as "mode of production", "forces of production", 
~ 
"relations of production11 , "means of production", "use-value", 
"exchange valuer•, "surplus value", :1hegemony 11 , "ideology", "social 
formation", "constant capital 11 , "variable capital" and 
"exploitation". From this discussion, he concluded that 
the reproduction of the capitalist system as a 
whole, then, cannot be isolated from the continued 
(and increasing) exploitation of the working class 
by the capitalist class. Nor can it be isolated 
from the struggles of workers to resist the 
domination of ~apital as they become conscious of 
it and its origins in the uroduction process(81). 
Using Castells' concept of "collective consumption1', Wilkinson 
argued that "housing in the broad sense is a critical element 
in the reproduction of labour-power 11 ( 82). He also employed Harvey 
to make. the points that the housing market provides new fields 
for capital accumulation (thus contributing to the reproduction 
of capitalist relations of production) and that investment in the 
11 buil t environment" is an important means of devaluing capital 
and thus overcoming the periodic crisis of over-accumulation (or 
over-production) that are inherent in capitalism. Furthermore, 
the provision of housing can be an instrument of social control, 
as in the locations and compounds that are so much a part of the 
South Airican way of life. 
Having linked capitalism and housing, Wilkinson briefly dealt 
with the "uneven and combined 11 development of the capitalist 
system. Here he defined concepts such as 11 urbanization11 , 
11 primitive accululation 11 , "marginalized working population11 and 
11 dependent urbanization 11 ·• Wilkinson's discussion up to this 
point (halfway through the essay) is a purely abstract exercise 
in conceptual mapping, methodologically akin to the work of 
Castells and open to the same charge of idealism since levelled 
at Castells. 
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The second half of the essay applies this framework to South Africa, 
wher• the system of apartheid, Wilkinson noted, has limited the 
urbanization process. He maintained, however, that the "housing 
problem" in South Africa is not simply a question of 11 the State's 
manipulation of the rate of provision of African family housing 
as one more instrument in the battery of 'influx controls'"· 
Many "Coloureds 11 and 11 Asians 1' also live under a:!_)palling 
conditions, and he concluded from this that 
it is now clear that the fundamental causes of 
the 'problem' are not to be located entirely 
within the ideo!~ of the Apartheid State, since 
there are no real qualitative differences in the 
urban housing conditions of these supposedly 
'different' groups. The underlying structural 
causes are to be found, rather, in the 
historically specific responses of the State to 
the changing material requirements of capital 
accumulation in South Africa since the dominance 
of the capitalist mode of production was first 
established(83). 
He turned therefore to the conceptualization of the state, which 
he saw as 11 the guarantor of the general material conditions of 
capitalist production and reproduction11 (84), and he suggested 
that a useful starting point would be to combine Harvey's insights 
into the capitalist urban process with Hirsch's theory of the 
capitalist state. 3uch ~theory, he says, would have to take into 
account the specificities of the present monopoly stage of 
capitalism in South Africa. 
As for the issue of squatting, Wilkinson pointed out that the 
apartheid system has limited the size or displaced the location 
of "informal" settlements, with the result that the urban 
"housing problem" in South Africa generally takes the form of 
severe overcrowding in existing townships. Nevertheless, squatter 
camps do exist in South Africa, but he was unwilling to discuss 
whether or not squatting can be seen as a form of class action. 
He did argue though that squatting should certainly "be seen to 
pose a real threat to bourgeois hegemony, particularly in terms 
of the ideological relations which legitimize 'property' and 
• 1authority"'(85). 
He noted that significant sections of the South African 
bourgeoisie have begun to propagate the 11 self-help" approach to 
housing in order to neutralize this threat, particularly by 
nurturing "a 'middle class' of black property owners to champion 
the virtues of the free enterprise system among their less 
privileged fellows 11 (86). Following Burgess, Wilkinson concluded 
that the "self-help" approach "represents yet another case of 
treatin·g the sympton rather than the cause" in typical liberal 
reformist fashion(87). However, the "self-help" ap9roach can be 
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appropriated by the working class to become an 
ideology of community resistance to 'external' 
control of the local environment. The extent 
to which such an ideology can evolve into a 
consciousness of class and beyond that, be 
translated into class practi~e is •••• an issue 
which, in this paper, must remain open(88). 
The debate on the urban question within the small circle of 
Marxist academics and students in the English-speaking 
universities of South Africa was at this stage clearly in danger 
of collapsing into pure scholasticism. A number of writers 
turned to painstaking empirical work to remedy the situation. 
In 1981, Wilkinson del~vered a second paper, this time dealing 
with the delimited topic of "the Resolution of the African Housing 
Crisis in Johannesburg, 1944-1954". In the first section of this 
surprisingly atheoretical work, he used central and local 
government reports, as well as various secondary sources, to 
provide a fairly detailed "political and economic context from 
which the African housing crisis emerged in the aftermath of the 
.Second World dar 11 (89). 
The second section provided a similarly factual account of the 
evolution of "Native Policy" prior to ·1948, focusing particularly 
on three related issues: "the need for a 'permanent' or 
'stabilised' urban African labour force, the distribution of the 
costs of accommodating this labour force, and the role that African 
building workers could play in providing cheaper accommodation for 
it''(90). 
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The third section 
sketches the parallel development during the late 
40s and early 50s of firstly, the legislative 
programme required by the Nationalist government 
to implement its increasingly coherent but 
controversial African housing policy and, secondly, 
the 'scientific' research programme co-ordinated 
by the NBRI to provide the State with the technical 
means to translate its policy into material 
reality(91). 
Here Wilkinson argued that the key difference between post-1948 
apartheid and post-1948 segregation as regards policy towards the 
accommodation of Afric~ns in the urban areas was the National 
Party government's denial of the necess1ty for a permanent urban 
African labour force(92). He showed how the new government had 
by 1952 formulated a coherent policy with which to tackle the 
African housing crisis and simultaneously re-establish control 
over the increasingly militant urban African population. 
This was the "site and service" approach, whereby squatters would 
be moved into controlled camps, where they would erect their own 
shelters on sites provided by the authorities, who would also 
provide rudimentary services. The self-built shacks would later 
I 
be replaced by conventional houses(93). Wilkinson quoted Dr 
Eiselen, who was at that time Secretary for Native Affairs, to 
the effect that 
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anly by the provision of adequate shelter in 
I 
properly planned Native townships can full control 
over urban Natives be regained, because only then 
will it be possible to eliminate the surplus 
Natives who do not seek or find an honest living 
in the cities(94). 
The final section showed how the Johannesburg City Council was 
eventually forced to go along with this plan. Wilkinson argued 
that 
the implicit ~olitical threat posed by the 
autonomous squatter movement was met, not by 
their expulsion .••• but with the realization that 
it could, in fact, be brought under control by 
the provision of 'adequate shelter in properly 
planned Native townships' - which of course 
amounted to a tacit recognition of the legitimacy 
of the squatters' presence in the urban areas(95). 
Perhaps Eiselen's stated intention to "eliminate the surplus 
Na ti ves" was not ·carried out in Johannesburg (al though this seems 
highly unlikely). In Cape Town at any rate, the implementation 
of the ''site and service" policy can in no way be seen as a 
victory for the squatters. As Younge has noted, once residents 
of the Cape Peninsula's autonomous squatter camps had been moved 
into controlled emergency camps, "illegals" were sifted out and 
expelled from the area(96). 
Wilkinson stated in his extremely short conclusion that he found 
in this account support for the concept of the relative autonomy 
of the state, as the National Party _government's 11 Native Policy•• 
was contrary to the 
strategic intentions of at least that fraction 
of the dominant class under whose hegemony the 
~agan Report had been oroduced and the ideas of 
the ~ocial and Economic ~lanning Council had 
gained considerable currency. 
In particular he mentioned the implementations of the segregatory 
Group Areas Act as being ;'difficult to explain in terms of a 
materialist theory of the State:•, unless one sees the state as 
being relatively autonomous of ''the 'economic"', focusing on the 
''intense three-cornered conflict between the central government, 
the local authorities and the representatives of organized commerce 
and industry 11 • He suggested that the disagreement between central 
and local government due to ti1eir representing different fractions 
of capital, and maintained that it is necessary to identify "the 
dominant social class at the local level"(97). 
Since 1981, two issues of the University of the Witwatersrand -
based .;ourna1 jl.frica 1-'ers~~~ have been devoted to the question 
of "Townships and Resistance''. :!!'or the pUr;Joses of this study, 
the most pertinent articles included in these two issues of the 
journal are those based on the Honours dissertations of Bloch and 
Cohen. 
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The first of these articles(98) built on Wilkinson's 1981 paper 
on the resolution of Johannesburg's African housing crisis during 
the period from the mid-forties· to the mid-fifties. This (and a 
good deal of other relevant emnirical material) was set within a 
conceptual structure in which state intervention to secure the 
"management-reproduction of labour power': (concerning particularly 
"the provision, distribution and management of some of the means 
of collective consumption") is 11 located within the general 
movement of the class struggle 11 ( 99). Bloch thus began to theorize 
the way in which working-class struggle articulates with 
I 
contradictions within the '7rlower-bloc: 1 (the alliance of dominant 
'" 
classes and class-fractions), giving rise to shifts in state urba~ 
policy(100). Ile referred specifically to fiscal policy, influx-
efflux control ancl ' 7 th.e Bantustan policies11 ( 101). 
There are two crucial issues which Bloch said he was unable to 
address in this discussion. The first concerns the way in which 
management-reproduction policies - in their 
economic, political and ideological dimensions -
have been tied to wages and wage policies (and 
hence to the value of labour-power), the 
allocation of land and the non-extension of 
political rights(102), 
while the second lacuna is the question whether 
the influx and efflux control and labour 
allocation measures taken in the second half of 
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the 1960 1 s •••. did reflect the ~rowing weight of 
monopoly capital in the power-bloc(103). 
The second Africa Persnective article is Cohen's less ambitious 
but equally thought-provoking account of the way in which Benoni's 
African workers forged a working-class culture during the 1930 1 s. 
They did this by enga-ging in struggle against "the forces of 
capital and state which shaped and controlled the lives of working 
people". Cohen argued that "regional and local histories are an 
essential prerequisite towards a full analysis of the history and 
nature of the South African working class: 1(104), and he showed 
empirically "how particular local conditions gave rise to a 
particular response from the local Council and to particular forms 
of working class resistance 11 • He drew the obvious conclusion that 
the day-to-day struggles between the working class 
and the local authority need to be accounted for, 
and examined in the context of wider national 
struggles, when the history of the working class 
in South Africa comes to be written(105). 
Koch and La Hausse have subsequently made significant contributions 
to the further development of South African regional urban 
historiography. Their unpublished Master's theses examined the 
position of Africans in respectively Johannesburg(106) and 
Durban(107) during the pre-war years. These works clearly embody 
the conviction that painstaking and theoretically informed empirical 
work is a prerequisite to the resolution of major theoretical 
• 
problems concerning for example segregationism, race versus class 
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and the role of the South African state. Koch and La Hausse 
displayed an admirable sensitivity to the dynamics of the 
historical process, avoiding on the one hand the temptation to 
focus upon and generalize from mere moments within this process, 
and on the other the imposition upon the historical process of 
ready-made and inevitably restrictive conceptual grids. 
This study of Africans in Cape Town seeks both methodologically 
and conceptually to complement the work of Koch and La Hausse, 
thereby contributing to the understanding of the origins and early 
development of urban segregation and resistance in South Africa. 
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant historical background, showing 
how a sizeable African population came to be established in Cape 
Town. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the local development of the policy 
of urban residential segregation. 'l'he growing "Native Problem" is 
) 
outlined in chapter 3, while the emerging solution to this problem 
is discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 traces the development of 
the policies of influx control and squatter control. 1rhe 
development of resistance to theoe policies is discussed in 
chapter c. Chapter 7, the conclusion, assesses the significance 
of this study and suggests directions for further research. This 
concluding chapter inoludes a brief discussion of the manner in 
which the present study diverges from previous studies, including 
those of Koch and La Hausse. 
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CHAPTER 2: 'rHE HIB'l'ORICAL BACKGHOUND 
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century 
the developing city of Cape Town and the lives of all its 
inhabitants were profoundly transformed by the growth of the local 
transport infrastructure and the first stirrings of secondary 
industrialization. While this process was clearly influenced by 
factors snecific to the Western Cape, it was crucially shaped by 
broader forces in the colonial and global political economy. 
The rapid expansion of the British textile industry provided the 
initial stimulus for accelerated local urban development. The 
greatly increased volume of Cape wool exports from the 1840•s 
onwards resulted in a marked expansion of the Colony's rudimentary 
communications-network(1). Hoad, rail and telegraph-line 
construction proceeded apace, and the Cape's first shipping-dock 
(the Alfred Basin in Table Bay) was opened in 1870. At the same 
time, commercial and embryonic industrial activity increased 
considerably, especially once British capital began pouring into 
the Colony with the 11 diamond boom 11 which followed the discovery 
of the precious stones in the interior. The 24 joint-stock 
companies that had existed in Cape Town in 1860(2) had more than 
doubled by the early 1b80•s(3), while a belt of industry developed 
along Dock Road during the 1870's(4). 
Economic expansion was temporarily re~arded by the severe depression 
of 1882-1886, the fundamental cause of which was 11 an over-abundance 
of capital thrust on to an unsophisticated economy, incapable of 




industry in the Transvaal, however, soon resuscitated the Cape's 
economy. The construction of a modern local urban infrastructure 
accelerated during the 1890 1 s and early 1900 1 s, with the completion 
of Cape Town's first power-stations, new water-reservoirs, 
sophisticated sewerage and storm-water drainage systems, an 
extensive street-paving programme and an electric-tram network(6). 
By 1908 Olive Jchreiner could rep6rt that Gape Town was 11 destroyed 
by the smoke of bad coal from tall chimneystt ( 7). 'rhis was the 
most industrially-advanced city in South Africa at the time of 
Union in 1910, but local development was thereafter ripidly eclipsed 
by the industrialization of the Rand(8). Nevertheless, the total 
of 21,000 workers employed in local industry in 1916/17 had 
increased to 31,700 by 1920(9), due to the stimulating effects of 
the First World War. 
Africans played a major role in this first phase of local 
construction and industrialization. Although as late as 1916 
"Africans made up only 4% of the industrial labour forcetr(10), 
their contribution as unskilled heavy manual labourers was vital 
to the construction of the infrastructure on which industrial 
development and capital accumulation denended. The vast majority\ 
'\ 
of local Africans were then (as now) Xhosa-speakers, drawn from 
the reserves of Transkei and Ciskei hundreds of miles away in the' 
Eastern Cape. 
~risin~'~nitially out of the dynamic relationships of power and 
authority within rural society as much as from the specific 
demands of capital 11 ( 11), the flow of migrant labour was 
subsequently largely determined by the consolidation of a 
relationship of structural dependency between rural periphery and 
urban centre. As this chapter explains, the chronic labour-
shortage that arose with the emancipation of slaves in 1838 was 
ameliorated throughout this period by the importation of Xhosa~ 
speaking unskilled workers from t.he Xhosa reserves. 
The Local Labour-Shortage and the ~roletarianization of the 
A ma-Xhosa 
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A number of Mfengu who presented themselves at the local police 
station at the end of Jeptember 1839 seem to have been the first 
African settlers officially recorded as havin~ voluntari~made their 
way to the end of the long wagon-road from Xhosaland. These 
refugees from the turmoil on the frontier (in the stormy period 
between the sixth and the seventh of the century-long series of 
wars which dispossessed the Ama Xhosa) had passes issued by a 
frontier magistrate in terms of Ordinance 49 of 1828, allowing 
them to enter the colony and seek employment. The Police 
Superintendent countersigned their passes as they requested, but 
being unaccustomed to such matters, he wrote to his superiors for 
further instructions and was told to regard their presence as 
legal 11 until further instructions be givent1(12). 
Saunders shows that the twenty to forty inhabitants of the half-
dozen or -so self-built huts comprising the little 11I<'ingo location" 
that was soon established at the foot of Table Mountain were 
provided with religious instruction, medical attention and even 
pauper relief when temporarily unemployed(13). This encouragement 
seems to have been motivated by the hope that the further voluntary 
settlement of Xhosa-speakers, most of whom were employed for rough 
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work in the harbour , would help to ease the serious local labour-
shortage. 
Within two years of the slaves' emancipation, aspirant capitalists 
were petitioning the Secretary of citate for the Colonies to the 
effect that the Cape offered i•a wide field for the profitable 
employment of •••• capital and labour11 , if only the labour-shortage 
could be remedied by the importation of a large number of British 
labourers(14). Unattractive wages and working conditions, 
together with the element of coercion retained in production 
relations in terms of the Masters and Servants Act, resulted in 
marked reluctance to engage in formal employment on the part of 
potential workers. The collapse of the export wine trade 
simultaneously created considerable opportunities to earn a living 
outside of the sphere of formal employment, and by 1842 there were 
approximately three hundred and sixty she beens (or ''unlicenced 
houses") in Cape Town(15). 
More than four thousand British immigrants arrived in Cape Town 
between 1846 and 1851, but they 11 did not supply the want of 
labourers, because they rapidly rose to the position of 
employers 11 (16). Free labour could not be procured to perform some 
of the heavy manual work that had previously been reserved for 
slaves. Mozambican "prize negroes" from Portuguese slave-ships 
captured as they rounded the Cape(17) and prisoners convicted of 
crim~s which presumably included pass offences and armed 
rebellion(18) were assigned to sanitary duties on the municipal 
"town carts", to conGtruction work on the government's road-
building programme and to heavy labour at the docks. By 1857 
however, disease, desertion and the expiring of indentures 
had drastically reduced the number of 11 Mozambiques 11 available for 
employment(19) and the municipal "overseer of sheets" prophesized' 
that there was "now a likelihood of their places being supplied 
J
lThe proletarianization of the Arna-Xhosa had been advanced with the 
)imposition in 1855 of a hut-tax of ten shillings per annum, 
} 
apparently to pay the salaries of the chiefs and the police who 
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maintained order in the Transkei. Governor 3ir George Grey observed 
early in 1858 that "it is not an easy task to bring a race of 
independent high-spirited barbarians to the state in which they 
cheerfully pay taxes 11 (21), but by mid-year he was able to report 
to London that the last Xhosa resistance to taxation had been 
stamped out(22). A series of Native Location Acts, including 
Acts 2 of 1869, 6 of 1876 and 37 of 1884, subsequently rationalized 
and extended the hut-tax system(23). Long before these measures 
could begin to register any notable effect on the labour market, 
however, the local dearth of heavy manual workers was temporarily 
relieved by the suicidal Xhosa cattle-killing episode of 1857. 
Among the many applications for Xhosa labour directed to the 
Colonial Secretary in this period was one from the secretary of 
the Cape Town municipality, who stated that 
the great scarcity of labourers in this city, 
rendering it difficult for the Commissioners of 
the Municipality of Cape Town to obtain a 
sufficient number of men for their public works, 
and having ascertained that many Caffres,, •t 
present in a state of destitution, are desirous 
of obtaining employment in this Colony, they have 
instructed me to request you to represent to His 
Excellency the Governor, that if His Excellency 
would cause to be brought down to Cape Town a 
number of those men, they would be glad to engage 
the services of from fifty to a hundred of them 
for public works(24). 
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Approximately two thousand Xhosas were in fact shipped to Cape Town 
in the wake of this disaster,which has been subjected to widely 
differing interpretations by Theal(25), Walker(26), 
Hodgson ·(27) and Mnguni(28). Most of these victims of the ''cattle-
killing" were indentured (many as families) to local farmers and 
other employers, while hundreds who had been convicted on the 
frontier of such offences as the theft of food were imprisoned and 
employed without remuneration (and much against their will) on the 
public works of the local and central government. Besides road-
building and the construction of such landmarks as the Roeland 
Street.Gaol and the South African Library building, Xhosa convicts 
built the Suburban railway line and the Alfred Dock and its 
breakwater(29). 
Once they had com~leted their terms of indenture or served their 
prison sentences, these unfortunates either "applied for passes 
to go back to Kaffir-land 11 (30) or took their chances in a town in 
which "the people (were) burrowing and sleeping in holes and 
corners'' ( 31). Some were evidently able to secure accommodation 
/ 
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in the back-streets, and "Kaffirs" occupying an overcrowded 11 abode 11 
in Rogge Bay were stricken by smallpox in ~eptember 1858(32) during 
an epidemic which claimed two thousand lives in the Peninsula(33). 
In December a small group of destitute "Kaffir squatters who had 
completed their terms of service and desire E1J to be sent back to 
Kaffir-landi' established a camp near the Amsterdam Battery, into 
which they were soon removed. It is unclear whether these men, 
women and children were given passages back to their devastated 
kraals, or whether they were simply sent out to new masters(34). 
The local demand for labour declined during the depression of the 
1860 1 s, only to re-emerge once the Kimberley diamond-rush had begun 
to lift the economy out of the doldrums. A committee of enquiry 
into the 11 Native ~uestion'' in 1869 suggested that the Colony's 
chronic labour-shoPtage could be relieved by the annexation of the 
11Transkeian territories:r and the imposition of increased taxation 
on the 11 Natives 1'(35). 'l'he accelerating diamond-rush drew increasing 
numbers of workers off the relatively labour-intensive wine and 
wheat farms of the Western Cape, and Stellenbosch farmers sought 
the government's assurance in December 1872 that convi·cts would 
be used on the planned extension of. the Cape Town-Wellington 
railway. It was argued that the use of free labour would aggravate 
an already intolerable situation, but the farmers were informed 
that convicts were simply not available. Agents were trying to 
recruit labour at the mission stations and it would hopefully be 
possible nto introduce Native labour fror.1 beyond the Colony''( 36). 
A Public Works Department labour-agent was able to reach a 
mutually satisfactory agreement with a Mfengu chief from the 
Ciskei (the farmer 11 Crown Colony 11 of. British Kaffraria, which had 
been annexed in 1865(37))and hundreds oP1Fingoe~'~ere consequently 
brought down to work on the Western Line of railway at the end of 
1875(38). These workers were presumably housed in tents that 
could be moved along as the work progressed, as had apparently 
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been the case with the road-building programme in British Kaffraria 
during the 1850 1 s(39). The labour-shortage remained in evidence 
throughout the Colony, even on the diamond-fields after the 
initial 11 rush11 had ended(40). In the Eastern Cape where the 
situation was said to be less serious due to the close proximity 
of the Xhosa territories of Ciskei and Transkei(41), the shortage 
of labour remained a problem, for "black workers •••• improved 
their terms of labour by refusing to leave home for waged work 
until better terms were offered11 (42). More than seven hundred 
11 Mozambiques 11 were transported to Cape Town during 1876 and 187'/ 
by labour agents and by the government, to be indentured on 
Western Cape farms(43), _and a further four hundred and forty 
were imported in 1876 to work on the Western railways(44). 
Minister of Public Works John X Merriman laconically observed that 
in the Cape the government is called on to •survey 
mankind from China to Peru' in the hope of creating 
and maintaining a class of cheap labourers, who 
will thankfully accept the position of helots, and 
not be troubled with the inconvenient ambition of 
bettering their conditions(45). 
The official report from which this quotation was taken noted 
52 
that unsuccessful attempts had been made to import Italian labour 
from 3outh America as well as Chinese labour from the Orient. 
Little confidence was expressed in the continued importation of 
"Mozambiques'1 , and the report concluded that the most promising 
source of labour was the "large masses of Natives within and 
immediately beyond our colonial borders". The introduction of 
11 European wants" and of individual land tenure were expected to 
impel growing numbers of Xhosas onto the labour market(46). 
The problem however was too acute to await solution through th~ 
slow and contradictory diffusion of capitalist economic relations. 
It demanded drastic and immediate action, in the form of the final 
conquest of the Arna-Xhosa after one hundred years of military 
resistance. This was accomplished when nin the early months of 
1878, imperial as well as colonial troops, with Mfengu and Tembu 
allies under white officers" crushed the Gcaleka paramount Sarili 
(Kreli) and his Ngqika allies( 47). The 'l'ranskei was then gradually 
annexed: Fingoland, Idutywa and Griqualand East in 1878; Port 
St Johns in 1884; Tembuland, Gcalekaland and Bomvanaland in 1885; 
the Xesibe tract in 1886, and finally Pondoland in 1894(48). 
Government Notice No 222 of 25 February 1878 invited prospective 
employers to apply for "Native labour" which would be contracted 
for a period of three years and six months. The Secretary for 
Native Affairs warned in the 1:otice that 
there may be difficulties in obtaining single 
persons for servic~, but it is believed that no 
difficulties will be found in meeting the 
applications of such as are prepared to take 
whole families. 
During the contracted period, employers would be responsible for 
feeding, sheltering and clothing the labourers and their families, 
in return for wages that rose from nothing at all for the first 
six months to the princely sum of ten shillings per month for the 
final year( 49). Saunders says that 11 between April 1878 and January 
1879, nearly four thousand Africans from the Ciskei and Transkei 
who had been caught up in the war were transported to the Western 
Cape by the Government"(50). As had been the case with the 
previous mass-importation of Xhosa-speaking labour in 1857, most 
were indentured in the town and surrounding villages or on outlying 
wine and wheat farms, while hundreds who had been convicted of 
transgressing the colonial law were housed in the Convict Barracks 
at the Docks. Many of the men were a~parently 9ersuaded to accept 
indentures by the simple expedient of transporting their wives and 
children to Cape Town and waiting for the men to volunteer to 
follow(51). Saunders notes a high desertion rate and reveals that 
"some Africans (had) walked to Cape Town from the eastern districts 
of the colony in search of relatives whom the government had 
trans:oorted there"(52). 
After complaints had been voiced about indigent Africans begging 
in the streets(53) and squatting near the military hospital(54), 
at least one shipload of "chiefly aged or decrepit individuals, 
who could not be indentured to masters in the Western Districts, 
being useless as labourers or work-neople 11 wa.s marched under armed 
guard aboard a ship bound. for East London. The vigorous protests 
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of two women among this group are recorded. One "threatened to 
destroy herself 11 (55). Forced re•)atriation had not yet however 
become a routine procedure, and the settlement of Xhosa-speaking 
time-expired labourers and nrisoners, with their families, beyond 
the eastern border of the municipality soon became a matter of 
grave concern. 0mallpox and the determined efforts of the 
Woodstock Hunicipality (formed in June 1882 11 in part to deal with 
the Kaffir problem"(56)) soon drove these people into District Six, 
where they erected makeshift huts or crowded into pestiferous 
tenements in the back streets. 
Their sojourn in District Six was to prove short-lived, for their 
political impotence and the extremely low level of their wages 
excluded them from the benefits of the urban development which 
accelerated along the line of settlement from Sea Point to Wynberg 
and beyond once the depression began lifting after the discovery 
of gold in the Transvaal. District 0ix itself grew quickly after 
about 1885, with building lots being la.id out and labourers 
cottages springing up in newly-paved streets(57). Rapid 
population-growth produced intense competition in the housing 
market,_and organized white labour began agitating for the 
establishment of a strictly-controlled "Native location" (this' 
will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter). 
Large employers were simultaneously becoming increasingly 
disenchanted with "free11 African labour. Although migrant wages 
were already low, employers looked enviously to the north, where 
the benefits of compounded labour in terms of discipline and cost 
had been demonstrated. By 1888, Kimberley's compound-system had 
''entirely superseded the former method of lodging Kafirs in 
unenclosed quarters 11 ( 58). 'l'he local Harbour Board apparently built 
a new compound in the docks in 1ts84(59), and started using Hfengu 
migrant-labour from the Transkei on a regular basis(60). 
Hundreds of Xhosa-speaking dockworlrnrs from District Six were 
dismissed in the early 1890 1 s after they had refused to move 
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without their families into this compound, where men slept on the 
floor on sacks( 61). ·rhe municipality similarly dismissed a large 
proportion of the Xhosa migrant-labourers ~ngaged in the construction 
of the Woodhead Reservoir on top of Table Mountain after a 
threatened strike for higher wages~ These men were apparently 
replaced by unemployed farm-workers from Worcester(62). 
By 1893, the local labour-shortage was said to be worse than it 
had ever been(63). Although Merriman (by that stage promoted to 
treasurer of the Colony and Commissioner for Lands, Mines and 
fiublic Works) expressed his 11 doubt whether the Western Province 
will ever be satisfied with tlie Kaffir. He is a savage and is 
just about as inferior to the Cape boys as we are superior to the 
Cape boys"(64), it seems to have been generaliy agreed that·from a 
pragmatic point of view 
h.aving such a large amount of Na ti ve Jabour on 
our borders, our first duty should be to try and 
get them to take service and derive some benefit 
from their labour to the Colony, rather than trying 
to get people from abroad(65). 
The employment of greater numbers of "Kaffirs 11 on public works and 
in the docks was in fact widely propagated as the only way in which 
the "Cape boys 11 could be kept on the farms(66). The City Engineer 
called for the introduction of 11 class legislationn, which had (he 
noted) successfully forced the Natal "Kaffirs: 1 onto the labour 
market(67). 
'I·he required legislation was not long in coming, for Prime Minister 
Rhodes was adamant that 
every black man cannot have three acres and a cow. 
We have to iace the question and it must be brought 
home to them that in the future nine-tenths of them 
will have to spend their lives in daily labour, in 
physical work, in manual labour(68). 
It was in this spirit that the Glen Grey Act (which provided for 
the allocation of allotments that were too small ~o maintain 
subsistence) was passed in 1894, and extended in the same year 
from Glen Grey to the districts of ·~dutywa, Tsomo, Butterworth and 
Ngamakwe. The effects of this measure were compounded and 
accelerated by the devastating rinderpest cattle-disease epidemic 
of 1896-1897. Many thousands of Xhosas were driven off their land, 
and the Transkei and Ciskei reserves were within one generation 
transformed into mere labour-re3ervoirs, whose continued 
underdevelopment had become a necessary corollary of capitalist 
development in Cape Town and elsewhere. 
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There was consequently a massive influx into Cape Town, where 
the number of Africans reached ten thousand by the turn of the 
century. '3egregationist agitation simultaneously reached a 
crescendo, resulting in 1901 in the establishment of a ''Native 
location° at Uitvlugt (later renamed Ndabeni). The local African 
population was forcibly removed into this location, which was the 
first officially segregated residential area in the Peninsula(69). 
The supply of unskilled manual labour was then for the first time 
(except for brief periods of depression) greater than the demand. 
Employers were not slow to take advantage of this new situation, 
and the Harbour Board, for example, finally succeeded in 1903 
in lowering wages at the docks from four shillings and sixpence 
to four shillings per day. This was accomplished by using the 
residents of the newly-established "Native location11 as 
strikebreakers(70). Local employers generally were clearly able 
to follow suit, and wages seem in fact· to have been reduced still 
further, for in 1918 (when the "Black October" influenza epidemic 
temporarily disturbed the unskilled labour market) minimum wages 
were reportedly raised to four shillings per day after a 11 Native 
Deputation11 had conferred with representatives of local and central 
government and of local employers 1 organizations(71). 
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The enforced protectionism induced by the First World War stimulated 
the local production of consumer goods, ending the centuries-long 
era during which industrial development had been restricted to the 
processing of agricultural raw materials(72). According to Nicol, 
Africans comprised about 14% of the industrial labour-force by the 
mid-1920's(73). Ten thousand Africans were officially employed in 
Cape Town by August 1927(74). The Great Depression of 1930-33 
resulted in a degree of concentration and centralization of 
capital, with the number of industrial establishments declining 
while industry as a whole tended to become increasingly capital-
intensive and mechanized(75). However those Africans who were 
formally employed seem to have remained largely confined to labour 
intensive sectors such as quarrying and construction(76), and the 
local African population continued to expand. The 1936 census 
r~corded 14,160 Africans in Cape Town(77), and this official total 
had increased to 18,500 by 1939(78). 'I'hese census figures are of 
course notoriously unreliable, and it is safe to assume that they 
exclude the majority of people rendered 11 illegal 11 by the adoption 
of measures discussed in the following three chapters. 
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CHAPTSR 3: THS D.;:VELOPM~NT OF :rm~ ;JQLICY OF URBAN RESIDZNTIAL 
8EGRSGATION IN CAPS TO~N 
PART 1 : THE GROdING 11 NXTIV3 i?ROBL.:!:M" 
The process of urban growth traced in the previous cha~ter closely 
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approximated colonial patterns elsewhere in sub-Saharan Afric~ ~n/J. 
terms of regional unevenness and dependency. On the whole, cities 
developed in European enclaves, where Africans were "denied a 
permanent stake in urban life 11 (1). Roberts has observed still 
more generally that ''the urban system in underdeveloped countries 
is •.•• organized to exclude much of the population from its material 
benefits" and that peripheral states tend to rely on 11 coercion as 
a means of capitalist development rather than on the integration 
of the ur~an population through democratic politics or the direct 
improvement of the standard of living 11 (2). In all of these respects, 
the South African urban experience w~s .typical. Indeed, colonial I/ 
south for administrators in many parts of the sub-continent looked 
their models of racial urban development(3). 
Chapter 2 also noted that the policy of urban residential 
segregation was inaugurated in Cape Town during the 1901 plague 
epidemic, when the city's first officially segregated residential 
A area was established~ the Afri"can location at Ui tvlugt, which was 
{)soon renamed Ndabeni. 3owever, this was by no means the first 
instance of urban residential segregation in what was then the Cape 
Colony. A 11 Native Strangers' location" had, for example, been 
established at Port Elizabeth in 1855( 4). Grahams town 1 s "l!1 ingo 
location" was set aside in 1856(5), while "Native locations were 
established in Worcester and Queenstown by 1873 and 1879 
respectively(6). Cook and Opland suggest that the establishment 
of the first "Native location11 at East London in about 1860 was 
due to the white inhabitants having "memories of the frontier wars 
uppermost in their minds and an idea of Blacks as hostile, cruel, 
murderous and barbaric"(?). 
So far as Africans in Cape Town are concerned, Saunders has in two 
seminal papers sketched the broad outlines of the development of 
the process of residential segregation. He has traced the 
appearance of what was referred to in the racist parlance of the 
time as a 11 Kaffir problem" in Woodstock in the late 1870 1 s, and 
followed the subsequent movement of Africans from Woodstock to 
District Six and the central City Slums as a result of harassment 
by the newly-formed Woodstock municipality. In particular, his 
6? 
work has cast valuable light on the evolution of the local location-
system, specifically Ndabeni and its successor Langa, opened in 
1927(8). The following sections of this chapter take these two 
studies as their starting point, but also seek to embroider the 
fabric of his account with more detail, while also teasing out the 
class interests involved. 
Woodstock 
Historical analysis of the local development of the segregation-
policy must begin in Woodstock in the late 187o•s(9). Thousands 
of Xhosa men, women and children had by that stage been shipped 
down to Cape Town, particularly in the wake of the 1857 11 cattle-
killing11 and of the final Frontier ;liar in 1878, to be indentured 
at extremely low wages in the de•eloping town and its surrounding 
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villages and on Western Cape farws. In the ~ame period, hundreds 
of Xhosa-speaking men were caught up in the colonial judicial 
system, and transformed into convicts who laboured without 
remuneration on local capital works. 
Many of these men, once they had served their sentences or 
completed their terms of indenture, found employment as day-
labourers at the docks and elsewhere. Their low wages prevented 
these "free'' Africans from occupying accommodation in Cape Town, 
\ 
where the municipality was enforcing strict regulations against 
overcrowding in an effort to "create a dernand for healthy housesH{10) 
and thus overcome the working-class housing crisis that had arisen 
in 1840 with the emancipation of the slaves(11). A witness 
complained to the 1879 3elect Committee on the Supply of the Labour 
Market that many 11Kaffirs 11 employed by the government in the docks 
and on the railways wer~ allowed to hire land and thus live 
independently(12). 
Soon a 11Kaffir Problem:• arose beyond the town's eastern boundary, 
on the estates of Papendorp (between the upper and lower main 
roads); Woodstock, Leliebloem, Altona and Roodebloem (above the 
upper main road) and in the hamlet of Salt River (immediately 
beyond Roodebloem). These areas were beginning then to develop 
from "open fields beautiful at times with masses of pink sorrel 
and white daisies 11 into quarters where 11 local and immigrant 
artisans by the hundred made their homes''• Coates says that the 
first sale of building lots in fapendorp took place in 1845, but 
that (despite the establishment of a police station and a post 
office), there were only a few houses in the area by 1860(13). 
Woodstock and Altona began being cut up into building lots in 
1874(14) and "the big estates were sub-divided and changed hands 
rapidly from 1880. Houses sprang up neither following a plan nor 
possessing a water-supply nor drainage 11 ( 15). It was into some of 
these rude cottages as well as into stables, outbuildings and self-
built shacks in the area that the freed Africans moved. 
The white inhabitants of the area were anything but welcoming 
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towards their poverty-stricken new black neighbours, and after fever 
had broken out in June 18?9 11among some Africans living on land 
sublet to them in Papendorp where they were 'huddled together in 
miserable cottages''', a piece of waste-ground between Salt River 
station and the upper main road was set aside as a 11Kaffir location'', 
where the erection of self-built huts was permitted(16). Africans 
could not however be compelled to move into this unofficial location, 
as the necessary government proclamation had not been issued. An 
offer of space in the location was in fact declined by the African· 
residents of Altona and Roodebloem, and a "Kafir Depot 11 official 
concluded that "they prefer to live free, rather than under any 
possible restraint in a location11 (17). 
Forty-nine (presumably "white") residents of Salt :River petitioned 
the House of Assembly in 1881, complaining of the "danger, 
annoyance and inconvenience they suffer through the number of 
Kafirs that have been allowed to locate themselves 11 in the area. 
There were said to be one hundred and fifty 11Kafirs 11 in Altona, 
almost one hundred in Roodebloem and about two hundred in the 
1'location near the main road 11 (18). Racial feelings were infiamed 
to the point where a i'mob" attacked African dwellings in Papendorp, 
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and letters to the press complained of a 11 savage people 11 having 
been "forced on the town 11 (19). Coates writes of "bla~k vagrants 
who had a stronghold in the vicinity of the military lines from 
where they launched murderous attacks on the residents'' and he 
suggests that it was suicidal for whites to venture out at night(20). 
One can only speculate that this h~gh degree of racial antipathy 
resulted not only from cultural differences magnified by fresh 
memories of war, but also from unemployment and competition for 
the scarce resource of housing. Certain landlords seem to have 
favoured African tenants, who were forced to accept fa~ lower 
standards of accommodation and higher levels of overcrowding than 
other tenants, thus providing the possibility of a better return 
on capital invested. 
Calls for the establishment of an official location grew increasingly 
strident as the conditions under which·Africans were living in the 
area deteriorated with their accelerating influx. Fears of an 
imminent epidemic became more and more pronounced. These fears 
proved well-founded, for the 1882 smallpox epidemic affected five 
hundred people in Woodstock(21), and killed a total of four 
thousand in the whole Peninsula(22). Many of the Woodstock victims 
were Africans, among whom the spread of the disease was facilitated 
by neglect on the part of the authorities. Lombaard cites an 
accusation of "Murdern made against the 11 local authorities 11 after 
"absolutely nothing" had been done to halt the spreading of 
' smallpox in the 11 b1ack location above the .:>alt River station11 (23). 
Mrs Sarah Short, who owned a number of properties occupied by 
Africans in the area, evidently experienced considerable difficulty 
?1 
in procuring medical aid and burial facilities from the new 
Woodstock municipality when the disease began taking its toll among 
her tenants(24). The ~olice Commissioner of Cape Town complained 
to the under Colonial .Secretary in October 1882 that 11Kaffira11 
living in infected houses in Woodstock were working in the Alfred 
docks every day(25), but nothing seems to have been done about 
this(26). 
The devastating effects of this epidemic, together with the 
establishment in the area of a local government apparatus that 
applied itself diligently to the task, proved sufficient to remove 
the Africans from Woodstock without a location having to be 
officially proclaimed. According to Laidler, 11 In 1881 it was 
decided to form the hamlets Pependorp, Altona, Roodebloem, 
Woodstock, Leliebloem and Salt River with the surrounding houses 
into a municipality11 (27). This amalgamation was effected in June 
1882 '1in part to deal with the 1Kafir problem:lt28). Section six 
of the municipal regulations of the new Woodstock municipality 
provided for a ten pound fine for the "keeper of any lodging house, 
location or kraal for Kafirs that is a nuisance 11 • This section 
also empowered the municipality to set aside land for an official 
Native location and to appoint a location superintendent. 
"Natives'' would be compelled to live in this proposed loc.ation at 
a quartely rental of three pounds per adult male occupier of a 
hut(29). The new municipality then began acting against the owners 
of properties occupied by Africans. In July, for example, Mrs 
Short was informed that legal proceedings would be instituted 
against her unless her 11 property at Roodebloem, occupied by Kafirs" 
was provided with a water-closet within fourteen days and measures 
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taken to reduce overcrowding(30). 
In ~eptember, the municipality formally urged the government to 
establish a lo ca ti on and thus place the nKafirs'' under_ proper 
supervision, isolated from the other inhabitants. 1rheir lack of 
decent clothing and of basic sanitary facilities was considered 
particularly offensive. It was reported that the majority of the 
African men in ~oodstodk had recently been discharged from the 
convict barracks at the docks, where they continued to work as 
labourers(31). The municipality was told, however, that the 
government was not responsible, under the 1876 Native Locations 
Act, for the establishment of locations within municipal boundaries. 
This was the responsibility of the municipality, which was advised 
also to promulgate sanitary regulations and to request the 
enforcement within its area of the 1881 Police Offences Act, in 
order to prevent Africans from appearin~ in public with insufficient 
clothing(32). 
The Police Offences Act was extended to ~oodstock from the beginning 
of November(33), but by that time smallpox had apparently greatly 
reduced t·he African population of the area. In addition, v/oodstock 
municipality had followed Cape 1'own municipality's example by 
appointing a street-keeper, whose duties included the inspection 
of premises for overcrowding(34). Soon the Gape Times was able 
to report that ''satisfactory results' had been achieved by the 
prosecution of property owners who were contravening municipal 
regulations. ~oodstock was then growing fast, two hundred and 
fifty houses having been built between mid-1882 and mid-1883, 
while the number of voters increased from two hundred to nine 
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hundred in the same period(35). 
Africans had still not been completely cleared out of Woodstock, 
and the ubiquitous Mrs Short (who was reported in May 1883 to have 
provided sanitary facilities at one of her properties on the low~r 
main road opposite the Woodstock Hotel by simply blocking off an 
alleyway and obliging her African tenants to use this as a 
toilet(36)), was warned after a particularly boisterous weekend 
in March 1884 that any recurrence of the disturbance among her 
African tenants at Altona would result in legal action being taken 
against her(37). In April and May of 1885, the municipality was 
very concerned about overcrowding among Africans in houses belonging 
to a Mr Dadabhoy(38). There were also, for example, a number of 
11Kafirs: 1 in a certain ''small shed 11 who were considered a 
nuisance( 39). 
There seems to be no reference to Africans living in Woodstock 
between 1885 and 1393, when an enterprising journalist was able 
to discover one dwelling that was still occupied by Africans. 
This was a shebeen hidden away in a little street on the Cape Town 
side of Woodstock station. It was reported that "Kafirs" had been 
a problem in Woodstock a dozen years previously but that they had 
subsequently been 11 cleared out 01 ( 40). 
District Six 
Saunders says that most of the Africans from Woodstock moved 
onto a tract of land between the east end of the 
city and Zonnebloem College, known - we do not 
know why - as the Orange Free State. Because this 
land belonged to the Qovernment and not to either 
the Cape Town or Woodstock municipalities, Africans 
were able to live there virtually free of official 
supervision(41). 
This area was soon incorporated within the expanding town's sixth 
district, the upper part of which was beginning to be developed 
after about 1885. Building lots were marked out and labourers' 
cottages sprang up in newly laid-out streets and lanes(42). Here 
numerous Africans found shelter, as they did also in the teeming 
slums of older-established areas such as the lower part of District 
Six (around Harrington and Barrack Streets), the upper Long and 
Loop street area with its warren of alieys and lanes, and the 
dockside area around Waterkant atreet. 
Concerned citizens continued, as they had done for many years, to 
publicize the deteriorating conditions in these areas(43). The 
committee of the Free Dispensary stressed the link between the 
health of the poor and their living conditions(44), and the Town 
Council, which was at first non~lussed by the extent of the 
problem(45), began acting against landlords through its sanitation 
department(46). 'rhe faterson L.:ommittee was appointed by the 
Council early in 1893 to investigate the whole question of slums 
and the acute local housing shortage(4'7). A ''Native Barracks" 
was built on the recommendation of this committee, but it was 
handed over to the Salvation Army on completion in 1897, and was 
never used for its intended purpose(4o). It served instead to 
accommodate some of the growing number of local 11 poor whites". 
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The accelerating influx of Africans after 1896(49) threatened to 
reduce more white workers to this lowly status by edging them out 
of the labour and housing markets. As early as 1892 the Cape 
Register reported an '1 enormous increase:1 in the number of white 
vagrants, and attributed this to unskilled whites being made 
redundant by employers who preferred 11 the more degraded black 11 ( 50). 
The majority of local white workers, however, were artisans for 
whom the threat from unskilled Africans was not on the labour front 
but in the field of housing. 
The Cape Register reported in 1692 that mechanics arriving from 
England with their families could not easily find suitable 
accommodation(51), and observed in early 1893 that while the 
u1ower middle class 11 increased in numbers every month, 11 little is 
done to provide for it in the way of suitable dwellingsn(52). 
'rhe following year a Cape Argus editorial drew attention once again 
to 11 the need of suitable, even decent, dwellings for the Cape Town 
artisan" and noted that 11 the influx of mechanics and artisans in 
recent years has been very great"(53). By 1899 it was renorted 
to be 11 difficult for white workers to find accommodation in the 
eastern part of town 11 ( 54). The Hadical Officer of Heal th observed 
that 
owing to the remunerative nature of the Kafir 
lodger (he requires only the barest accommodation 
I 
and pays on an average about 2/- per week - one room 
therefore with twenty Kafir lodgers brings in 
about £8 per month), there is an increasing 
tendency to let houses for this purpose, thus 
displacing the more civilized artisan population(55). 
The white artisans(56) in the eastern part of town (particularly 
in District Six) began to organize in defence of their interests 
in the housing market. Predictably, due to the historical and 
social context, their cam~aign centred around the dema~d 
(expressed for the most part in offensively racist terms) for the 
removal of Africans to a location(57). In mid-1898, the South 
African Working Mens' Progressive Union urged the Town Council to 
provide a nKafir location11 (58). The municipality, which had been 
represented on a Cape Mayoral Congress~special committee that had 
called on the government in 1895 to empower municipalities to 
establish locations(59), promptly appointed a joint committee of 
streets regulation and sanitation committee members to decide on 
a suitable site(60). This committee duly reported that the old 
quarry at the top of Strand Street was the most likely site(61), 
but the suggestion was opposed by a deputation representing white 
workers from District Six which in August 1898 urged the Town 
Councii to remove Africans from town to a location in Salt River 
or Maitland(62). This deputation presented the Council with a 
petition signed by 809 residents(63), requesting that 11 measures 
be taken in Districts 5 and u to prevent them being rendered unfit 
for the habitation of the respectable working classes by reason 
of the herding of Kafirs therein 11 ( 64). 
The Town Council thereupon sent a deputation to confer with Prime 
Minister Sir Gordon Sprigg, who agreed that a location would have 
to be established and undertook to order a Native Affairs 
Department report on possible sites. It was unanimously accepted 
at this meeting that the establishment of a location would have a 
beneficial effect on the local labour market, as it would ensure 
employers of a plentiful supply of good, cheaF labour(65). The 
:Prime i·1inister voiced his conviction that ·'the dwelling together 
of Natives and Europeans was not possible, in this or any other 
country. The races must be se11arated11 (66). At that stage it was 
however already clear that the municipality was not prepared to 
accept sole responsibility for the establishment and maintenance 
of the proposed location(67). 
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White residents of areas mentioned as possible location sites were 
predictably unhappy at this prospect. There was much agitation, 
leading up to a meeting in Woodstock between representativ~s of 
Woodstock, Sea Point, Rondebosch, Mowbray, Maitland and Claremont 
municipalities. This meeting, at which Cape Town municipality was 
not represented, agreed on the necessity for a location, but decided 
that as the majority of local Africans lived and worked in Cape 
Town, the location should be sited within the Cape Town municipal 
area. Maitland municipality in particular objected to its area 
being used as a "dumping ground 11 (68). 
Six weeks later it was reported that delegates of these suburban 
municipalities had decided (presumably due to representations 
from Cape Town municipality) to request that the government should 
allow a portion of its land at Uitvlugt forest to be developed as 
a location(69). This suggestion was strongly opposed by farmers 
from Mowbray and by the Department of Forestry, which had started 
a plantation at Uitvlugt in 1883(70). Saunders says that 
when delegates from Woodstock, Cape Town, Mowbray, 
Rondebosch, Claremont and Maitland met the 
Secretary for Agriculture on 3 June 1899, they 
asked him to approve the establishment of a general 
location for Africans and suggested the goveinment-
owned farm Uitvlugt on the Cape Flats between 
Mowbray and Maitland as a possible site. He was 
sympathetic, but was not prepared to promise action, 
especially when a Forestry official insisted that a 
location at Uitvlugt would mean the destruction of 
the wattle plantation there(71). 
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Mr (later Sir) Walter ~tanford, the 3uperintendant of Native Affairs, 
then suggested that the Old Outspan site near Maitland would be 
suitable for the proposed location. This site had some time 
previously been ceded to the Cape Town municipality to be developed 
as a sewerage farm but had never b~en used for this purpose. It 
was inspected and ~nthusiastically endorsed by the full Town Council 
of Cape Town on 1 March 1899(72), but Maitland residents held a 
public meeting to protest against Cape Town 11 shunting its Kafirs 
in their direction''(73). After hearing representations from the 
Maitland Village Management Board, the Divisional Council came out 
in support of these objections(74). The municipality of Cape Town, 
however, refused to be discouraged and persevered with plans for 
a location at Maitland that would house five thousand Africans in 
just over one thousand brick houses(75). 
The issue then became deadlocked, as the central government and 
the municipality could not reach agreement regarding responsibility 
for the establishment and maintenance of the proposed location(76). 
Meanwhile the momentum of the campaign for segregation among the 
"whi te 11 section of Cape Town's population was maintained by the 
South African ~orking Mens' Proeressive Union, which o~ganized at 
least one more pro-segregation ~ublic meeting in District Six(77). 
Town Councillor 0 1 Reilly, who was the Union's president(78), seems 
to have led the segregationists on the Council(79). His Union 
colleague Thomas Harris declared that he City Fathers should be 
swept out along with the 11Kafirs11 as they were completely 
incompetent(80). The Council was accused of "criminal negligence" 
for allowing ttNatives •••• to live cheek by jowl with the white 
man11 (81) while Dr Alfred E .Sellar, a prominent resident of District 
Six, said that the Council, capitalists. and property owners were 
resnonsible for the unbearable conditions in that area(82). The 
editor of the Cape Argus agreed that the Town Council was 
neglecting its duty toward.3 "the respectable poor of this city 
(who) are obliged to herd with Kafirs 11 (83). 
A Council deputation met the Prime Minister again in September 
1900, and after carefully considering the matter(84), the 
Government seems to have agreed to accept the responsibility of 
establishing a location(o5). A commission under the chairmanship 
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of Stanford was appointed to find the most suitable site. The 
draft report of this commission recommended that the proposed 
location should be established at Uitvlugt and that the municipality 
should 11 pay for and run the location11 (86). An epidemic of bubonic 
plague descended on Cape Town in February 1901, however, before 
the Stanford Commission had drawn up its final renort. 
The Establishment Of Ndabeni 
Elias says that 11 the outbreak of bubonic plague in the summer of 
1901 spurred the colonial government to remove the responsibility 
for African housing from the c.b.c. (sic) and to assume it 
themselves 11 (87). The Colonial Secretary assured a Town Council 
deputation in mid-§ebruary that the government would begin work 
on a location at Uitvlugt within four days and would issue 
regulations compelling all Africans in· Cape Town to move there(88). 
The Africans, many of whom worked at the docks where the plague 
was introduced, were blamed for spreading the infection, and the 
location was established under Section 15 of the Public Health 
Amendment Act of 1897, which empowered the government to halt the 
spread of diseases by means of mass removal(89). Government 
Notice 209 of 5 March 1901 provided for punish111ent of Africans 
who refused to move into the location, and legitimized whatever 
force might be considered necessary to effect the proposed 
removal(90). Further regulations promulgated on 12 March 
officially inaugurated the location (Government Notice 231) and 
ordered all Africans out of District Six unless they had obtained 
special permission to remain there (Government Notice 238)(91). 
According to van Heyningen 
the vendetta which was launched against the 
Africans when the first cases of plague were 
discovered, and their living quarters were 
suddenly invaded by sanitary officers and police, 
at once provoked fear and suspicion. The shipping 
company offices were hesieged by men seeking 
passages home, and the refusal of either the 
shipping companies or the railways to take them 
contributed further to their unease. dhen the dock 
employers attempted to register their addresses on 
16 February, the labourers struck •••• and it was 
only after A.R. Mc Kenzie, one of the largest 
employers of African labour, had addressed a 
meeting of the discontented on the slopes of the 
mountain, that they agreed to return to work(92). 
On the morning of 12 March, African dock-workers from District Six 
reported for work as usual, only to be told to return to their 
homes. There they found their meagre belongings either burning 
on bonfires or deposited in the street, while a force of 11 one 
hundred government cleansing staff Kaffirs;' was busy scrubbing and 
spraying their dwellings with carbolic solution. Not surprisingly, 
many of these evictees were found to be "in a very unruly frame 
of mind"(93). 
Between eight hundred and one thousand of these people were rounded 
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up by soldiers that day and marched under an armed mounted-police 
escort to the Woodstock market siding, where they were forced into 
trains bound for the new location. They were followed by a large 
crowd of angry 11 Coloureds 11 , who "jeered and hooted" as the trains 
left the siding(94). A further eight hundred were removed in a 
similar fashion on the following day(95) and the remaining Africans 
held a meeting on the mountain slopes.at which it was decided to 
hold a protest meeting on the Grand ~arade(96). All meetings of 
more than twenty five people were banned under the Public Health 
Act in terms of a Government Gazette Extra ordinary issued on 13 
Harch( 97) and the approximately one thousand protesters wh·o~­
assembled on the Parade on the 14th were dispersed by mounted 
policemen(98). 
Africans in other parts of Cape Town were required to.move to the 
location by Government Notice 276 of 21 March(99). Many seem to 
have compl~ed voluntarily, presumably to avoid losing all their 
possessions aa seems to have been the case with a large number of 
Africans removed from Di.strict 0ix( 100). 'l'hen on 27 March, a 11 posse 
of mounted and foot police:' swept through Districts one and two, 
starting at the top of Kloof Jtreet and netting some five hundred 
Africans as it worked its way down to tha sea(101). A ~umber of 
illegal Africans still remained in town, and it was reported the 
following month that nNatives in groups of thirty to fifty 11 were 
to be seen wandering around in an apparently bewildered fashion in 
Long, Burg and ~trand Streets(102). It seems that nearly all the 
Africans (except the few who were exempted) had been removed from 
Cape Town and its contiguous suburbs by mid-year, when there were 
reported to be almost seven thousand people in the location(103). 
/' 
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Thus was the policy of residential segregation initiated in Cape 
Town. Before outlining further developments with regard to the 
local implementation of the policy of residential segregation in 
the period leading up to the promulgation of the Nativ~s (Urban 
Areas) Act of 1923,. it is instructive to quote Jaunders• 
. '' 
description of conditions in the new location. He says that 
Within the area surrounded by a six foot high 
barbed wire fence and patrolled by an inner and 
outer location guard, no liquor was allowed, ~o 
strangers might remain more than twenty-four hours 
. - I 
and no women visitors stay overnight. Those 
entering the location had to report themselves, 
on which they were provided with an identification 
card and allotted a 9lace to live. At first, some 
were housed in tents, but the basic accommodation, 
which was to remain in use with few improvements, 
consisted. of five large dormitories, each sleeping 
five hundred men, and 615 unlined lean-tos made of 
corrugated iron. In the lean-ttis, which measured 
18 feet by 12 and, to begin with, had no floors, 
seven or more men, and sometimes a· family, were 
accommodated(104). 
The Deterioration of Ndabeni and the Renewed Growth of the 
"Kaffir Problem'' 
This section focuses on deteriorating conditions in Ndabeni. It 
also explores efforts by the authorities to enforce the residential 
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segregation policy by moving kfricans (who preferred a fugitive 
existence in the city slums) into the location. 
Towards the end of 1901 the Cape Times advocated the provision of 
additional accommodation at Ndabeni, in order to build up "a 
labour supply from which it will be possible to pick and choose 
the most desirable men 11 (105). This suggestion was not implemented, 
however, for the location's po9ulation dwindled during the 1903-9 
depression(106), which was (according to Hallett), the worst in 
living memory(107). Adverse economic conditions rende~ed growing 
numbers of even the most quiescent residents unable to pay their 
rentals and therefore obliged either to leave Cape Town or to seek 
shelter alongside their more defiant fellows in the city slums and 
the outlying shanty-towns. Dy 1911 there were reported to be a 
mere 680 people left in Ndabeni, where a number of unoccupied 
buildings were in fact dismantled and sbld(108). 
A deputation from the Diocesan Board of Missions complained to the 
Prime Minister about Ndabeni's inadequate medical facilities and 
sanitary arrangements in December 1901(109). During the following 
year the 3outh African ~pectator (never the most militant of 
publications) accused the government of gross neglect in its 
administration of the location(110), and disclosed that the 
approximately one hundred men in each long wooden dormitory shed 
slept on the ground and cooked over open fires. A similar shed 
which had been partitioned by its inmates constituted the married 
quarters; and although a few new and improved buildings had been 
erected, even these did not have floors(111). In 1903 the report 
of the Select Committee on Native Locations stated that the 
government proposed to provide wooden floors and to reduce the 
number of occupants of the twelve by seven foot huts, each of which 
housed seven people at that time(112). The residents were still 
waiting for their wooden floors in 1911(113). 
The Department of the Interior's Assistant Medical Officer of Health 
in Cape Town '1made a surprise inspection of the Ndabeni location 11 
in October 1912. He reported that there then 1,119 residents 
(including 170 families) in the location, which could accommodate 
four thousand and hence presented 11 a ha1f-deserted appearance". 
This situation was due, he said, to 
\ 
the laxity of the administration of the law 
requiring the segregation of Natives in this 
location •••• The municipalities have given 
practically no information or assistance in the 
matter and there is no doubt a certain class of 
property owner who is averse to the enforcement of 
the segregation provisions. 
The government had not instituted a 11 satisfactory system of 
enforcement 11 , despite the location sunerintendent Mr Nicholls' 
repeated representations; and the result was that Africans had 
re-established themselves in the Jt. Johns, Francis and Roger 
Streets areas of Cape Town as well as in· District Six and were 
also squatting at such places as West London (the present Athlone), 
Ysterplaat and Maitland(114). 
The 6ecretary for Native Affairs wrote to the Provincial Secretary, 
asking what action his honour the administrator will 
be p~epared to take to assist this department in 
/ 
checking the unauthorized residence of Natives in 
the European quarters of Cape Town and its 
suburi:isC115). 
The Provincial Administration replied that it would request the 
local municipalities to enforce the provisions of the 1902 and 
1905 Location Acts(116), which had formalized the segregation-
principle in the Cane. The Department of Native Affairs thereupon 
decided to 
instruct its local officers to work in conjunction 
with the various municipal a:uthori ties and Gil~ 
endeavour to secure the co-o~eration of the police 
authorities with a view to the due enforcement of 
the law(117). 
The Native Affairs Department was pleased to report to the 
Department of the Interior in February 1913 
that as a result of representations made through 
the Provincial Administration, the municipalities 
of Claremont, Mowbray, Maitland, Rondebosch, 
Woodstock and Wijnberg(sic) have instructed their 
inspe~tors to keep a·strict look out for natives 
86 
residing in the municipal areas •••• with a view to 
.concerted action being taken by the departments 
concerned(118). 
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The municipality of Green Point and 3ea ~oint also agreed to 
co-operate\119), as did the municipality of Kalk Bay, the boundaries 
of which then stretched as far as Lakeside(120). Maitland 
municipality averred that it was doing its best to cope with the 
problem and had sent inspectors with police on surprise visits at 
night to check on suspected illegal Africans lodging with "Coloureds 11 
at Brooklyn(121). The Town Clerk of Cape Town assured the 
Provincial ~ecretary 
that all premises within this municipality are 
being visited with the object of ascertaining if 
Kafirs reside there, and unless the municipal 
officer is satisfied that they have permits to 
reside in Cape Town, or are registered voters, the 
cases are reported direct to the Inspector of 
Folice(122). 
A report by Dr Willmott of the Hedical Officer of Health's staff 
in the Department of the Interior showed that the location's 
population had increased by almost two hundred people in the next 1 
year, as duperintendent Nicholls had 
lent two of his Native Police to assist the 
suburban police to rout out the Natives living on 
the Flats - mainly at ~est London •••• The 
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representations made to the various suburban 
\ 
municipalities were also responsible for part of 
the increase, but the municipal authorities appear 
to have become lax in the matter of late and it 
would seem desirable that the Unified Council of 
Cape Town be asked to take action in the matter. 
(The municipalities of Cape Town, Green Point and Sea Point, 
Woodstock, Maitland, ~owbray, Rondebosch, Claremont, Kalk Bay and 
Muizenberg had by that stage amalgamated in terms of Otdinance 19 
of 1913). An increasing incidence of sick people being attracted 
to the location by the availability of free medical treatment was 
noted, but Ndabeni reportedly remained half-empty, and it was 
suggested that 1'if the government were prepared to spend the money 
on building a better class of hut, many more Natives would 
voluntarily migrate to the location", providing that rents were 
not thereby increased(123). 
Superintendent Nicholls endorsed this view, recommending that the 
Provincial Administration again be called upon to pressurize the 
respective municipalities to prevent Africans from residing 
illegally in the areas under their jurisdiction. He admitted that 
ideally admission to the location should be on a voluntary basis, 
rather than as a result of n compulsory driving" by the police, ·as 
a significant proportion of the people who were forced into Ndabeni 
did not stay there for·any length of time. The provision of three-
roomed cottages would, he said, make the place a lot more 
attractive(124). The Public Works Department was asked to delegate 
an official to confer with Mr Nicholl and draw up a scheme which 
would improve conditions in Ndabeni, thus making the location more 
popular among the people for whom it was intended(125). Public 
Works, however, replied that Native Affairs should 11 first approach 
the Finance Denartment to ascertain whether funds are available 11 (126). 
Evidently they were not. 
Dr Willmot tendered his second bi-ann1tal report in May 1914. This 
showed that the location's population had increased to 1,495, 
compared to 1,313 six months previously, but Dr Willmott argued 
that 
so long as the Unified Council of Cape Town fail 
to take a serious view of the fact that Natives 
are living without authority all over the southern 
suburbs, the location will continue to be short of 
its full complement of inhabitants. 
Many Africans were still said to ''only seek shelter in the location 
when they find themselves stranded on account of illness' 1(127). 
In 1916, the population had reportedly increased to about 1,600 
people as the police continued to 
make spasmodic efforts to round up Natives found 
living in the urban areas in contravention of the 
law, and to send them to the location, but there 
is no regular system and their efforts are quite 
inefficient. Natives so found are given notice, 
and then instead of moving into the location they 
usually move somewhere else. Apparently the 
Municipal Authorities take little or no interest 
in the matter. 
Many of the oldest and most rotten huts had been destroyed and 
there was consequently very little accommodation available in the 
location, and "none whatever for families of fairly respectable 
Natives 11 • Efforts to enforce the Location Acts could therefore, 
it was argued, not be effective until forty or fifty Hbetter-class 
cottages 11 had been provided( 128). 
The Department of the Interior called on the Department of Native 
Affairs 
to make strong representations to the Provincial 
Administration with a view to ensuring that local 
authorities rec-operate in enforcing Section 3 of 
Act No 40/1902 and .Section 2 of Act No 8/1905 
(Cape)( 1 29 ) • 
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Native Affairs replied that ''it would be ~uite useless endeavouring 
to enforce the provisions of Section Three of Act No 40 of 1902 
(Cape) until provision has been made for improved accommodation in 
the location". Unsuccessful representations had been made to the 
~ublic Works Department, and nothing could be done until financial 
conditions returned to normal(130). 
Ndabeni by this stage supported a burgeoning "informal sector" 
based mainly on the illegal liquor trade, which continued to thrive 
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des:pite the outlawing of 11 Danti 11 and its substitution by African 
beer brewed under permit. In August 1916 ~r Nicholls.called for 
a total ban on the introduction into the location of liquid yeast 
and hops, which he said were being brought in from the breweries 
by the cartload. He cited a police report showing 116 arrests and 
113 convictions for unlawful possession of liquor as evidence of 
the extent of the 11 liquor evil 11 (131). The introduction of brewers 
yeast and hops in liquid form into theJlocation was prohibited in 
terms of Government Notice 1411 of 14 November 1916(132) but this 
was challenged in court and declared ultra vires in Jeptember 
1917(133). Government Notice 1411 was withdrawn in December(134) 
to be replaced by Government Notice 496 of 10 April 1918, which 
made the introduction of more than one quart of liquid yeast or 
hops illegal( 135). '.Vhile a mainstay of the 11 illegal 11 economy was 
thus ruthlessly severed, thousands more 11 illegals" were pouring 
into the city. 
Rent levels rose rapidly in Cape Town at this time as the 
available housing stock diminished, with hundreds of houses in the 
dockside area and in lower District Six and Woodstock (both formerly 
respectable European areas that had been invaded by 11 Colouredsn 
( 
during the post South African War depression{136)) were replaced 
by stores and offices during the second decade of the Twentieth 
Century(137). Police ~ction that intensified with the accelerating 
influx of Africans augmented the effect of rising rent levels in 
the slums(1j8), and the population Of Udabeni had risen to 2,753 
towards the end of 1917(139). The Department of Finance was 
asked to provide two thousand pounds per annum for five years to 
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improve the situation(140) and a Native Affairs official informed 
his superiors that although there was an urgent need for additional 
accommodation, Hit is satisfactory to note that more use is being 
made of the Location as a labour reservoir11 ( 141). 
I I 
By February 1918, the location's popuJ.ation had re ~)ortedly risen 
to 3,300, and was said to be increasing daily. 'l'he police 
continued 11 dri ving 11 Africans into the extremely overcrowded 
location, where no accommodation was available for them(142). 
The position had become so bad by the end of 1918 that magistrates 
began discharging Africans brought before them for residing 
illegaly in town, where they were (in the words of the City 
Council's Medical Officer of Health) being "driven from one part 
\l of the city to another" by efforts to implement restrictions on 
their residence(143). 
A woefully inadequate building programme got under way(144) and 
in April 1919 there were reported to be 3,500 people (including 
2,300 ''single" males) living in the 520 dwellings at Ndabeni. 
The .Superintendant was sure that 11 at least another 1,000 would move 
in tomorrow if they could 11 ( 145) while the Assistant Medical Officer 
of Health reported that the location housed one thousand people 
too many(146). 
f\l,-~-f t la. I . ~0 OV'-Cc1 ~"f ~ 
Al though this was beyond its terms of referen~, the Stanford j 
Commission (which is more fully discussed below) felt compelled 
to urge in its report tendered in January 1920 that immediate 
steps should be taken to provide housing for the approximately one 
thousand people (mainly ''bachelors 11 ) living in the 140 bell-tents 
that had recently been put up at Ndabeni, and for the fifteen 
hundred or so Africans living in the city(147). 
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By March, peo11le living in the 11 very dilapidated ancient tents ,; 
which are certainly not rainproof 11 were beginning to die of 
pneumonia(148) and it was reported the following month that many 
people were living in the location without the Superintendant!s 
knowledge, making the prevention of epidemic disease extremely 
difficult. People were reportedly being "allowed to rig up any 
sort of shelter composed of paraffin tins, sacking etc, under which 
they can slee~'· The Native Affairs Department, in an effort to 
ease the appallingly overcrowded conditions, had decided to erect 
temporary wood and iron barracks, but only one of these shelters 
was'then under construction. A case of typhus had been traced to 
Ndabeni, and the health official concerned recommended that (once 
control had been re-established) all n~w arrivals should be 
deloused(149). 
Early in May the Superintendant assured the Advisory Boa~d that 
dormitories were being built as quickly as possible for those then 
living in tents, as well as for "batchelo1~s"( sic) occupying huts 
that could be used as married quarters. Asked whether people who 
had erected their own 11 shanties 11 could justifiably be expected to 
pay rent, he replied that the ten shillings they were paying per 
month was in fact 11 site rent for the temporary use of the ground 
upon which the building was standing"(150). 
Soon Superintendant Nicholls was urg~ntly requesting a disinfector, 
as Ndabeni had, he said, become :1very much of a dumping ground 
of Natives from everywhere including those areas affected with 
typhus and smallpox 01 (151). In July the Advisory Board was extrem~ly 
concerned at the growing incidence of crime and disturbances in 
the location, and it was revealed that frequent attacks on the 
location police force were occurring, necessitating the calling 
in of police reinforcements from »ioodstock. 1-:icholls adrni tted that 
the official population figure of 4,340 did not take into account 
the unauthorized surplus ~opulation driven in by constant police 
action. The true size of the population was, he estimated, 
approximately six thousand people. A few dormitories had been 
completed and occupied under close supervision to prevent unlawful 
tenancy, as ;'the surplus would squeeze into anything offering 
shelter"(152). 
Ten of the new dormitories had been co~pleted by August and were 
occupied by 1,500 .ibachelors 11 from the "tents and hovels" and also 
from 115 of the huts, which were added to the stock of "married 
quarters". ·rhere were still about one thousand 1'bachelorsri 
occupying huts that were considered better suited to the 
accommodation of families(153). 
By the end of the year there were "cases of typhus cropping up at 
Ndabeni every few weeks or so 11 , but delousing facilities had still 
not been provided(154). A medical inspection in January 1921 
revealed two recent deaths from enteric fever and it was noted that 
''with the increased population the water supply is •••• insufficient 
and often no water is available 11 (155). In March the location's 
Medical Officer drew attention to the increased incidence 6f 
Africans arriving from outside for medical attention(156). The 
Superintendant drew the attention of his superiors to the fact 
that there were no treatment facilities for sick Africans outside 
the location(157), but the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs 
echoed Superintendant Nicholls when he told the Secretary for 
~ublic Health that it would be necessary to restrict the provision 
of medical treatment to "registered residents'' if Ndabeni was not 
to become a mere "dumping ground of sick Natives 11 (158). Hr 
Nicholls was duly instructed "to refer other cases of sickness, 
i.e. where the patients are not 'registered residents•, in the 
location to the Hagistra.te for· disposal by the District Surgeon'' ( 159). 
The Department of Public ilealth, however, pointed out that this was 
contrary to the provisions of the ~ublic Health Act of 1919, which 
placed "the duty of dealing 1vith cases of infectious and 
communicable diseases on the Local Authority of the place of 
discovery 11 (160). 
The Cape Argus reported in mid-Nay that there had been ten cases 
of typhus (three of them fatal) at Ndabeni during the previous 
week(161) and its editor called on the City Council to act against 
the health hazard constituted by the conditions under which 
Africans were living both in Ndabeni and illegally in town(162). 
The Minister of Public Health, the Secretary of Public Health and 
the Assistant Health Officer of the Union inspected Ndabeni at 
that time. They found the dwellings 11 generally speaking very 
dirty and verminous.... 'l'he whole Location", they said, "is 
unkempt, dilapidated, dirty and insanitary. There are evidences 
on every hand of inefficient control and supervision11 •. A thorough 
clean-up and the institution of an effective system of cleansing, 
maintenance and control was recommended; and the provision of a 
11 uortable disinfestor1' was called for in order to put an end to 
the repeated outbreaks of typhus that had qeen occurring in the 
location for the past year or so(163). The Cape Argus complained 
that 11 the Native location is mainly a dormitory for our unskilled 
labour. This is its first and ereat function; and the shame of 
Ndabeni is that it fails to fill adequately even this simple 
~T:;;;--;;,f~x ~~A~ns continued unabated, presumably due to the 
accelerating underdevelopment of the Xhosa reserves, where the 
slJ productive capacity was beginning to collapse. In 1921 there were 
I 
\estimated to be one thousand Africans fn the local slums, This 
had increased to three thousand in early 1922(165) and to seven 
thousand by the end of that year(166). 
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Thus by the early 1920's a 11 Kaffir f"roblem" of far greater magnitude 
than that which had given rise to Ndabeni had become a major social 
issue in Cape Town. Pressure for segregation once again intensified, 
but there was no need now for organized white workers to press for 
the legislative entrenchment of this form of racism. Residential 
segregation of Africans was an eatablished fact, a principle 
enshrined in· the statute books and 11 almost universally accepted 
by whites, (even) in the Hother City11 (167). The skilled white 
workers, their interests in the housing market by that stage more 
or less secured, no longer maintained the momentum of segregation 
as they had a little more than two decades before. This role was 
left to liberal philanthropists and (interestingly enough) to 
organizations of white women, who were beginning then to agitate 
for their own enfranchisement, which was won in 1930. The 
"Native Invasion 11 was an issue on which this newly Dolitically-
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CHAPTER 4: THE D~VZLOPl,~_?.N'r OF !~L~ FQ.~_!~Y. O~URBld~_gESIDENTIAL 
SEGR3GATION IN CAPE TOrlU 
PAR'l' 2: 'rll~ ElERGlNG 30LU1'ION 
----·-·-~-~ ... - ~----- ···--·-
Slowly a solution emerged to the racially-perceived social problem 
of poverty and homelessness, the growth of which was outlined 
above. The effects of the influenza epidemic of October 1918 
(which claimed over four thousand lives in Cape Town) underlined 
to t~e authorities the seriousness of the situation(1) that had 
been allowed to develop through racist neglect and avarice. 
Liberal philanthropists such as the Reverend (later Bishop) Lavis 
led the call for houses for the "poorer classes11 (2). The 
municipality announced that it would build 122 dwellings in 
11.3 
Haitland for its own workers (apparently both "Coloureds and '1Jhites, 
but predictably not Africans(3)). The Minister of Mines and 
Industries told the Mayor that the municipality should provide 
accommodation for all Ndabeni residents who were not government 
employees, but the City Council insisted that housing urban Af·ricans 
was the responsibility of the central,government(4). 
Meanwhile employers began, in their own interest, to press for the 
amelioration of the housing crisis. A committee representing the 
Cape Province Manufacturers Association, the Master Builders' 
Association and the Associated Master Printers was formed to draw 
up a workers' housing scheme for non-municipal employees. This 
was felt to be imperative, as insecurity of tenure and rising 
rentals were identified as prime causes of industrial unrest(5), 
which had become a matter of grave concern to local employers by 
that stage. 'rhis Employers 1 Housing Committee stressed in a 
communication to the Hayor that "there can be no hope of a settled 
and contented industrial population until the question of proper 
housing for the working cJ asses has been dealt with'' ( 6). 
One of the main aims of this committee was the drafting of a Bill 
providing government assistance for municipal housing schemes(?). 
It was obviously pressures of.this nature that led to the 
enactment of the i1unicipal (Provision of Homes) Ordinance of 1919 
and the Housing Act (No. 35) of 1920, which made local authorities 
responsible for the establishment, with government subsidization, 
of housing schemes for those who could not afford to provide 
themselves with accommodation that complied with existing legal 
standards. This enabled great strides to be made in overcoming 
the "poor white" housing shortage, but the position with regard 
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to 11 Non-Europeans" remained critical. Morris says that "For many 
years •••• the p0\·1ers given by the ()lousing) Act in respect of 
black and coloured housing were little used 11 (8). In fact the 1919 
Housing Commission (the recommendations of which formed the basis 
of the Housing Act) did not· even attempt to quantify the deficit 
of housing for Africans in Cape Town, although it did provide 
extremely low estimates of the 11 colourect 1r and "white" housing 
shortages. Its major recommendation seems to have been the 
upliftment of the 11 poor whites 11 and the prevention of "dangerous 
racial mixingif by the perpetuation of urban residential 
segregation(9). 
Conflict and Eventual A~reement Between the Local and Central 
Authorities 
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Municipal officials, preoccupied with precisely these concerns, 
conferred with those of the Native Affairs Department, who admitted 
that 
under present legislation the Government have to 
deal with the housing and general good government 
of aboriginal natives, and it recognizes the need 
for further accommodation at Ndabeni(10). 
This was taken to mean that the central authorities had accepted 
"sole responsibility for native welfareil, and the municipality 
urged the Government to deal with the increasing overcrowding in 
the location(11). The Mayor repeated this call at the beginning 
of March 1919(12), after the Minister of the Interior had promised 
to try and find tents for Ndabeni's surplus population and to 
clear the "natives" out of town(13). Towards the end of' that 
month, however, it was announced that Ndabeni was to be handed over 
to the municipality in terms of the Urban Areas Bill which was then 
being debated in Parliament(14). This would hopefully, said the 
Cape Argus, facilitate the clearance of 11 natives 11 from the city 
and thus ease the overcrowded conditions in many quarters(15). 
Towards the end of April a City Council special committee was 
considering an offer from the Government to provide £20,000 for 
additional accommodation if the municipality would assume 
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responsibility for the location(16). These terms were accepted 
in June(17) and the Native aeserves Location Acts (Cape of Good 
Hope) Further Amending Act of 1919 provided for the transfer of 
Ndabeni and Port Elizabeth's New brighten locations to local 
authority control. the Gouncil soon realized that upgrading 
Ndabeni would require far more resources than had been envisaged. 
' 
The agreement with the Government was unilaterally rescinded in 
October, and 11 lengthy negotiations followed •••• concerning the 
Council's wish to build a new 'model location' to replace 
Ndabeni 11 (18). Early in December, the i'iinister of Native Affairs 
was persuaded by a City Council deputation to appoint a itsmall 
commission11 , including three Council re pre sen La ti ves, 11 to enquire 
and report on (a) The suitability of Ndabeni as a site for a 
permanent location; and ( b) al terna ti ve or additional sites'' ( 19). 
This commission, chaired by the prominent "native administrator" 
and brother of Jir Walter, Mr A.H. Stanford, recommended that 
Ndabeni should be demolished, as it was bounded by Maitland on the 
\ 
one side and by the proposed ''Garden Ci ty 11 of f'inelands on the 
other.. The Government was advised that 
with the large increase in the industries carried 
on in the Cape Peninsula, which there are strong 
reasons for anticinating, there is •••• necessity 
for making pro~ision for a very much larger 
influx of native labourers. 
The commission was convinced that this could only be accomplished 
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by the establishment of a new location housing at least twenty 
thousand people. A part of ~pping Forest where the Railways 
Department grew timber for railway sleepers was recommended as 
the most suitable site(20). 
In March 1920 the Minister of Native Affairs called on the City 
Council to support the Stanford Commission's recommendation that 
a new location should be established at Epping(21), but the Mayor 
replied that.Council officials had still not been given access to 
the site in order to survey it(22). The South African Railways 
decided during the following month that it was not prepared to 
give up part of its plantation as the site for a location(23). 
The Secretary of Native Affairs informed the City Council of this 
development, and suggetited the Old Outspan at Maitland as a 
suitable alternative site(24). A City Council joint committee, . 
however, resolved to insist on the Epping site, as the Outspan was 
said to be waterlogged(25), a contention that was of course denied 
by the Railway authorities(26). 
The editor of the Cape Times supported the municipality, which was 
said to be anxious "to deal with the problem of its local 
reservoir of labour on progressive lines", and was quite correct 
in rejecting the Outspan site as this was in fact waterlogged in 
winter(27). 
A City Council deputation conferred on 8 June with ~rime Minister 
Smuts, who undertook to negotiate with the Railways authorities 
' 
with a view to securing the Epping site(28). The Railways, 
however, remained ''very averse 1 to losing part of its plantation( 29); 
l-
and the municipality was told to discuss the question of possible 
compensation with the Hail ways authorities( 30). rrhe town clerk 
protested that the Prime ~inister had undertaken to conduct such 
negotiations personally(31), but the municipality was advised 
towards the end of the year that the Prime ~inister's efforts had 
not borne fruit. The Railways would only give'up the site upon 
receipt of £27,000 in compensation, which would have to be paid 
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by the City Council as the Government had no funds available for 
this purpose(32). The Council replied that this was totally 
unacceptable. Epping was the only suitable site for the proposed 
location and the local authority could not be expected to pay for 
the implementation of the Stanford Commission's recommendations(33). 
It had become apparent by this stage that 
the location difficulties in Gape Town are •••• 
only part of the large and vexed question of the 
treatment and control of natives in the urban 
areas throughout the Union(34). 
The Native Affairs Commission, (which had been set up to study the 
"native question 11 in its broadest dimensions, as the political, 
economic and cultural problems engendered by the rapid development 
of a new class of town-bred Africans, without rural ties, had 
become extremely urgent and perplexing) was asked to consider the 
situation in Cape Town and make recommendations for its 
amelioration(35). The Commission reported to the Minister of 
Nativ~ Affairs (it is unclear exactly when) that the growing 
number of Africans attracted to the Cape Peninsula by ongoing 
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industrial development and their increasing tendency to settle 
permanently necessitated the establishment of a new location either 
at Epping or at the·outspan, but preferably at the outspan. This 
should primarily house the permanent, settled section of the 
African population, while Ndabeni should house the 11 floating male 
population''• The Minister of Nat~ve Affairs (Mr F.S. Malan), who 
also happened to be the Acting ~rime Minister, hosted a meeting 
with the Administrator of the Cape, members of the Native Affairs 
Commission, various heads of Government departments and City 
Council representatives on 1 July 1921. The day befor~ this 
conference took place, he was informed by the Native Affairs 
Commission that the municipality's. Vijgekraal property on the Cape 
Flats would be as suitable for the new location as the Outspan 
site(36). 
The City Council delegation at this conference insisted however 
that only the Epping s~te was acceptable, as the Outspan was 
waterlogged and Vijgekraal had been purchased for the specific 
purpose of absorbing effluent from the adjoining municipal 
sewerage works. Furthermore, the municipal representatives were 
adamant that Ndabeni would have to be removed, as it was too close 
to the proposed Garden City. The Government would have to provide 
the municipality with between ~150,000 and ~200,000 to pay for 
the construction of the new location. The General Manager of the 
Railways declared his departments continued strong objections to 
relinquishing its plantation at Epping; and the Acting Prime 
~inister stressed that the ~overnment would not pay for the 
establishment of the new location, as it was the local authority's 
responsibility to accommod~te the Africans working in the city. 
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He threatened 11 dr<:tstic action'' if a solution could not b~ agreed 
upon(37). 
This conference was adjourned until July 6 to give the various 
interested parties time to consider their options. A special 
meeting of the City Council on Jul.y 5 resolved to ask the Government 
for .£50,000 to remove lldabeni and .£150,000 to build a new location 
at Epping(38). The Council was evidently not prepared to back 
down on this issue. Neither, it was soon to discover, was the 
Acting frime Minister. 
At the meeting on July 6 (which was expanded to include Divisional 
Council representatives) Mr Malan announced that new legislation 
making local authorities responsible for the establishment and 
maintenance of locations would be introduced during the next 
session of Parliament. He recalled that the Government had offerred 
the Council a free site for a location in 1919, and disclosed that 
in view of the Council's subsequent rejection of this offer, it 
had been decided that the granting of free land to a local 
authority for this purpose would create a dangerous precedent. 
The municipality, he said, was resp9nsible for the accommodation 
of Africans whose presence in Cape Town benefitted local industry 
and the local ratepayers. Until the municipality had found a 
suitable site and built a new location, the population of Ndabeni 
would have to be limited to a reasonable size, which would be 
determined by a survey. The surplus population of the location 
would, said the Acting frime Minister, have to be repatriated to 
the "Native territories". A committee comprising two representatives 
of each interested party (except the affected Africans) was set 
up and instructed to make practical suggestions by the end of the 
week(39). 
This committee could not agree on a suitable site for the new 
location. Two reports were ?resented to the Acting Prime Minister 
in mid-July. 'rhe majority report, signed by all except the local 
government representatives, made no definite recommendation~, but 
clearly favoured the site in the Uitvlugt Forest north of 
Vijgekraal. The minority report, signed only by the Cape Town 
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City Council and Cape Divioional Council representatives, 
recommended that the Epping site was most suitable, but stated that 
Vijgekraal would be an acceptable alternative. There was clearly 
consensus within the committee on the wider issue of the status 
of local Africans, for the covering letter to these reports noted 
with approval that 
the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill, published in 1918, 
has been referred for revision to the Native 
Affairs Commission, and it is intended at no 
distant date to publish the revised draft for 
general information, with a view to legislation 
when Parliament again assembles(40). 
Within the national political arena, the Native Affairs Commission 
and the Local Government Commission, together with Native Affairs 
Department' representatives, agreed at a three-day conference in 
Johannesburg during August 1921 11 That a statutory duty (should) 
be placed on municipal bodies to provide adequate housing 
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accommodation for all natives within its area" (sic), for which 
purpose "adequate tracts of land 11 would have to be placed at the 
municipalities' disposal. Great stress was laid on the necessity 
for influx control and the re pa tria ti on of "redundant natives 11 ( 41). 
Ndabeni's population had by then been frozen at a. maximum of three 
thousand(42), exacerbating conditions in the city slums(43). The 
site of the proposed additional location remained the subject of 
much contention. Residents of Goodwood, Parow and Bellville held 
a protest meeting to voice their opposition to the use of the 
Outspan site as a location(44), while the Combined Civic 
Associations of the Cape Flats endorsed the Vijgekraal site(45). 
The City Council 1 s Special Committee on Native Locations pressed 
the reportedly-sympathetic Prime ~inister Smuts for financial 
acisistance and a free grant of land at Epping or Vijgekraal(46). 
The Council remained opposed to the two-location system suggested 
by the Government, which envisaged the proposed new location being 
exclusively for set~led African families, while Ndabeni was 
retained for the migrant-workers(47). The matter was apparentl.y 
considered by the Cabinet(4d), and after a four-month delay Smuts 
was happy to offer a Council deputation four hundred morgen of 
land at Uitvlugt Forest north of Vijgekraal(49). This was 
gratefully accepted, and the local press congratulated all concerned 
for having chosen an ideal site(50). 
The fate of Cape 1own's Africans had thus been decided (entirely 
without their participation) by early 1922. A.11 that remained was 
the working out of details anq the promulgation of legislation 
whereby the machinery of state could intensify the segregationist 
dynamic that had been developing since the 188o•s. This involved 
(as will be shown) not only the further development of the 
location-system, but also the attempted stemming of the "native 
influx" and the eradication of squatter camps. 
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While state policy was thus crystallizing immediately after the 
first world war, the segregationist momentum was maintained by 
liberal philanthropists and their organizations and by organizations 
of white women. The following section briefly outlines the mounting 
racist pressures from these quarters. 
The Renewed .3egregationist Agitation Among Local "Whites" in the 
Early 1920 1 s 
Organized pressure for segregation within the "white" population 
re-emerged forcefully in early 1921. Negotiations between the 
central and local authorities were deadlocked at that time while 
more and more Africans were refused admission to the hopelessly 
inadequate location and crowded into the city slums. The issue 
seems originally to have been taken up by the Social Reform 
Association. 
In March 1921 the Cape Argus printed a letter from a Mr R.G. Ross, 
saying that he had forwarded a petition signed by residents in 
the vicinity of "a certain lane1 i to the tfayor and the Inspector 
of Police, calling for the removal of the 11 Natives 11 residing in 
seven houses there. No action had as yet been taken, and these 
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"natives" continued to reside in the centre of the city "in open 
defiance of the law11 many of them engaging in the illegal liquor 
trade which had made the neighbourhood unsavoury and dangerous. 
The removal of these and other Africans to temporary accommodation 
in Ndabeni would, it was argued, not only stamp out vice and crime 
but also "secure increased housing accommodation'' in the city(51). 
A fellow segregationist revealed that the lane in question was 
Heliger Lane near Riebeek Square(52), and in May Mr Ross (writing 
as a representative of the Social Reform Association) revealed 
that Africans living there had been subjected to two liquor-raids 
by the police, whom he implied should turn their attention also 
to other quarters of the city. He declared that "Horses and mules 
are better cared for in out city than the Natives •••• The Nati~e 
is a big asset to the country; the treatment he receives in our 
city is scandalous1'(53). The Cape Argu.s commented editorially·· 
that public safety was endangered by "allowing natives to live 
amongst Europeans in conditions that make health and decency 
impossible''(54), while the Reverend Savage (a mission priest at 
Ndabeni) stressed that Cape Town's Africans were in general 
"decent.and honourable people", living in terrible conditions in 
the location and in many parts of the town. He called on the local 
public to face up to its responsibilities towards ''those who are 
the real 'labour' class today" by paying living wages and providing 
decent accommodation(55). The Cape Peninsula Evangelical Church 
Council urged Acting Prime Minister F.S. Malan to take ''immediate 
steps'' against "Natives'' living conditions in the location and the 
slum's(56). 
The problem constituted by the growing presence of Africans in 
the city slums was discussed at a public meeting of concerned 
"whites11 in the YMCA Hall at Three Anchor Bay in September 1921. 
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Mr Ross informed the meeting that there were twelve localities in 
town where "natives'' had become .. a health hazard. Although no 
resolution was taken, it was agreed that a Native ~elfare 
Association should be established to provide a channel for Christian 
involvement(57). 
The Cape Peninsula Welfare Society was eventually inaugurated in 
May 1922, replacing ~he apparently defunct South African 
Association of which Sir Waltet Stanford had been chairman. Sir 
Walter was elected chairman and John X Merriman president of the 
new society, which included on its executive committee such 
luminaries as Canon Lavis, Father Savage and Professor Radcliffe-
Brown. At the inaugural· meeting, Dr Loram of the Native Affairs 
Commission urged that a ''Joint Committee of Europeans and Natives" 
should be established, as experience in other centres had shown 
that Native Welfare Societies were most effective when working in 
conjunction with such committees(58). 
A Joint Committee was duly established, and one of its African 
members, speaking at the Native Welfare Society's first annual 
general meeting in December, upbraided the municipality for not 
consulting Africans over plans for the proposed new location(59). 
The activities of this Society and of the Joint Committee which 
it spawned obviously require investigation. For the moment, one 
can only quote Canon Lavis' segregationist pronouncements here, 
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and mention his and Father Savage's views on influx control. in the 
following chapter. 
Early in 1922, Canon Lavis hailed the Urban Areas Bill as a "great 
step forward", which heralded·the end of the intolerable situation 
whereby 
for the sake of a few thousands expenditure on the 
location,the natives •••• have been allowed to crowd 
into this notoriously overcrowded city and thereby 
force the Coloured population into conditions of 
housing even more unspeakable than those which 
prevailed before(60). 
A year later he argued that the removal of "Natives" to the 
proposed new location would not only be an "act of justice to the 
natives 11 thus rescued from the slums, but would also be "an act 
of reparation and liberation to the Coloureds", for whom more 
accommodation would thus become available at cheaper rents, as 
they would no longer have to compete with Africans in the housing 
market(61). 
Organizations of "whi te 11 women came to the fore during 1922. 
Concerned citizens at a public meeting convened by the Fairhaven 
work Party (which was apparently a womens' charitable organization 
concerned with the welfare of 11 white 11 ex-servicemen) urged the 
City Council to make land available in the location where Africans 
could temporarily build their own huts. This would, it was felt, 
'· 
put a stop to 
Kafirs sleeping on the mountain-slopes, in gardens -
in out-houses, many of them out of work, and coming 
and going quite freely, by day or night, quite 
uncontrolled by pass laws or anything else(62). 
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At least one more meeting of this nature was held at that time(63), 
and the Fairhaven Work Party complained to the Native Affairs 
Department that "gangs of natives wandering on the slopes of Lion.•s 
Head and Signal Hill" near "white" residential areas constituted 
a danger to "white" women(64). The Women's Enfranchisement League 
reiterated this allegation at public meetings whereby it too began 
pressurizing the Council to provide temporary accommodation for 
homeless "wandering natives 11 (65) but the police denied that white 
women were being interfered with and claimed that the problem was 
being exaggerated(66). A third group of "white" women, the 
Women's Municipal Association, joined in the condemnation of the 
Council and urged it to provide temporary accommodation for 
Africans living on the slopes of Table Mountain and Signal Hill 
"under the rudest of shelters and without sanitation''. The 
Council was further urged to use force if necessary to remove 
"degraded natives" from their hovels in the slums, but the Africans 
were being referred to then as a health hazard rather than as a 
threat to "white" women(67). Le·tters in the local press supported 
~he Womeri's Municipal Association's position regarding the removal 
of Africans from the slums, maintaining that this would benefit 
"poor whites' 1(68). 
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' Ministers were visited by segregationist deputations at this time. 
A Cape Peninsula Native i•Jelfara .Society deputation apparently 
urged the Minister of Native Affairs to ensure that temporary 
accommodation was provided at Ndabeni so that the unwanted Africans 
could be removed from town(69). The Minister of Railways was told 
by a Women's Municipal Association deputation that there were 
sufficient African dock-labourers living illegally in town to fill 
the condemned Docks 11 location" several times over. During police 
raids the previous Sunday, he was informed, up to-sixty dock-
labourers had been found living in a single house. The Minister 
agreed to consider the continued usage of the decaying barracks(70) 
(it was not really a location at all), once its inhabitants had 
been removed to new premises on the breakwater(71). Following 
representations from the City Council(72), the government did 
undertake to allow eight or nine hundred Africans to continue 
living in the Docks "location", and the Women's Municipal 
Association deplored the City Council's failure to remove the 
thousands of ;'illegal natives living all over Cape Town''(73). 
The Gardens bri;inch of the Women's South African Party and the 
Rondebosch Ratepayers Association were among the organizations 
that voiced their concern at the lack of "progress"(74). 
Pressures of this nature certainly speeded up the decision-
making process and contributed to the "solution" of the local 
"native problem" through the disestablishment of Ndabeni and the 
development of a new location at Langa. The next section discusses 
" the segregatory aspect of this "solution", while the following 
chapter outlines concomitant attempts at influx control and 
squatter control. 
The Demise of Ndabeni and the Development of Langa 
The Magistrate of Cape Town reported to the Native Affairs 
Department late in 1922 that 
the whole question of Native housing is as bad as 
it possibly can be and the policy of letting 
matters slide may result in very serious results. 
The bedrock of putting the native housing question 
on a proper basis is money. Is the Government 
prepared to spend this money? A temporary 
solution is, will the Government allow the natives 
to erect their own huts within the area of Ndabeni 
Location?(75). 
The Government had however by that sta~e 
decided as a policy that responsibility for the 
native population in urb~n areas should devolve 
upon the local authority, this being the principle 
underlying the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill now 
before Parliament •••• The Government will in due 
course relinquish the Ndabeni location, and in these 
circumstances it is not proposed at this stage to 
incur additional capital expenditure on 
accommodation at the Ndabeni Location(76). 
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The City Council was authorized to raise the quarter-million pound 
loan necessary for the building of the proposed new location, 
after an extremely heated public meeting at which many of the 
approximately six hundred ratepayers present voiced their 
indignation at the rate-increase that this would involve(77). 
The Minister of Native Affairs was then able to announce in 
Parliament that the Government had agreed to hand over the Ndabeni 
site and buildings to the City Council, and that title deeds to 
the site of the proposed new location would be issued to the 
Council within two weeks(78). The Mayor and his deputy thereupon 
set off on an inspection-tour of the Johannesburg, Durban and 
Bloemfontein location-systems(79); while the Council called for 
the curfew provisions of the Natives Registration Bill to be 
incorporated into the Urban Areas Bill, and for the inclusion 
within the latter Bill of a clause-making the non-payment of 
location rent a criminal offence(80). 
In May 1923 the ~ity Council secured from the Native Affairs 
Department permission to provide temporary accommodation at 
Ndabeni, and resolved to erect two hundred "Nissen steel tents", 
each ten feet high and fifteen feet in diameter(81). Ten men 
would be housed in each of these huts(82), one hundred and forty 
of which had been erected by November. The Council called on the 
police to begin 11 reducing the large number of natives now resident 
within the City" ( 83), but there were only fifty-seven 11 single'' 
men in the Nissen huts by the end of 1923(84). A City Council 
Native Townships Committee deputation complained to the Minister 
in May 1924 that there were still six hundred vacancies due to the 
lack of resolute action on the part of the police(85), but the 




in the following month and by mid-June there were reported to be 
1,750 men living in the Nissen huts(86). 
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The Municipal boundaries were extended to include Ndabeni at the 
end of January 1925(87). Then ~t the beginning of May 
responsibility for the control, administration and maintenarice of 
the location was transferred to the City Council in terms of 
Proclamation 95 of 1925(88). Confident in the abilities of its 
new "Superintendent of Natives" Mr George Cook (the respected ex-
Superintendent of Bloemfontein location and architect of the 
Advisory Board system, who was recommended to the Council by the 
Native Affairs Commissioner Dr Loram(89)), the Council set ou~ to 
establish a "native administration" system characterized by "that 
thoroughness and discipline which is necessary to maintain natives 
under proper control"(90). 
Almost immediately upon assuming control, the municipality began 
to act against rent defaulters(91). A police-station was 
established in the location at the beginning of September 1925 and 
in the following twenty months municipally-organized rent and beer 
raids, with police assistance, netted approximately nine hundred 
rent defaulters and about five hundred brewers and possessors of 
"Kaffir beer"(92). 
Proclamation 60 of 1926(93) stipulated that as from April of that 
year Africans in Cape Town were required, under Section 5 of the 
Urban Areas Act, to live in a proclaimed location unless they had 
been granted specific permission to reside elaewhere(94). There 
was an initial difference of opinion between the central and local 
authorities regarding ~esponsibility for the issuing of residence 
permits(95), but the City Council finally agreed in August to 
undertake the registration of exempted Africans living outside 
the location(96). 
The first section of Langa location was officially opened on 10 
September 1927, with accommodation available in the Main Barracks 
for over two thousand "bacholors"(97J. "Single" African migrants 
living illegally in town were ordered by the City Council to move 
into the location in terms of Proclamation 60(98), while the 
Council sought permission to close the Nissen huts at Ndabani and 
transfer their inhabitants to Langa(99). On the advice of its 
senior official in Cape Town(100), the Native Affairs Department 
replied that, according to the City Council's own figures, there 
\ 
were ~hree thousand Africans living illegally in the city, while 
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Langa could only accommodate 2,200 "single Natives". The closing 
down of any available accommodation was therefore not to be 
considered(101). 
'saunders reveals that "By mid-October the Council was complaining 
bitterly that the police were not acting to force Africans out of 
the town"(102). In mid-November, an attorney acting for "a 
considerable number of Native Clients" disclosed that "single 
Natives are being prosecuted for failing to proceed to Langa"(103) 
and towards the end of that month the Town Clerk informed the 
Native Affairs Department that 
The Council are actively engaged in prosecuting 
owners of property for harbouring contrary to the 
provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 1923, 
and also natives who are illegally resident within 
the City, but difficulty is caused through slow 
progress in connection with prosecutions and the 
imposition of unreasonably low fines •••• 
Furthermore the police authorities recently took up 
the position that Act No 21 of 1923 contains no 
power to search premis~s, and in dealing with 
natives, the Council have been forced to rely on 
existing regulations re overcrowding, For this 
purpose special constables have been engaged.,,, 
to cooperate with the City health authorities, but 
the method proves cumbersome and leads to 
unnecessary delay(104). 
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Nevertheless, 242 Africans were convicted during one month in late 
1927 for not living in the location, and 127 people were convicted 
for "harbouring11 Africans during 1928(105). 
A deputation comprising representatives of the "Joint European 
and Native Council'', the Bantu Union and the Combined Civic 
Associations of the Cape Flats protested to the Native Affairs 
Commission that due to the exorbitant cost of transport to and 
from Langa, the high rentals in the new location resulting from 
its being built exclusively by unionized and hence expensive white 
labour, and the law wages paid to Africans in the Peninsula, many 
prospective residents ''could not afford to live at Langa with the 
consequence that they are being forced to squat in the Cape Flats 
or on the mountain side". The deputation called on the 
Government to ensure that the railfare was reduced, to pressurize 
the municipality for a rent-reduction and to "set a good example 
by paying a more generous wage to its Native employees 11 (106). 
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In June 1928 the Town Clerk reported that 11 as a result of the steps 
taken by the Council to remove natives illegally resident in the 
City to Langa, there are at present over 1,300 single men in 
residence at the new township"(107). This forced removal was 
partly negated by the continued influx of Africans into the 
Peninsula(108), but by May 1929 the Town Clerk was able to inform 
the Native Affairs Department that almost all the unexempted 
"single" Africans had been removed from the City(109), as had many 
Africans from the 'l'iynherg district( 110). The removal ·of African 
families from the city slums was held in abeyance while the 
Council concentrated on the clearance of Ndabeni. 
The Native Affairs Department's local Officer in Charge reported 
to his superiors in August 1928 that despite the Council's planned 
extension of Langa, it might take years to remove all the 
residents from Ndabeni and close the dilapidated location down(111). 
The Native Affairs Department was informed that the City Council 
wished to extend Langa to provide accommodation for the eight 
thousand Africans shown by registration returns to be normally 
resident in Cape Town and to reduce rentals in Langa from the 
beginning of 1929 in order to forestall the ongoing agitation over 
this ·issue (which will be discussed in chapter 6). ·These proposals 
could only be implemented 0 subject to consent being given to the 
closing of a portion of Ndabeni at the end of the current year and 
thereafter as further accommodation becomes available at 
Langa"(112). The Department, however, insisted on a more 
substantial reduction of Langa rentals than that proposed by the 
Council, and also on an increase in rentals at Ndabeni in order 
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"to make up the difference in revenue"(113). The Council protested 
that "the proposals of the Hon. the t.\inister are not practicable 
from a financial point of view" as any further reduction in rentals 
at Langa would be uneconomical, and requested permission to 
increase rentals for 11 single" men at Ndabeni by fifty percent(114). 
The central government concurred, with the proviso that when the 
Council's deficit had been liquidated, rentals at Langa were to 
be further reduced(115). 
Approval of the revised rental-scales for the two locations was 
then sought from the Provincial Administration(116), but the 
Council was re~inded that the locationts Advisory Boards had first 
to be consulted in terms of Section 10(2) of the Urban Areas 
Act(117). There was at that time no Advisory Board in Langa and 
one had to be hastily constituted before the Council's Native 
Affairs Committee could confer on 7 February 1929 with both 
Advisory Boards on the question of rentals. The new Langa 
Advisory Board presumably had no objection to the proposed rent 
reduction in that location, but the Ndabeni representatives 
vigorously -Opposed any suggestion of an increase. Nevertheless, 
the Advisory Boards had been consulted as required by law, and the 
new rentals were gazetted on 22 February 1929, only to be declared 
ultra vires by the courts, to which local Africans were 
increasingly turning in their efforts to resist the implementation 
of state policy(118). 
A Joint Council deputation led by Sir Walter Stanford called on 
the City Council to reduce rentals at Langa substantially rather 
than using force to relocate the recalcitrant residents of Ndabeni 
there(119), but the Council was pinning its hopes of filling the 
new location (which could accommodate five thousand people but 
only housed about one-fifth of that number) on the Urban Areas Act 
Amendment which was then before Parliament. It was hoped that the 
amended Act would (besides facilating more effective influx 
control and squatter control), give municipal officials and the 
police greater powers of search, arrest and removal to the new 
location(120). 
The resistance continued (as will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter 6) and in July 1930 the Assistant Native Commissioner 
recommended the closing down of all accommodation for the 1,690 
men in Ndabeni who were "single or deta·ched from their wives •••• 
in the Territories11 (121-). The City Council was officially 
requested to reduce rents at Langa, where there was reported to 
be room for about 2,300 "bachelors"(122). The Council toyed with 
the idea of allowing people removed from Ndabeni to Langa to pay 
rent. on the Ndabeni scale for the first six months, and then 
considered a differential rental system, as the Ndabeni Advisory 
Board insisted that ex-residents of that location should 
permanently pay a rent set halfway between what they had been 
paying in the old location and what they were expected to pay in 
the new(123). When the Native Affairs Department responded 
unenthusiastically to this suggestion(124), the Council finally 




This long-delayed decision could not be implemented immediately, 
however, as the Langa Advisory Board had ceased to function and 
could not be resusci'tated due to the uncooperative mood of that 
location's residents. The law required the approval of an Advisory 
Board before a new scale of location-rentals could become 
operative(126), so the Council resorted, during the first week of 
December, to serving eviction notices under the amended Urban Areas 
Act on "single" men at Ndabeni. These notices were predictably 
challenged in Court, and lengthy litigation followed. The 
Supreme Court ruled towards the end of 1931 that the C~uncil 1 s 
action was legal. New eviction notices were then served on Ndabeni 1 s 
"bachelors", and convictions were secured against those who failed 
to comply. Langa•s population consequently exceeded that of 
Ndabeni by early 1932. Hundreds of cottages were built in the new 
location during the following two years, and as they were 
completed the remaining families at Ndabeni were ordered into them. 
The Ndabeni huts were demolished as they were vacated and the City 
Council moved the last few hundred people from Ndabeni to Langa 
at the beginning of 1936(127). Government Notice number 695 of 
1936 then formally confirmed the demise of Cape Town's first 
officially segregated residential area(128), and Langa, with a 
population of 5,260 people, was declared full at the end of 
1938(129). 
Saunders and Elias both allude to the social control function of 
Langa, which was denigned to facilitate efficient policing(130). 
Saunders makes the additional point that, in providing accommodation 
for only five thousand Africans, the Council sought by the 
establishment of its new location to "confine the number of natives 
within the Municipality to that necessary for the economic 
requirements of the city 11 (131). 
It had in fact become obvious by the early 1920 1 s that residential 
segregation could not be accomplished unless the accelerating 
influx of Africans to Cape Town could be halted. Chapter 5 
discusses this issue, and outlines the att~mpts made during the 
period under consideration to implement the policy of influx 
control envisaged in the Urban Areas Act. The chapte~ concludes 
with a brief discussion of the squatter control measures that 
were considered necessary in order to ensure residential 
segregation and facilitate influx control. 
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CHAPTER 5: INFLUX CONTROL AND THE ERADICATION OF .SQUATTER 
SETTLEMENTS 
The previous chapter has shown how Cape Town's chronic black 
housing crisis had by the early 1920's reached a stage where it 
could no longer be ignored. The establishment of the "Native 
location1' at Ndabeni had not solved the problem, and powerful 
sectors of white public opinion once again began agitating for 
residential segregation. These sectors claimed that this could 
not be achieved without the establishment of control over the 
continued influx of Africans into the Peninsula. It was also 
contended that residential segregation and influx control 
necessarily included a further dimension. This involved the 
eradication of the burgeoning squatter settlements that harboured 
11 illegal" Africans and those '1legal 11 Africans who either would 
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not or could not live as required by law in the location set aside 
for them. 
This chapter discusses local contributory factors to the 
crystallization of state policy regarding influx control and 
squatter control that occurred at this time, and it outlines the 
local implementation of state polici. Cape Town was of course not 
the only city in which white public opinion was being ~obilized 
around these issues, and it is impossible to assess without more 
research the precise extent to which the local situation influenced 
policy-making on a national scale. However, events in Cape Town 
were certainly among the more urgent pressures impinging upon the 
Government (and in particular the Native Affairs Department) at 
that time. Davenport notes that Prime. Minister smuts, in 
introducing the second reading of the Urban Areas Bill in 1923 
"recalled the great changes which had occurred in his own lifetime 
with respect to the influx of Africans into the towns, above all 
in hie own Western Province"(1). Smuts also observed that 
representations by the Muni6ipal Association of the Cape Province 
were largely responsible for the ensuing Act's denial to Africans 
of land-ownership rights in ~rban areas(2). 
Influx Control 
The question of in~lux control (at least in the local context) 
was first raised official~y by the Native Affairs Department at 
the beginning of 1921, in response to the breakdown of the policy 
of residential segregation. Saunders says that 
in 1919 some Africans whom the police took to 
court pleaded in defence that there was no 
accommodation for them at Ndabeni, and they were 
discharged. From then on the law was a dead 
letter; the police let Africans live wherever 
they could find accommodation in Greater Cape 
Town(3). 
As more and more Africans entered the city, the situation 
increasingly grew out of control. The local Commissioner of 
Police called for action from the Native Affairs Department(4), 
which responded by drawing up a circular informing all magistrates 
in the Cape Province (including the "Native Territories" of 
Transkei and Ciskei) 
that the accommodation for natives in Cape Town 
is extremely limited. Under the Native Reserve 
Location Acts Nos 40 of 1902 and 8 of 1905, all 
natives in the municipality are required to live 
in the Ndabeni Location at Maitland, but it has 
been found impossible to make the accommodation 
there keep pace with the large increase in the 
number of natives arriving in Cape Town in recent 
years. They have accordingly had to find whatever 
accommodation they could, and in consequence the 
conditions under which they live are far from 
satisfactory, and they are under no sort of control. 
In the circum$tances they cannot be prosecuted for 
living outside the location, and the police are at 
a great disadvantage in dealing with them. I 
would therefore request you to warn as far as 
possible all natives intending to go to Cape Town 
of the conditions prevailing there and, unless they 
can satisfy you that they will be properly housed, 
to endeavour to dissuade them from doing so. 
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The draft circular was sent for comment to the City Council, which 
replied tersely that there would have been no necessity for such 
measures had the Stanford Commission's recommendation for a location 
of twenty thousand "natives" at Epping been accepted(5). 
This circular in fact seems to represent a compromise between 
different branches of the State apparatus. Issued on.the 
recommendation of the Location Site Committee earlier appointed 
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by Acting Prime Minister F.S. Malan at a meeting between central 
and local goverriment representatives(6), it clearly represents a 
retreat from Malan's threat (see the previous chapter) to 
repatriate surplus Africans from Cape Town to the "Native 
Territories" unless a solution to the local "Native problem11 could 
be agreed upon(?). 
As economic recession settled over South Africa, the local 
unemployment problem worsened in the second half of 1921. The 
Provincial Administration sent a telegram to Mr Malan saying that 
In peculiar circumstances here Administrator 
considers all naiives not in riormal employment 
should be repatriated make room for residents of 
district and ease position. He will be glad if 
Minister will give this matter special 
consideration(8). 
The Administrator was however reminded that this proposal had been 
discussed months previously, but had been rejected due to the 
"great distances involved in repatriation''( 9). The Native A.ff airs 
Department informed the Provincial Secretary that it had 
no funds out of which it could undertake the 
repatriation of destitute unemployed Natives in the 
Cape Province, a matter which would appear to fall 
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within the purview of your Administration(10). 
This was strongly contested by the Provincial Administration, 
which argued that "to make the Province responsible for matters 
which it can neither control nor prevent seems to the Administrator 
a serious flaw 1' ( 11 ) • 
This "stand-off'' between different levels of government catapulted 
I 
the questions of housing and influx control into the public arena. 
An editorial in the Cape Times suggested the imposition of a 
"native labour licence fee" payable by employers of "natives above 
a certain quota fixed for each city and town''• This was envisaged 
.as a means whereby "cheap rents could be provided for cheaply paid 
workers without expense to ratepayers, while stemming the influx 
of natives to the cities"(12). The suggestion was endorsed by the 
.Central Housing Board in its report foi 1921, which argued that 
the payment by employers of registration fees for all "natives" 
employed in urban areas would provide finance for the development 
of locations and facilitate influx control(13). 
Liberal philanthropists supported influx control for much the same 
reasons as they had welcomed residential segregation. In August 
1921 the Social Reform Association called on the Government, if 
agreement could not be reached with the City Council, to either 
house or repatriate the estimated one thousand 11 natives" living 
in the city slums and the two-thirds of Ndabeni•s six thousand 
residents for whom suitable accommodation had not been provided(14). 
When the Cape Peninsula Evangelical Church Council urged the 
I 
Acting Prime Ninister to take "immediate steps" against "Native 11 
living conditions in the location and the slums(15), Mr Malan 
replied that the government awaited the City Council's proposals 
and had warned "natives upcountry" against coming to Cape Town. 
Existing laws did not, however facilitate the establishment of 
control ove~ the continued influx of Africans(16). 
Taking what can only_be described as a narrow view, and ignoring 
\ r , 
the fact that deteriorating economic conditions in the Reserves 
were forcing more and more Africans into the urban areas(17), 
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Canon Lavis declared that the "Native Invasion" had to be stopped, 
and Africans encouraged to live elsewhere(18). A report in the 
Cape Argus conceded that the alarming situation in the Transkei 
was responsible for the accelerating influx of Africans to Cape 
Town, but argued that these people would be better off in the 
"Native territory, as while there is a· scarcity of food in many 
parts, there is something to eat; there is plenty of f~esh air 
too 11 (19). 
The Reverend Father Savage of Ndabeni called on the government in 
April 1923 to repatriate unemployed "Natives11 to the "Native 
Territories" and prevent them from returning. The influx of 
Africans was, he maintained, 
swamping us with a flood of badly paid unskilled 
labour. Is it fair to our Coloured people who 
hive first claim on us, as this is their only home? 
After all, the Natives have their own homes and 
other resources(20). 
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Canon Lavis identified the "Native Invasion'' as the main cause 
of an alleged increase in criminal activity and once again urged 
the authorities to halt the continued influx(21). The Watton 
Vigilance Association(22) and the Womens' Municipal Association(23) 
weretamong the organizations which supported this line of 
reasoning. 
Bowing to these pressures, the City Council called for the 
imposition of influx control measures(24). The Council was of the 
opinion that Cape Town "possessed its own reservoir of labour in 
the coloured community''(25) and it sought to safeguard the interests 
of this local "civilized labour force 11 (26). While the pressure 
for segregation and influx control was thus intensifying, the 
local Commissioner of Police sought clarification of the legal 
position from the Department of Native Affairs. He was informed 
that there was at that time no law whereby the movement of 
Africans in the Cape Province could be controlled. Magistrates 
had on several occasions been reminded that Africans i,n their 
areas should be warned against travelling to Cape Town, and once 
the municipality had assumed responsibility for the control and 
accommodation of Africans, 
It is hoped that by the provisions of the Urban 
Areas Bill .••• and a Pass Bill which the Department 
is anxious to introduce during the next session of 
PS:-rliament, means will be found not only to deal 
with the surplus population of unemployed and idle 
Natives, but also to control the influx of Natives 
to industrial areas and provide for the repatriation 
• 
of those in excess of the number necessary to 
minister to the needs of the European [sJ ( 27). 
The deteriorating position in Cape Town had by that stage assumed 
national significance. The need for a revision of "native 
legislation'' was stressed by the Pretoria newspaper Die Volkstem, 
which published an editorial saying that while 25 years previously 
there had been "hardly a Kafir in Cape Town" (except at the 
Breakwater construction site), local factories now employed 
Afri9ans in their thousands. Many of these people were said to 
have severed their tribal ties, and they were said to be joini_ng 
trade unions, taking part in May Day demonstrations and forming 
a permanent part of the population of Cape Town(28). An indication 
of the extent of permanent urbanization is provided by Rich, who 
reveals that the number of African women officially enumerated 
in_ Cape Town increased by 110% between.1911 and 1921(29). 
The Cape Town City Council was among the bodies advocating some 
form of amalgamation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill and the 
above-mentioned Pass Bill, the Natives Registration and Protection 
Bill(30), which were introduced simultaneously during the 1923 
session of Parliament. Minister of Mines and Industries 
F.S. Malan (~cting for Prime Minister Smuts who was also the 
Minister of Native Affairs) strongly hinted at such a possibility 
in March of that year when he met a deputation from the Wesleyan 
Methodist Church, which was concerned about the increasing 
incidence of unemployment and starvation among the residents of 
Ndabeni. He said that there was plenty of wor' in the 
agricultural sector for Cape 'rown•s "surplus army of native 
labour". The problem waa, however, that these people refused to 
work on the labour-starved farms, and insisted on coming to Cape 
Town where rates of pay were higher for those who could find 
employmerit. Effective regulation of the African influx, said the 
Minister, was the solution to the problem; and he disclosed that 
the incorporation of clauses from the Registration Bill into the 
Urban Areas Bill was being considered in this regard(31). 
After lengthy wrangling_ in Parliament, this is precisely what 
happened. A majority of the House agreed that the question of 
African housing in urban areas (which was in terms of the Urban 
Areas Bill to be made the responsibility of local authorities) 
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was inextricably linked to the problem of influx control. The 
municipalities would, in short, not be willing to provide housing 
for Africans unless their numbers could be restricted(32). 
Furthermore, the extension to.Africans· of freehold land-ownership 
rights in urban areas (as originally envisaged in the Urban Areas 
Bill) was not proceeded with. The proposed freehold rights were 
replaced by mere leasehold at the insistence of the ascendant 
Nation~l Party, whose leader Hertzog insisted that the acquisition 
·by Africans of land in the urban areas (alqeit in locations) would 
inevitably lead to their demanding enfranchisement. Nothing could 
be more detrimental in South Africa, said Hertzog, than to give 
the "natives 11 the franchise. 
Echoing the views of the previous year's Transvaal Local 
Government (Stallard) Commission report, Hertzog declared that the 
1913 Land Act had made the urban areas "white man's land" in which 
11 the native could only be a temporary resident"(33). 
The Urban Areas Act was promulgated in June 1923, and the Native 
Affairs Department informed the City Council that it ~ould begin 
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to be implemented from the beginning of 19~4(34). There seems, 
howe~er, to have been some confusion over who would finance and 
exercise the repatriation powers provided by the Act. These 
details were in fact not clea~ly specified. The Council apparently 
waited expectantly for action on the part of the Government, 
before sending a deputation in early May 1924 to confer with 
Minister F.S. Malan. Two days after this meeting the City Council 
formally requested the application of the provisions of the 
Urban Areas Act to Cape Town, so that unemployed Africans could 
be repatriated(35). The Department replied that the municipality 
should apply for repatriation powers under Section 12 of the Act, 
as "It is not the intention of the governme'nt to recommend that 
the Governor-General should ·exercise these powers in respect of 
Cape Town" ( 36). 
City Council representatives discussed the "Native Question" in 
August with the new Prime Minister Hertzog (who had taken office 
at the beginning of July). They argued that 
whilst it is realized that the question of native 
pressure on urban areas is largely an economic one, 
it is necessary, in inaugurating the new township, 
to take all possible steps to confine the number 
of natives within the municipality to that 
necessary for the economic requirements of the 
City. 
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The Prime Minister was told that the "unrestricted flow" of 
Africans into the Peninsula during the previous few years had 
undermined the "local labour market for the Coloured unskilled 
worker'' and that 
in the absence of any effective system to prevent 
the unlimited influx of natives into the urban area, 
it is considered unreasonable that the local 
authority should be required to repatriate large 
numbers for whom no employment can be found. 
The cost of repatriating unemployed Africans, it was argued, 
·"should be borne by the Government'', which should hand over the 
administration of Ndabeni to the City Council. Once this had been 
done, all that would be required was for the location to be brought 
within the purview of the Urban Areas Act, from which (being 
outside the municipal boundary) it was specifically excluded. 
The solution would then be in sight: 
The registration clauses of the Act could be 
I 
enforced; the repatriation by the Government of 
idle, dissolute or disorderly natives dea~t with; 
the illicit liquor traffic controlled and generally 
improved supervision exercised over the location(37). 
These arguments did not have the desired effect, and a Council 
deputation travelled to Pretoria to urge the Prime Minister and 
the Secretary of Native Affairs to "repatriate 11 Cape Town's 
unemployed "Na ti ves 11 ( 38). 'rhis was after the Deputy Pqlice 
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. Commissioner of the Western Division had suggested to the Justice 
Department that the repatriation provisions of the Urban Areas 
Act should be enforced immediately, although the full Act could 
only be implemented once the proposed Langa location had been 
built. The police believed that 11 this would give us some hold and 
control over the natives, and if rigidly enforced, might drive a 
considerable number of them back to their kraalsr•. The Deputy 
Commissioner reported that the uncontrolled influx to the 
Peninsula had led to a rash of petty theft by homeless and 
'·unemployed "natives", and to a situation in which "the Cape Flats 
swarm with wandering natives who are putting up shacks of all 
descriptions in the bush 11 (39). 
This extended dispute over administrative and financial 
responsibility apparently continued for another fifteen months, 
time 
during which/the situation steadily deteriorated. Only towards 
the end of January 1926 did the Native Affairs Department appoint 
"its own officer in charge of Native Affairs at Cape Town, on whom 
the duty of repatriating destitute and unemployed natives, as well 
as alien natives, then devolved 11 (40). In June of that year, 
Section 12 of the Act was implemented in Cape Town. Africans 
entering the area had thereafter to obtain permits allowing them 
td remain for up to fourteen days in order to seek work, and for 
up to one month for other purposes. Once these permits had 
expired, their holders were liable to arrest and repatriation(41). 
A registration office was opened in Dock Road in July(42), and 
approximately ten thousand Africans had registered there by 
August 192'7(43). 
Already by that stage, however, it had become apparent that the 
Act as it then stood did not provide sufficient power .to effect 
the desired repatriation. Saunders shows that Superintendent 
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Cook of Ndabeni had hoped to remove three or four thousand Africans 
under Section 17, which provided for the repatriation of "idle, 
dissolute or disorderly natives'', but after a number of court-
cases had been held and repatriation orders issued and defied, 
the Council discovered that because repatriation 
was only a semi-judicial order such defiance was not 
a punishable offence ••.• Section 17 was, then, 
virtually a dead letter(44). 
Actually, as Davenport points out, the 1923 Act as a whole was 
totally ineffective in controlling the influx of Africans to the 
urban areas(45}. What is generally ov~rlooked though is the fact 
that, due to Cape Town's unique characteristics of firstly having 
a substantial 11 Coloured 11 work-force and secondly being situated 
hundreds of kilometers from its reservoirs of unskilled African 
labour, it was possible in the Western Cape to attempt to 
supplement the normal influx-control measures that applied (at 
least on paper) elsewhere with a regionally-specific "Coloured 
Labour Preference Policy 11 • 
This policy, the suggestion of which had been bandied about since 
at least 1906(46), can probably best be understood as forming 
part of a strategy designed to divide African from "Coloured" 
workers. Smuts had argued in introducing the second reading of 
the Urban Areas Act in February 1923 that 11 Coloureds 11 should be 
treated as a 11 class apart", separated from "Natives" and "as the 
years go .on .••• dealt with on the White basis" ( 47). His 
successor Hertzog, who oversaw the co-option of the white workers 
by means of the "civilized labour policy" after 1924, began making 
overtures towards the "Coloureds'' pri~r to that year's election 
which brought him to power~ Davenport says that he "played on 
their cultural ties with the Afrikaner and on the natural desire 
of many to rise in status by dissociating themselves from the 
Africans"(48). In the famous speech that he delivered at 
Smithfield during the following year, Hertzog advocat~d the 
extension of full political rights to ''Coloureds" ( 49) and he 
unsuccessfully placed a Coloured Persons Rights Bill before 
Parliament in 192,(50). 
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The Coloured Labour Preference Policy was initiated, as an extension 
or corollary of the Civilized Labour Policy, even before the 
Urban Areas Act had been applied to Cape Town. Early in 1923, the 
Wesleyan Methodist Church deputation which conferred with Minister 
F.S. Malan about the increasing incidence of starvation at Ndabeni, 
told the Minister that the location's residents suspected that they 
were being "ousted by a policy of replacing them with Golot,tred and 
White workers'' ( 51). This does not seem to have yet been the case, 
however, although both liberal philanthropists(52) and the City 
Council(53) wished it to be so, and the Native Affairs Department 
condemned local employers for preferring cheap ''native" labourers 
to more expensive "coloureds'' ( 54). 
Then on 28 August 1925, as a member of a 11 Native Deputation11 
subsequently complained to Prime Minister Hertzog, African 
labourers at the docks were quite unexpectedly 
told not to return to work on Saturday morning as 
our places would be taken by coloured people. We 
would not at first believe it, but we found it was 
correct; we have done nothing wrong; there is 
nothing against·us; we were impressed by and 
believed your speeches in the Transkei and then 
the first thing was this replacement and an 
increase in our taxes. How will we pay them if we 
have no work? There is no work for us in the 
Territories; who is going to take care of us? 
We are very grieved(55). 
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Hertzog replied that 11 The Western Province of the Cape (Peninsula, 
Stellenbosch, Malmesbury, Swellendam etc.) is really the home of 
the Coloured man". In order to protect "Coloureds" and "Europeans" 
in the region, the African dock-labourers' deputation was told, 
the government was 11 following the policy of gradually lessening 
the natives, so that those who do not find work here will be. 
slowly absorbed in other places and other directions''. The mini~g 
and agricultural sectors were both said to be short of African 
labour, which would also be required to build a new railway line 
in the 11 Native territories11 (56). 
The issue was taken up by the local African political leadership, 
which protested to Hertzog in March. This will be more fully 
discussed in the following chapter, but it seems appropriate to 
quote here the Prime Ministe~s response to the arguments advanced 
at this meeting. He told the African leaders that Cape Town was 
a place par excellence, the home of the whit~ man 
in South Africa, the birth place of the coloured 
man in South Africa. In the first place all the 
industries, all the life going on in Cape Town is 
the creation of the white man •••• the coloured 
person was born and bred here. The native has 
vast stretches of country assigned to him as his 
own •••• The section which must look elsewhere is 
the native - the imported plant ..•• if natives in 
Cape Town are prepared to go to farms, cotton fields 
or mines there are openings enough. 
The remaining seven hundred or so Africans could continue working 
in the docks for the meantime, and the government was prepared to 
begin work on the railway line from Imvani to St Marks in the 
Transkei sooner than had been planned, if sufficient Africans 
from dape Town applied for work on the project(57). 
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The Native Affairs Department's local officer in charge, Mr Tandy, 
reported two weeks later that 127 .Africans had registered for 
work on the Imvani line(58). This figure had increased to two 
hundred in the next few days, despite the fact that ''the so-called 
leaders of the natives informed me that there would be no 
applications for wovk at Imvani: the actual response clearly -
indicates the value of their opinion". He noted that almost all 
those who had registered were unemployed and without means, and 
emphasized that 
there seems to be an excellent opportunity now of 
shepherding away some hundreds of natives and if 
something is not done soon the natives may scatter 
and'become less inclined to avail themselves of 
the Government's offer. 
They should, he said, either be temporarily set to work in the 
docks, or repatriated to their homes, "from where they could be 
given facilities to proceed to the new railway construction as 
soon as they were required"(59). 
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The scheme disappointed its planners. The Native Affairs 
Department assured the City Council, in response to a hopeful 
enquiry( 60), that a ''large number" of men who had registered for 
work on the Imvani Line had been despatched to their places of 
origin, and the local officer in charge of Native Affairs 
expressed the conviction that many more would follow, in view of 
the "very limited" work-opportunities for Africans in Cape Town. 
By the beginning of June, however, two weeks after the magistrates 
in the reserves had been requested to despatch the 175 men who had 
been sent home to await the call to the works, only 35 had turned 
up at Imvani. An additional 19 had been sent there directly from 
Cape Town(61). The engineer in charge of the Imvani works had to 
168 
be permitted to employ locals(62), who had at first been turned 
away(63). It seems that the authorities were able to "repatriate" 
a mere 266 men, 14 women and nine children at this time. All 
except 16 Ciskeians were sent to the Transkei, 192 o'f the men 
being·sent directly or indirectly to Imvani(64). A lengthy 
altercation ensued between the departments of Railways and Native 
Affairs over responsibility for the cost of repatriating the men 
who were sent to Imvani(65). 
The failure of the Imvani scheme necessitated a change of emphasis 
as far as repatriation was concerned, and the local Assistant 
Native Commissioner reported towards the end of 1928 that "This 
I 
office is not now repatriating unemployed able-bodied natives and 
\ 
has not done so for a long time 11 (66). Local "native administrators" 
in the employ of the City Council and the Native Affairs Department 
concentrated then on "the repatriation of sick natives11 (67) and as 
the then ex-Assistant Commissioner Tandy later recalled, 
Superintendent 
Cook used to telephone or write and ask if we 
would help repatriate certain Natives, and I used 
to reply by saying Government would go fifty-fifty 
with the Council. This resulted in the removal of 
quite a number of families; Cook rarely applied 
in respect of individual males, his cases were 
generally man and wife or families, and their 
removal suited the city and also the policy of the 
Government(6~). 
While this process of repatriation (for which figures have 
unfortunately proved unobtainable) continued, the accelerating 
influx from the Reserves simply could not be stemmed. The 
Coloured Labour Preference policy remained in operation at least. 
up to 1930, and probably also thereafter(69), but the legislative 
framework necessary for its implementation had not yet been 
erected. 
The Secretary of Native Affairs ~ptimistically informed the Chief 
Magistrate at Umtata and, the Chief Native Commissioner at King 
William's Town in early May 1926 that since the recent 
promulgation of Proclamation No 60 and the local application of 
the Urban Areas Act, Africans arriving in Cape Town without 
permission would find it impossible to remain for any length of 
time. He requested that Africans be made aware of this fact 
through their local District Officers(70). These official~ in 
turn informed their subordinates of the situation(71), and the 
news presumably filtered down to at least some people in the 
Transkei and Ciskei. Notices in African newspapers such as Imvo 
helped to disseminate the warning(72), but early in 1927 it was 
reported that the influx continued unabated(73). The City Council, 
at the instigation of the Superintendent of Ndabeni, suggested 
that the Railway authorities should co-operate by refusing to 
issue tickets to Africans wishing to travel to Cape Town and that 
"a Native Affairs official should inspect all passes at De Aar as 
natives pass through''(74) but the Native Affairs Department replied 
that 
No pass is necessary for natives to travel from 
any place in the Cape Province (including the 
Transkeian Territorie~) to Cape Town and in the 
Cape Province the railway authorities have no 
power to refuse a native a ticket provided he 
tenders the requisite fare. Magistrates in the 
Territories have been instructed to do their 
utmost to dissuade natives from proceeding to 
Cape Town and it is regretted that the Department 
is unable to do anything further than this(75). 
The Labour Department expressed its concern-at the deteriorating 
situation(76), and was informed by the Native Affairs Dep~rtment 
that "All we can do is by way of moral persuasion11 (77). When the 
Stedelike Behuiaings Bond (of which Archdeacon Lavis was the 
chairman of the Management Committee) ~rged Prime Minister 
Hertzog to see that action was taken to halt the influx of 
Africans to Cape Town, which was alleged to be the cause of the 
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bad housing conditions of the "white and coloured poor working 
classes", it was told by the Native Affairs Department that Africans 
from the Transkei and elsewhere in the Cape could not (under 
existing laws) be prohibited from coming to Cape Town(78). 
Towards the end of the following year, it was reported that the 
influx was still continuing(79), and the Native Affairs Department 
informed the Labour Department that "this Department has done, 
and is doing, everything possible, in the absence of a pass law 
in the Cape Province, to prevent the influx of Natives into Cape 
Town11 (80). 
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The ineffe~tual 1923 version of the Urb~n Areas Act was amended 
in 1930. Early that year, while the Amendment Bill was being 
debated in Parliament, the City Council requested that the amended 
Act should include provisions empowering municipal officers to 
enter and search premises and to arrest without warrant Africans 
who contravened its terms(81). These powers were granted in terms 
of Section 3 and 5 of the amended Act(82) which was brought into 
' operation in Cape Town by Proclamation No 231 of 30 December 
1932(83). Registration regulations requiring adult male Africans 
not in possesion of valid service-contracts to register every 
month as "togt" or casual labourers were issued under Government 
Notice No 1700 of the same date(84), and Superintendent Cook was 
appointed as the local registering officer(85). 
Those adult male Africans who were not contracted to employers or 
in possesion of casual labourer (~ogt) licences were required in 
terms of these Regulations to leave the proclaimed urban area of 
Cap~ Town, but when the City Council began attempting to enforce 
these regulations, the Supreme Court ruled in favour ·of a man who 
had been fined two shillings and sixpence for failing to renew 
his "togt" licence. The regulations were found to be defectively 
worded(86). The approximately two hundred and fifty casual dock-
labourers housed in the Docks Location (or barracks) thereupon 
"not only refused to renew but (have) also declined absolutely 
even to apply for togt certificates", and the Railways 
auth,orities (who administered the barracks) refused to intervene 
in the matter(87). Difficulties of this nature made the 
establishment of control as elusive as ever, and "In the first 
months of 1936 there were again complaints of an influx of 
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Africans into the city and suburbs' 1(88). 
Squatter Control 
The attempts to implement the policy of residential segregation 
outlined in the previous chaptei gave rise to an increasing 
incidence of illegal occupation of land by Africans in the 
Peninsula. 1rhis section discusses the growing ''squatter problem", 
which not only threatened the policy of segregation but also that 
of influx control, for the burgeoning squatter settlements provided 
a refuge for the steadily-increasing "illegal" population. 
African squatters seem first to have been perceived as a problem 
in the early 1890 1 s, when the Cape Register called for legislation 
to prevent "Kaffirs or any other representatives of the native 
tribes" from erecting ''shanties and poridokkies where' er their 
sweet will, and funds, allow them11 (89). Van Heyningen notes that 
by 1901 squatter communities including substantial numbers of 
Africans had developed on the Cape Flats beyond Rondebosch, 
Mowbray and Claremont, at Elsies River and elsewhere. Thirty to 
forty Africans were ej~cted from rented cottages on the Mowbray 
Flats in March of that year(90). Saunders suggests that the 
establishment of Ndabeni in March 1901 led to an increase in the 
African squatter population(91), but concrete evidence of this is 
hard to come by. The location was certainly unpopular, and in 
1912 the Assistant Medical Officer of Health reported that 
settlements of African squatters had developed at such places as 
r 
West London, Ysterplaat and Maitland(92). 
The "problem" seems only to have assumed significant proportions 
in early 1922, after Ndabeni's population had been frozen at a 
maximum of 3,000(93). Part of the overflow from Ndabeni settled 
in self-built pondoks at Vasco, but prompt action by the local 
authority there resulted in an exodus of African squatters to 
Elsies River(94). The "unauthorized location at Elsies River" 
the police, and its inhabitants moved to the A was soon closed by 
II /Kensington Estate near Maitland(95). Here they were subjected to 
raids for illicit liquor, large quantities of which were 
confiscated in September after the police had been attacked by 
"hundreds of hostile natives" and had been obliged to use their 
revolvers(96). Three such raids had taken place by the following 
month(97), by which stage there were reported to be up to two 
) 
thousand African squatters in the area(98). Eviction notices had 
apparently been issued, and a number of huts occupied by 11 single 11 
men were demolished, only to be re-erecited by the{r recalc~trant 
inhabitants(99). Landowners were being prosecuted for allowing 
squatting on their properties, while the "white•! residents of 
Maitland threatened to form vigilante groups and attack their 
unwelcome new neighbours(100). 
The local magistrate expressed his concern that the ongoing 
prosecution of landlords would render growing numbers of African 
squatters homeless, but the police-insisted that it was better to 
scatter these people than to allow them to congregate in any 
numbers(101). The raids continued, and in August 1924 the Deputy 
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Police Commissioner reported 70 arrests in a "roundup" the previous 
week, and called for the immediate enforcement of the repatriation 
,. 
provisions of .the Urban Areas Act in order to "drive a 
considerable number of Gquatter~ back to their kraals"( 102). 
The municipality of Wynberg and the Cape Divisional Council 
appear to have taken the lead in acting against the growing 
"squatter problem". African squatters in Grassy Park, which was 
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within the Wynberg municipal area, and in the Divisional Council's 
Parkwood Estate were ordered to leave early in 1925. The plight 
of one particular group of people who were living on land 
belonging to a Mr William MacGregor at Grassy Park is dramatically 
highlighted in the available documentation. In February 1925 
MacGregor was fined three pounds for contravening Wynberg Municipal 
Regulations by allowing unauthorized "natives" to live on his 
property(103). He then ordered these people to leave and refused 
to accept their rent at the end of that month. There was, however, 
nowhere in Cape Town where they could legally reside, as there 
were no vacancies for married people at Ndabeni. When they had 
still not moved by the beginning of April, they were visited by 
MacGregor and two policemen, who told them (in the words of their 
leader, railway worker Mr Jackson K Sifumba), that "if you not 
remove here after seven days the governor shall send the 
policemen to come to burnt you". 
The squatters approached a lawyer, who told them that they had no 
legal defence. They thereupon wrote to the authorities, 
beseeching the "governor" for "the place to stay any where" and 
explaining that "we don't know where we go to when the Governor 
our Father expel us in this country"(104). As there was then "a 
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glut of Kafir labour in Cape Town"(105), they were advised to 
"remove to a centre which offers labour and accommodation for 
natives, or' to return to the district or location of your home 11 (106). 
These peopl~ then moved to Rylands Estate, where a squatter 
settlement which included people "removed last year from Cedarvlei-
Grassy Park, Wynberg districtn was inspected by Superintendent 
Cook in Fepruary 1926. Cook reported that the Rylands squatters 
had invalid contracts of sale for the land they occupied, and he 
gratuitously added that 11 they are not a desirable type of native, 
although the majority work 11 (10?). African squatters were also 
reported at this time to be a problem in Churchill Estate, 
Parow(108), and the local Management Board was advised to draw up 
building and health regulations that would outlaw this 
development(109). 
Langa was being built at .that: time, and the Town Clerk warned 
the Native Affairs Department that 11 natives 11 acquiring land on 
the Cape Flats would not easily be moved into the new location(110). 
The Department's local officer in charge urged that "we should do 
all in our power to prevent Gquatter~ increasing in numbers"( 111), 
and after representations by the City Council(112), a Proclamation 
was issued in June 1926 extending from three to five miles the 
area beyond the municipal boundary within which Africans were 
prohibited from residing(113). 
Saunders shows that many of the Africans forced out of the city 
by the police and the City Council's special constables (see the 
previous chapter) ended up not at Langa, as the authorities 
intendeq, but in the squatter settlements of .the Cape.Flats(114). 
This was true also of a substantial proportion of the people 
evicted from Ndabeni(115). The largest of these settlements was 
on the Kensington Estate Reserve, which seems first to have been 
occupied (from about 1920) by "Coloureds" evading the payment of 
{ 
rates and compliance with building regulations by settling just 
beyond the municipal boundary. In August 1928 the Kensington 
Estate Reserve Ratepayers Association voted to do away with the 
"Kafir location connota tions 11 of the area's ·previous name and to 
call their settlement Windermere(116). 
Towards the end of 1928, this Ratepayers Association was 
complaining of an influx of Africans to Windermere(117) and a 
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Vigilance Committee was established to deal with the proliferating 
shebeens which were said to be attracting growing numbers of 
Africans to the area(118). The chairman of the Cape Divisional 
Council, which was the responsible local authority, reported in 
1930 that despite a number of prosecutions unemployed Africans 
continued to erect "mushroom huts" among the bushes of Windermere. 
The Divisional Council was not in a position to clear the area, 
' and called on the City Council to assume control(119). The City 
Council, however, felt that the quarter million pounds that the 
City Engineer estimated would be necessary to "put Windermere in 
order" was prohibitive, and it decided in 1931 not to include 
Windermere within the municipal boundary(120). 
Windermere was by no means the only·expanding settlement where 
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African squatters in increasing numbers found shelter during this 
period. The 1932 Native Economic Commission specifically mentioned 
the particularly 11 disagreeable 11 conditions at Windermere and Elsiea 
I 
River(121), but there were also concentrations of Africans 
illegally occupying ground at Vrygrond, Blaauvlei and elsewhere. 
The 1937 Cape Coloured Commission found gross overcrowding in the 
shanty towns of the Cape Flats(122) and by 1939 there were an 
estimated 50,000 squatters in the Cape Town area(123). The 1939 
census showed 18,500 Africans officially in Cape Town(124), of 
whom a mere 5,260 were living in Langa(125). 
The local "squatter problem'' simply could not be tackled under 
existing laws and administrative procedures, and it was only in 
the 1950's that a determined effort was made by t~e new National 
Party Government to establish control over the situation, which 
had assumed monumental proportions by that stage(126). 
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CHAPTER 6: RESISTANCE 
This chapter discusses the development of popular resistance to 
the crystallizing state policies examined in the previous three 
chapters. The focus here is on the struggl~ waged•locally by 
Africans,for housing and urban rights. This is a largely 
neglected topic, although admirably pioneered by Saunders(1). 
A somewhat arbitrary starting-point coincides with the 
190 
establishment of Ndabeni, as little evidence of organized political 
activity among Africans in Cape Town prior to that date has yet 
come to light. Africans resisted removal to the new location 
(see chapter 3) and once there, their resistance intensified and 
assumed increasingly organized forms. 
Early Resistance at Ndabeni 
This resistance found expression initially in a stay-away which 
was seemingly spontaneous. The Reverend James Jolobe (the first 
African to be ordained by th~ Dutch Reformed Church(2)), 
undoubtedly expressed the feeling of many residents of the new 
location when he wrote that 
the Natives who are unfortunate enough to be 
compelled to live at Maitland Location themselves 
say it would have been better for the Government 
to have destroyed them and their families at once, 
rather than to have sent them to so terrible a 
spot to die of fever, consumption or other diseases, 
which are certain to afflict them. 
During the recent rains, said the black dominee, 11 nearly all the 
so-called huts were submerged in pools of water, as the place is 
a swamp or marsh"(3). 
General discontent with these conditions gave rise to a widely-
supported withdrawal of labour. Although popular grievances were 
initially disregarded by the authorities and the white population, 
within two months of the location's establishment the ensuing 
labour-shortage forced the Town Council to send a deputation to 
the Colonial Secretary. The Colonial Secretary assured the 
deputation in essence that the "Natives 11 had no real alternative 
but to return to work(4). There were said to be 
over 6,000 Kafirs in the location who were for 
various reasons unavailable, chiefly .••• because 
they either had not settled down to work after 
their transference from the •••• slums, or else had 
their hearts in their huts beyond the Kei(5). 
A month later the situation remained unchanged: "The Kafirs were 
dissatisfied and were disorganizing the labour market 11 ( 6). This 
strike seems in fact to have continued at least until the end of 
September, when the Reverend Elijah Mdolomba (who had supported 
the establishment of the location and had accused Jolobe of 
exaggerating the foulness of the place(7)),defended the residents of 
Ndabeni against charges of lazines$ levelled in the local press. 
The labour shortage, he said, was due to ill-trea tmen-t and not to 
laziness(8)~ 
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While the stay-a~ay began to collapse, a rent-strike was gathering 
momentum. Saunders has provided a detailed account of this strike. 
It began in June 1901, when rents of ten shillings per month 
(including train-fare into Cape Town) first became due in the new 
location after three months of rent-free residence(9). By that 
stage the location residents had already split into two opposing 
factions, one of which (led by William Sipika) was pressing for 
freehold title, while the other more radical group "queried the 
continued existence of the location now that the plague threat 
seemed to have passed"(10). 
However, Saunders did not attempt to explore this division within 
the local African community. Furthermore, he concluded that 
the chief spokesman for the resistance and, it 
would seem, the main organiser, was Alfred Mangena, 
who was in 1912 to be a founder member of the 
South African Native National Congress. 
He immediately qualified this assertion with the observation that 
Although not a resident of the location, then, he 
(Mangena) both advised Sipika and others and acted 
himself as 'champion of their cause', becoming in 
the eyes of the Location Inspector a 'mischievous 
irresponsible Native'(11). 
In fact Mangena seems to have been less of an organizer than an 
advisor and translator, a link between the authorities and the 
then largely illiterate African workers of Cape Town. He clearly 
played such a role among the dock-workers who appointed him as 
their secretary in October 1901(12). Mrs Edith Davies, who 
provided Mangena with accommodation, clothing and tuition for his 
legal studies in return for his services as interpreter and 
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teacher at the "Natives Night School", said in evidence before a 
Special Examiner of the British High Court (who had been sent to 
Cape Town in 1907 to collect evidence for a case in which Mangena 
appeared as the plaintiff) that "he often advised the Dock Natives, 
and they often paid him". He was completely honest and reliable, 
and as many as one hundred dock labourers at a time came to consult 
him(13). 
This was the man who (according to another witness who gave 
evidence before the Special Examiner), the location residents 
turned to when they "needed a competent man to represent them to 
the Whites"(14). It was, however, the more radical faction (of 
which this witness was a leader) and not the more conservative 
section of the population (led by Sipika and Mji and supported by 
the Reverend Mdolomba) that Mangena acted for. 
The Vigilance Committee that was formed to liase with the 
authorities was within a year being challenged by an alternative 
and more militant committ~e. Mdolomba maintained that the 
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Vigilance Committee represented the "educated natives" while their. 
opponents were supported mainly by the 11 raw natives"( 15). It 
seems that people like Mdolomba, Sipika and Mji can be categorized 
as members of a small but vociferous aspirant petty bourgeois 
class. Saunders shows for example that Sipika supported the 
establishment of the location as he "hoped to be able to give up 
his job as a dock labourer and start a business in the location11 (16). 
The members and supporters of the alternative committee seem to 
have harboured no such aspiration~, which were in any event 
unlikely to be fulfilled during this era of "class levelling11 (17). 
Both factions advocated the non-payment of rent; the Vigilance 
Committee in order to compel the authorities to provide adequate 
shelter from the elements, and their opponents in protest against 
being forced to live in the location at all(18). Feelings were 
obviously running high when the Prime Minister visited Ndabeni in 
an attempt to resolve the problem in July 1901, for he "said 
afterwards that he had never before been spoken to as he had by 
Africans that day"(19). 
Saunders has outlined the ensuing development. of this rent 
struggle. In August, rentals were reduced from ten shillings to 
eight shillings per month (and to four shillings per month for 
those who did not make use of the "Maitland Express"). But soon 
afterwards the non-payment of rent was criminalized, and this was 
made retrospective to June. Early in 1902 the locatio~ waa:divid~d 
into six wards (each under a paid African wardsman) in order to 
establish more effective control over the residents. Then in 
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February 1902 a more efficient rent-collection system was 
introduced, leading to the arrest and conviction of approximately 
two hundred people who had not paid rent. Nine leading "agitators" 
were included among the convicted, and the case of one of these 
leaders, Arthur Radasi (who was described as a "well-known 
agitator") was taken on appeal to the Cape Supreme Court, where 
his conviction and sentence were overruled on a technicality. 
The Chief Justice, however, declined to pronounce on the validity 
of the argument put forward in his defence that the location 
regulations issued in terms of the Health Act were no longer 
legally binding. He suggested in fact that a new case should be 
brought to court to settle this matter(20). 
Saunders observed that ''these remarks prompted Mangena to organize 
a series of meetings in the location"(21), but this does not seem 
entirely accurate. In fact, it seems io have been at this stage 
that the opponents of the Vigilance Committee formed an alternative 
committee of which Machine Wakani was chairman and treasurer(22). 
He was assisted in the latter capacity (as he was illiterate) by 
John Zwayi(23) who was appointed joint treasurer with Wakani at a 
public meeting. The surnames of the other members of this 
committee were Melani, Potswana, Bloem, Koboka, Nzikani, Booi, 
Ngquati, Sizani and Mtati. None of these community representatives 
were fluent in English and it was decided to invite Mangena to help 
in the campaign against the payment of rent(24). Mangena had 
already demonstrated his support of the location's "radical" 
faction by means of a number of letters published in the local 
press(25). 
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Regular mass meetings were held in Ndabeni in the six weeks between 
Radasi's successful appeal in mid-May und the one-day· strike or 
"riot" at the end of June, which marked the climax of the anti-
rent campaign(26). A few of these meetings were addressed by 
Radasi's legal representatives, the attorney Mr Karie and the 
advocate Mr Wilkinson, and also by Dr Alfred Sellar (or Seller) 
of District Six(27). Dr Sellar had (as was mentioned in chapter 
3), been one of the most outspoken proponents of the location's 
establishment, but conditions in Ndabeni were so appalling that he 
felt obliged to speak out for their amelioration(28). Mangena 
proved his worth as an interpreter at these meetings, where the 
three 11 White11 advisors (who appear to have been well paid for their 
services) repeatedly stressed that the Africans' campaign should 
remain within the bounds of legality. This was, however, not to 
be. 
According to Saunders, "As the rent could not be collected, the 
Native. Affairs Department advised the Railways to collect rail 
fares on its own, and it decided to do so from 30 June 1902 11 • 
No fares were collected on that day hbwever, and few of the 
residents left the location by.train or by any other means. There 
were allegations of widespread intimidation by the Wakani 
faction(29) and stones were thrown during, a stormy meeting called 
outside the Magistrate's Office by the Assistant Resident Magistrate, 
who recall'ed afterwards that the "Natives" had b~en "masters of the 
situation and the police could do nothing11 ( 30). The following day 
one hundred police reinforcements were sent into the location, and 
; 
the residents returned to work(31). 
The upshot of all this was that wakani and his entire committee 
(except for Koboka) were each sentenced to three month's hard 
labour and 14 residents were fined two pounds each for travelling 
on the train without tickets(32). The latter case provided the 
testing of the location regulations that the Chief Justice had 
recommended at the Radasi appeal; and althoug~ the Magistrate 
found the regulations valid, it was felt necessary to "put beyond 
legal doubt the powers the government was already exercising" at 
Ndabeni and to make provision for the establishment of similar 
segregated locations elsewhere(33). 
A Town Council deputation urged the Prime Minister not to delay 
the introduction of legislation dealing with the "Native Location 
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Question'' and the councillors were assured that the necessary Bill 
had already been drafted(34). This was promulgated as the Native 
Reserve Location Act (No. 40 of 1902), which 11 gave the Governor 
the power to proclaim locations in municipal areas and compel 
blacks who could not claim exemption to live in them"(35). 
Uitvlugt was renamed Ndabeni by this Act, which also stipulated 
that residents who failed to pay their rent-arrears would be liable 
to a fine of five pounds or one month's imprisonment and that those 
who continued !not to pay rent would be summarily ejected from the 
location(36). 
This ended the 1901-2 Ndabeni rent strike which (unless it can be 
proved that the earlier withdrawal of labour was in fact 
organized) seems to have been the first organized workers' 
} 
community struggle in Cape Town. After this lengthy campaign, the 
location remained quiescent during the bitter years of depression 
between 1903 and 1909, and the slow period of recovery leading up 
to the Great War of 1914-18. It was only in 1918, after years of 
wartime inflation and at the beginning of the short boom ushered 
in by the war, that organized resistance re-emerged in Ndabeni. 
The Period of Quiescence, 1903-18 
Conditions in the location deteriorated steadily throughout this 
period (as shown in chapter 3), but the political economy and the 
prevailing social climate seem not to have permitted the 
development of a grass-roots organization that could articulate 
the residentJ interests and complaints. On the contrary, it was 
the conser•ative elements at Ndabeni, centred around the Advisory 
Board, who were strengthened· during this period. The Reverend 
Mdolomba went so far (in his evidence to the 1903 Select Committee 
on Native Locations) as to stress the benefits that the residents 
had derived from the establishment of the location. They now had, 
he said, no liquor, better discipline, and their own-schools and 
churches(37). 
The 1905 Native Locations Amendment Act (No. 8 of 1905) provided 
for the establishment of "Native Advisory Boards" in locations(38) 
in order to facilitate control. In 1908 the Assistant Resident 
Magistrate of Ndabeni informed the Native Affairs Department that 
an Advisory Board comprising the "leading men of the location" 
had been established there in terms of Proclamation 297 of 1908; 
The Advisory Board was not, he admitted, fully representative of 
all sections of the community;and many residents objected to the 
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ruling whereby those residents who were in arrears with their rents 
were excluded from participating in Advisory Board elections(39). 
Nevertheless, even this tame and unrepresentative body could not 
remain completely silent about the deteriorating conditions in the ~ 
location. Eventually the Board was told in 1911 by its chairman, 
the 'Location Superintendent Mr Nicholls, that the Native Affairs 
Department was making arrangements to procure railway sleepers 
which could be used for flooring purposes(40). The Acting 
Secretary for Native Affairs thereupon wrote to the Public Works 
Department in this regard(41). 
In an effort to win popular support, the Advisory Board in 
December 1911 resolved to press for a compulsory education system 
in the location. It urged that this should.be financed by a tax 
on all residents rather than by the parents, many of whom could 
not afford to pay for their children's· education(42). The 
government's immediate response was to inform the Board that its 
resolution could not be implemented as a decision regarding 
pending legislation was awaited(43). 
This was one of the matters discussed in mid-1913 with the 
Secretary for Native Affairs (Mr Dower) by a deputation of 11 Native 
Ministers 11 from Cape Town led by the white Reverend Father Wallis 
and apparently accompanied by Mr Nicholls(44). The Education 
Department, however, pointed out that the existing educational 
legislation did not provide for compulsory education for 
Africans(45) and the Justice Departm~nt ruled that education at 
Ndabeni could not be made compulsory under the Locations Act, but 
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had to be dealt with under the laws on education(46). The Finance 
Department was asked whether it would be in order for.rentals at 
Ndabeni to be increased by thruppence monthly to pay for 
education(47), and replied that this was a matter for the 
Provincial Administration, which was responsible for all education 
except at the higher levels(48). It remains unclear how this 
education issue was resolved. 
Another question raised with Mr Dower was the proposed subdivision 
of the location's four wards and the appointment of sub-headmen in 
each ward. This, said Mr Nicholls, "would very materially 
strengthen the hands of present police and ensure better 
administration''• The deputation further requested the outlawing 
of "Danti" and its subs ti tut ion by "Ka fir Beer'', and the provision 
of a railway pl~tform at the halt which se~ved ~he approximately 
seven hundred location residents who travelled into town to work 
each day( 49) • 
A Peninsula Natives' Association existed by that stage, but it has 
proved impossible to discover evidence of its activities (if any) 
at Ndabeni. This Association was by late 1911 holding regular 
political-education meetings in District Six, where such topics 
as immigration and taxation were discussed(50). The organization's 
president, Mr Thomas Zini, told a meeting convened in District Six 
during the following year to protest against the "White Labour 
Policy" and the proposed issuing of passes to African women in the 
Orange Free State that "all that had been done in the past to 
uplift South Africa had been achieved by means of native labour"(51). 
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Protest meetings against the Natives Land Bill then before 
Parliament were held by the Peninsula Natives Association on the 
Grand Parade during 1913(52), but no subsequent mention of the 
organization's activities has yet been unearthed. It seems 
reasonable to assume that it merged with the South African Native 
National Congress (formed in 1912), and that the reason for its 
apparent failure to organize and agitate within Ndabeni was the 
strict policing and control then exercised within th~ location. 
The next open stirring of defiance among the residents of Ndabeni 
apparently occurred in 1917, when a number of residents refused 
to move into already occupied huts in order to make room for 
newcomers driven out of town into the location. A test case 
resulted in the conviction of certain Africans fo~ disobeying 
lawful commands, but the case went on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, where the judges ruled, on the grounds of public decency and 
health,that people could not reasonably be expected to obey such 
orders. After all, the judges noted, Ndabeni's population had 
quadrupled since 1911, but no additional accommodation had been 
provided(53). Legal victory could not however prevent the further 
deterioration of living conditions in Ndabeni. 
As the already grim conditions steadily deteriorated towards the 
end of the First World War, the Advisory Board raised the first 
timid voice of protest, which was soon drowned by a more militant 
chorus. The question of overcrowding was discussed at an 
Advisory Board meeting early in December 1917. This was followed 
by a mass meeting of more than four hundred residents, which 
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called on the Government to ''make additional accommodation 
~vailabl~ at an early date". Two members of the original 
Advisory Board of· 1908(54), apparently still in office, were among 
the three men authorized by the meeting to convey this resolution 
to Mr Nicholls(55). 
The Re-emergence of Militancy 
It was around the ever-explosive issue of education, however, that 
resistance of a more militant nature crystallized. Maylam has 
claimed that education was an issue dear to Durba.n.1 s African· petty 
bourgeoisie(56), but in Cape Town during this period of transition 
its perceived significance seems to have been more general. For 
people who had become inextricably enmeshed in the social matrix 
of a developing city, traditional mechanisms for the socialization 
of the young were obviously inadequate. Concern for education can 
be seen as a corollary of permanent urbanization, and when Mr 
Nicholls arbitrarily dismissed the headmaster of the United Mission 
School in Nd~beni in May 1918, the permanent residents of all 
classes saw this as a threat to the future of their children. 
A meeting of parents and other residents protested against the 
"disgraceful dismissal'' of "a very good teacher" who had not been 
given the opportunity of a hearing(57). The Reverend Z.R. Mahabane 
took the lead in the campaign against this high-handed measure on 
the part of the unpopular location superintendent. Hahabane had 
been prominent at a combined mass meeting of African political 
organizations held at Ndabeni in March 1918 at which representatives 
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from all over the country protested against an early draft of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Bill which was then before Parliament(58). 
He became provincial leader of the South African Native National 
Congress in 1918 and the "moderate" president of the renamed ' 
African National Congress in 1924(59). 
A letter from Nicholls to the Secretary for Native Affairs reveals 
I 
that the Mission School lost almost all of its pupils, moat of 
whom enrolled at schools in Salt River. A petition of residents 
was drawn up and handed to the Superintendent General of 
Education by a concerned member of the Provincial Council. 
Nicholls rejected this petition with the claim that it included 
the signatures of people who had never shown an interest in 
educational matters. He attributed the agitation over his 
dismissal of the headmaster to his continuing attempts to suppress 
the illegal liquor trade, which supported a large number of women 
residents. This contention was backed up by the written testimony 
of Advisory Board st~lwart the Reverend Patwell Matshikwe(60). 
The Department of Public Education endorsed Nicholls' action in 
dismissing the headmaster, but a further protest meeting in early 
July passed a vote of no confidence in Nicholls as the manager 
of the school. Mahabane called on the Native Affairs Department 
to intervene, asserting that the continued existence of the school 
was threatened(61). He was told that the matter rested with the 
Education Department(62), which held that decisions, once taken 
in cases of this nature, should not lightly be reversed(63). 
A protest meeting at the beginning of August called for Nicholls' 
resignation as school manager and for the substitution.of 
individual management. of African and "Coloured" schools by school 




achools(64). The Superintendent General of Education ~o whom this 
resolution was forwarded), replied that its tone was regrettabl4) and 
that he was satisfied that the residents' grievances were 
groundless(65). The following month Mahabane chaired a South 
African Natives National Congress mass meeting in Ndabeni that 
denounced the 
fatal and increasing discrimination between black 
and white •••• ~hic12) had divided the South 
African family at a time when the people of the 
so-called Union should be presenting a united 
front to the world 
and called for African representation on the peace delegation 
that was then preparing to go overseas(66). 
This rising tide of local African militancy ebbed temporarily as 
the "Black October" influenza epidemic of 1918 literally brought 
the people of Ndabeni to their knees. An open-air thanksgiving, 
humiliation and prayer service .held in the location as the epidemic 
was on the wane adopted Mahabane's resolution thanking the 
Municipality for its "kindly thoughtfulness in bringing timely 
relief to a stricken and helpless people ••.. a people that was 
dying partly from the effects of the dread malady and partly from 
O· 
starvation and neglect 11 (67). 
The Reverend Turner of St Cyprian's Mission in Ndabeni drew 
attention to ~he sterling work carried out there by philanthropic 
relief workers who had 11 given the Natives a new outlook towards 
Europeans 11 and.stated that the government locations at Ndabeni 
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and New Brighton in Port Elizabeth were far better than municipal 
locations elsewhere(68). This latter assertion was roundly 
challenged by Mr James M. Molebaloa of Ndabeni who maintained that 
"to my knowledge there is no location under the municipality in 
any town which is a disgrace as Ndabeni to Cape Town11 (69). 
The influenza epidemic disturbed the local supply of African 
unskilled labour sufficiently for representations by a "native 
deputation" to the Mayor and representatives of the Railways 
Administration, the Chamber of Commerce and other employers• 
organizations to result in the raising of minimum wages to four 
shillings per day. The Ndabeni branch of the South African Natives 
National Congress thanked the Mayor for arranging the meeting, and 
the employers for recommending the increase(70). But even as this 
wage increase temporarily helped' offset the effects of post-war 
inflation, so the accelerated pace of industrial development 
fostered the proliferation of various forms of propaganda and 
organization among the workers. The ferment among Cape Town's 
workers during this period cannot be discussed here(71), but it 
is interesting to note that a meeting of the Industrial and 
Commercial Union (ICU), Cape Town Harbour branch, Dn 14 February 
1919 discussed the need to organize tlie residents of Ndabeni and 
Mr Batty, a member of the Democratic Labour Party who was described 
by a police informer as "a leading light in Native and Coloured 
walks and ~] most dangerous factor as a European agitator"(72), 
announced that he would be addressing a meeting in the location 
that weekend(73). 
This meeting (at which Batty does not seem to have played a very 
large role) resolved unanimously 
that the government be respectfully urged to take 
immediate measures to relieve the state of 
overcrowding in this location, and further to 
provide housing accommodation for the many 
'homeless' who are at present without homes in the 
Peninsula, 
and called for the provision of tents as a temporary measure. In 
' moderate tones, the meeting requested 
a temporary suspension of the law prohibiting 
Natives, other than registered Parliamentary voters, 
from residing outside the location area, so as to 
' enable those of the people who cannot find 
accommodation in the Location to be at liberty to 
find same elsewhere in the area of the Municipality 
of Cape· Town. 
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A deputation comprising the Reverends Z.R. Mahabane and w.w. Olifan, 
together with Messrs Simon Ntisa and Alfred Ngaleka, was appointed 
to interview the Minister of Native Affairs(74). The call for an 
..---------------------------------------
audience with the Minister was repeated at another mass meeting 
in early April. The gathering noted that it had been decided to 
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hand the location over to the Municipality and resolved to "humbly 
beg" for consultation with the residents. The Reverends Mahabane 
and Matshikwe, with S. Ntisa and s. Jordan, were delegated to 
present this resolution to the Ministerl75) who does not seem to 
have deigned to meet either of these proposed deputations. 
The location had by then become so over6rowded that when Nicholls 
reported that the dismissed· headmaster (who was teaching at the 
A.M.E. Church School which had been established in opposition to 
the two official location schools) was living outside the location, 
' 
he was told that no action could be taken "in the existing 
circumstances when twenty men are being squeezed into space barely 
sufficient for four". Negotiations between the municipality and 
the Native Affairs Department continued(76). 
Tents were eventually procured, and the ''bachelors" occupying 
certain huts that were designated as married quarters were ordered 
to move out into the tents to make way for homeless families. 
They refused to do so until the tents were provided with wooden 
floors, and their attitude was strongly condemned by Nicholls and 
his proteges on the Advisory Board(77). When the "bachelors" had 
still not moved at the beginning of September, an Advisory Board 
member was reportedly 
of opinion that there was some evil influence at 
work ~n this location and their object appeared to 
be to defy anything official and endeavour to point 
out that anything coming fro~ the office was wrong 
and against the native~ interests. The law should 
be invoked, otherwise they will try to rule the 
location(78). 
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The day after "the Council thought better of assuming the burden 
of the location when the government would offer no more than 
£20,000 for improvements there"(79), the Reverend Matshikwe of the 
Advisory Board wrote in his personal capacity to the Acting 
Secretary for Native Affairs to express the b~tter disappointment 
of the residents at this turn of events (which was discussed in 
chapter 4). Further delay in providing accommodation could, he 
said, only lead to the further deterioration of living conditions. 
There were already three to four families or up to twenty 
"bachelors" in each hut, while the second-hand huts that had been 
provided were "giving way". He appealed to the Acting Secretary 
"in the name of God and humanity to stop this kind of livingil(80), 
and was told simply that the matter was receiving attention(81). 
The Reverend Matshikwe again called on the Government to provide 
sufficient accommodation for the location's residents at an 
Advisory Board meeting in December at which Nicholls thanked the 
Board for its valuable assistance in persuading the "bachelors" 
to move into tents(82). 
A number of "bachelors'' who refused to move into tents without 
flooring had been convicted in the magistrates court of disobeying 
a lawful order, but the Supreme Court quashed the convictions, 
.finding that the removal order was unlawful. Despite this ruling, 
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Nicholls continued to insist that they should move into the' tents, 
and seven men (presumably ''ringleaders") were expelled from the 
location when they continued to refuse to do so. A meeting was 
held, and it was decided to enlist the aid of Advocate Upington, 
M.P., whose Liesbeek constituency included Ndabeni. A deputation, 
comprising James Molebaloa, Benjamin Ntia, William Olifan, Simon 
Jordan, John Geduka and Robert Songelwa, accompanied Mr Upington 
on 24 November to protest to the magistrate of Cape Town against 
this injustice. The magistrate was told "that the older men had 
a great deal of trouble in keeping the younger men quiet" and he 
wrote to the Secretary for Justice, recommending "an inquiry into 
the conditions and state of affairs in ~h~ location. Unless this 
is done pro~ptly, and the natives given an opportunity of stating 
their alleged grievances, serious trouble may arise 11 (83). 
On 2 December 1919 a public meeting in'Ndabeni protested against 
the lack of consultation with the residents that characterized the 
ongoing negotiations regarding the location's future. It was 
resolved that "the proposed removal of the location from its present 
site [i~ an unjust and unfair proposition" and that responsibility 
for the control of Ndabeni should be transferred to "some local 
authority, say, the City Council of Cape Town". A deputation 
comprising Reverend Mahabane, George Solundwana, Edward Ntwana and 
Alfred Ngaleka was appointed to transmit these resolutions to the 
Minister of Native Affairs(84). The Minister's private secretary 
was approached personally by Maha~ane and in writing by Molebaloa 
(the "Secretary to the location committee") to arrange the desired 
interview(85) which took place on 5 December. 
On 4 December, however, the Minister received a deputation from 
·' 
the City Council, and agreed to appoint a 11 small commission", 
including three Council representatives, "to enquire and report 
on: (a)the suitability of Ndabeni as a site for a permanent 
location; and (b)alternative or additional sites 11 (86). The 
Ndabeni deputation told the Minister the following day 
that the human feelings of the people of the 
location were not considered, for they had not 
been consulted by either the Government or the 
municipal authorities with a view to ascertaining 
their views and wishes in regard to the several 
questions raised in the course of the negotiations. 
The people, continued the speaker, had been waiting for months to 
know what was to become of the location, and at last they heard 
with keen disappointment that the City Council was not prepared 
to take over the location unless a suitable and adequate site was 
provided by the Government elsewhere than at Ndabeni for the 
establishment of a new location. The Minister was reminded that 
Africans had been removed from town to Ndabeni two decades 
previously. It was, he was told, intolerable that they should be 
shifted again. It would appear, said the residents' spokesmen, 
that Africans were not wanted in Cape Town~ 
that only their hands were needed at work, and that 
if some mysterious arrangement could be devised 
whereby only their hands could be daily brought to 




faces not seen at all, that would perhaps suit 
their white masters better. 
The deputation suggested that the creation of an additional 
location would be more economical and less traumatic than the 
removal of Ndabeni, and that local authority control would 
facilitate the redress of grievances and complaints. The Minister 
was apparently sympathetic, and agreed that the location's 
residents could submit three names from which he would select a 
"native representative'' for the proposed Location Site Committee( 87). 
It had however already been agreed at the previous day's meeting 
with the City Council representatives that this position would be 
filled by Reverend Matshikwe(88). 
A public meeting in the location duly voted to submit the names 
of Mahabane, Jordan and Molebaloa for the Minister's consideration, 
with the rider that 
the meeting would respectfully yet strongly 
recomme.nd the selection of the first mentioned 
gentleman as the one man who commands the fullest 
confidence of an overwhelming majority of the 
Native people in this location(89). 
News reports of Matshikwe's prior appointment (he in fact filled 
the role of an advisor to the commisaion together with his friend 
Nicholls) spread swiftly through the location; and a mass meeting 
registered its "humble yet emphatic protest", at Matshikwe•s 
appointment, whicb was said not to be ''in accordance with the 
wishes of the Ndabeni residents''• The people protested against 
Nicholls' attitude and called for Matshikwe•s withdrawal and the 
substitution in his stead of a popular representative on the 
commission(90). · These representations were predictably ignored, 
and the commission (chaired by Mr A.H. Stanford, the brother of 
Sir Walter Stanford) included Nicholls and Matshikwe as advisors. 
Disunity and Further Deputations 
The transcript of verbal evidence given under cross-examination 
by prominent residents of Ndabeni to this commission reveals that 
the location residents ~nd the lopal branch of the South African 
Native National Congress were deeply divided. Branch secretary 
Simon Jordan seems (for the transcripts are painfully stilted) to 
have sided with Matshikwe against his provincial president Mahabane 
on the question of the desirability of the proposed removal. 
Jordan and Matshikwe were against the retention of Ndabeni as the 
site of an improved location. Jordan argued that the ground was 
marshy and was in any case too close to the proposed Pinelands 
Garden City, while Matshikwe stressed the permanent inhabitants• 
need for gardens which could not flourish at.Ndabeni.· Mahabane, 
on the other hand, was 9pposed in principle to ''constant removal 
from one place to another, first from Cape Town to Ndabeni and now 
the proposed removal to another site". He made it clear though 
that he was speaking on behalf of the permanent residents only 
(including the 20% of migrant labourers who were on long contracts 
and regularly returned to Ndabeni after their annual holidays with 
their families in the reserves). He conceded that even the 
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permanent residents would accept another site as long as gardens 
and other facilities were provided. James Molebaloa (whose name 
is given in the transcripts as Molibwa and Molebama) declared that 
"the people as a whole object to the removal" and wanted "more 
ground" at the present site. Unlike Mahabane, he opposed the 
separation of 11 bachelors 11 from married people. 
Jordan, Mahabane and·Molebaloa could not even agree on the size 
and nature of a mass meeting that had been held in the location 
the evening before they gave their evidence. Jordan said that 
the meeting had been attended by about one hundred people, most 
of whom favoured the removal of Ndabeni, while Mahabane maintained 
that a resolution emphatically protesting against the proposed 
removal had been supported by all eight hundred people present. 
Molebaloa agreed with Mahabane on the outcome of the meeting, but 
estimated the turn-out to have been app~oximately three hundred(91). 
It is clearly impossible to explain these interesting contradictions 
without more evidence regarding political currents in the location. 
The Ndabeni branch of the Cape Province Native Congress called a 
meeting of "Bantu residents of the Cape Peninsula" in March 1920 
to protest against the shooting down of striking African 
mineworkers on the Rand. The meeting called for the establishment 
of wage boards and the institution of a judicial enquiry into this 
instance of 
intimidation of the worst Prussian type, •••• 
calculated to seriously disturb the peaceful 
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relations subsisting between White and Black in 
this country, to undermine the loyalty of the· 
subject to the ruling race, and ultimately to 
encourage and foster the spirit of Bolshevism in 
this land. 
These resolutions were conveyed to the Secretary for Native Affairs 
by Branch Secretary Jordan(92). 
No information is immediately available on political developments 
in Ndabeni in the ensuing six months, but early in September 
Mahabane and the Reverend Hlate (of the A.M.E. Church at West 
London) reportedly addressed a large crowd in the location. Here 
Mahabane apparently spoke out against Superintendent .Nicholls' 
maltreatment of the residents, as evidenced in the dismissal of 
the headmaster and in the more recent arrests of rent defaulters 
and brewers of illicit liquor(93). This meeting seems to have been 
part of an ICU campaign for higher wages which included further 
. 
meetings in October and November at West London(94). The Reverend 
Matshikwe spoke out at an Advisory Board meeting against ''the 
practice of using Sundays as a day of holding political strike or 
agitation meetings which were to the detriment of the people and 
the churches"(95). 
There seems to have been little political development in Ndabeni 
during 1921. This is hardly surprising, as the short post-war 
boom had ended in Cape Town by then, throwing the city's workers 
more and more on the defensive. ICU president: Selby,Msimang, 
whose leadership had been challenged by Cape delegates at the 
organization's 1920 annual conference in Bloemfontein(96), urged 
moderation and denounced confrontation at the 1921 annual 
conference at Ndabeni(97). The local Communist Party became 
increasingly involved in the activities of an "Unemployment 
Committee" that seems to have been founded in mid-1921 with the 
aim of securing productive work for the growing number of 
unemployed(98). The Party's regular street meetings, apparently 
started in 1919 by its predecessor, the·syndicalist(99) 
Industrial· Socialist League, were banned by the municipality (on 
the recommendation of the police) in 1922(100). A large crowd 
I 
rallied behind the slogan of 11 work or full maintenance" at an 
Unemployment Committee demonstration on May ~ay 1923 on the Grand 
Parade. Speakers from the Communist Party (which was reportedly 
working with the Unemployment Committee) declared that socialist 
revolution was the only cure for the un~mployment problem and 
emphasized that "workers are workers, irrespective of race, 
nationality or colour". The capitalist strategy of dividing the 
workers along colour lines was particularly deplored(101). 
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This style of rhetoric and agitation was certainly a far cry from 
the deprecating aspirant petty-bourgeois attitude of the African 
Political Organization's local Anti Colour-Bar p~tition-campaign 
of 1922(102), but it failed to find effective organizational 
expression. Cape Town's workers remained divided, and those 
unfortunate enough to be confined to Ndabeni or living as semi-
fugitives in the slums and shanty towns because they ~elonged to 
the most exploited and oppressed group of local workers, the 
Africans, remained apparently isolated from these revolutionary 
local currents and proved malleable to the developing· designs of 
the omnipotent segregationist state. 
In Ndabeni, Mahabane joined the Advisory Boar~ but this did not 
make unity among the residents any less elusive. ''Faction 
fighting" broke out in the first quarter of 1921(103), and in 
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June the location residents were reported to be dissatisfied and 
discontented, while conditions were becoming increasingly 
overcrowded and their future remained uncertain(104). In April 
1922 the Secretary for Native Affairs was informed by J. Malangabi, 
the secretary of a meeting held in the location, that 
the residents of Ndabeni location have decided that 
there should be a Standing Committee to discuss 
anything connected with the removal of the location 
with the Authorities when there is occasion to do 
so. To prevent any unauthorized person or persons 
coming to you saying that .they have been sent by 
the residents of Ndabeni, they are sending the 
following names. Standing Committee: w. Masiza, 
S. Hoyi, W. Mgabadeli, s. Jordan, J. Dude, 
J. Dlwati, J. Malangabi, J. Tomeli, A. Coto(105). 
The secretary for Native Affairs asked Mr Nicholls whether the 
Advis6ry Board had approved of this committee(106), and on being 
told that it had not(107), he informed Malangabi that the Standing 
Committee would not be recognized by the Government, as 
the Location Advisory Board - the members of which 
are appointed by the Government - and as such.are 
the recognized channel of communication between the 
Ndabeni residents and the Government, is the body to 
submit matters to the Department in connection with 
the location(108). 
Meanwhile City Councillor Dr Abdurahman, the leader of the ineptly-
named, exclusively - "Coloured'' African Political Organization, 
had arranged for the Mayor to receive a deputation from this 
committee. Dr Abdurahman apparently told the very accommodating 
Mayor at this meeting that all that was required to allay the fears 
of the "Natives11 was consultation with them before the completed 
scheme for their removal was finally approved. Simon Jordan, on 
the other hand (his name is given in the press report as "Mr 
Jordaan") "raised several points, such as the right to trade, sale 
of land to Natives, the style of house and the police 
control"(109). 
The questions of land rights, trading rights and police control 
(insofar as they affected the growing urban African population) 
were central to the wide-ranging debate then being conducted in 
Parliament and in the press as the Urban Areas Act gradually took 
shape. The government, however, was simply not prepared to 
discuss such fundamentai issues with representative bodies of 
Africans. Too much was at stake (economically, politically and 
culturally) for such a debate to be sanctioned. Even straight-
forward and concrete complaints were characteristically dismissed 
as groundless. 
Thus when the unpopular Mr Nicholls was finally brought to book 
after ruling Ndabeni as his personal petty fiefdom since 1910, he 
was dismissed from his post for non-compliance with departmental 
procedures and for using government property for his own purposes. 
The Public Service Commission enquiry into his maladministration 
of the location dismissed "the charge of negligence in failing to 
take action on the complaints made by natives", apparently on the 
basis that a complaints book had been kept(110). 
Nicholls' replacement, Mr Harrison, found the location in an 
"indescribably filthy" state, and reported that "the attitude of 
the Residents appeared to be a mixture of thinly veiled disgust 
and suspicion of the local administration. Unrest was brewing and 
being openly discussed among the natives". Official warnings were 
issued that as from 1 September measures would be taken against 
people who contravened the sanitation ~egulations and the 
regulations governing the payment of rent. Believing that "the 
essence of control [is] the Registration and reporting of arrivals 
and departures as a preliminary to any further administration", 
Superintendent Harrison began acting against the large number of 
unregistered and unreported residents(111). 
' 
A mass meeting was held early in September, and a deputation led 
by Reverend Mtimkulu (who had rep.laced Mahabane in the Wesleyan 
Mission and on the Advisory Board) was elected to protest to th~ 
new Superintendent against these evictions. The deputation also 
called on the government to provide additional accommodation at 
Ndabeni. Mr Harrison assured the community representatives that 
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he was merely carrying out instructions in enforcing the 
regulations, and he promised to inform his department· of the urgent 
need for additional accommodation(112). 
This reply was obviously unsatisfactory, and a week later the 
Secretary for Native Affairs received a telegram from J. Dlwati 
(whose name is given in the transcript as Dlwali) saying 
Am instructed by Joint Executive of local Congress 
and Vigilance Asso.ciation Ndabeni to beg you to 
instruct Inspector Harrison to suspend drastic and 
uncalled for measures taken in location STOP 
Grievances memorial following BTOP Great deal of 
unrest prevails. 
Dlwati was to~d by telegram that the proper channel for 
communications of this nature was the Advisory Board(113), and the 
matter was dropped after Harrison submitted that 
the grievances alluded to •••• were caused firstly 
by the fact that they saw amongst them an official 
new to them. They saw the Regulations being given 
effect to apparently for the first time for some 
years, and they resented any attempt to restore 
Administrative control(114). 
At the beginning of 1923, the Ndabeni branch of the Cape Native 
National Congress organized a well-attended meeting in the 
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location's Brothers Hall to discuss the problem of housing for 
Africans in Cape Town. Here it was decided to formally-call on 
"the Native Affairs Department to provide dwelling houses for the 
homeless people coming from different places in want of work"(115). 
The Department replied that 
The Government has decided as a policy that 
responsibility for the Native population in urban 
areas should devolve upon the local authority, this 
being the principle underlying the Natives (Urban 
Areas) Bill now before Parliament. 
The Government planned to hand Ndabeni over to the City Council, 
and was therefore not prepared to spend money on additional 
accommodation(116). 
The passage of the Urban Areas Act met with little local resistance, 
but in 1924 
'Professor' James s. Thaele, who had recently 
" ' returned from the United States and who now 
'injected his own strain of Garveyism into Cape Town 
politics', told the new Superintendent Mr Cook that 
the Cape SANNC would resort to 'passive resistance' 
were 'pass laws' introduced(117). 
In 1925, the ANC mouthpiece the African World called for the 
adoption by the ANC and the ICU of. a 11 two-stream policy" of 
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passive resistance and "a strike within a given time, say six 
months after the Pass Laws have become an established .fact"(118). 
The ICU, however, was already in decline, making the organized 
withdrawal of labour impossible, while widespread passive resistance 
only became a reality in the changed conditions brought about by 
the Second World War. 
In response to the initial implementation of the Coloured Labour 
Preference policy (which was discussed in the previous chapter), 
the Cape ANC and the Bantu Union convened a mass meeting at Ndabeni 
on Sunday 7 March 1926. This meeting unanimously condemned the 
government's "industrial segregation policy'' and resolved that 
while natives were recruited and induced by the 
Government to come to Cape Town to build the Docks 
and the City, and are now being dismissed, Meeting 
feels it impossible to place its confidence in the 
Government's word of honour that natives replaced 
here would be found work elsewhere. Further, 
Meeting wishes to assure the Government of its 
expressed opinion of not accepting the Government's 
offer of Farm work, and recommends to the 
Government the policy in the Cape of 'Free Market' 
in labour matters. 
The meeting further resolved that if these grievances were not 
immediately redressed, the "challenge of the Government both in 
State and Church matters" would, as a last resort, be accepted(119). 
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These resolutions were conveyed to Prime Minister Hertzog the 
following day, by a deputation from Ndabeni that included James· 
Ngojo of the ANC and the Reverend Mtimkulu. Members of the 
deputation referred to a letter explaining the Coloured Labour 
Preference policy that had apparently been sent by the Native 
Affairs Department to local African leaders through the Member of 
Parliament Mr Payn, who introduced both the Ndabeni deputation and 
the previous month's dock-labourers deputation (see chapter 5) 
to the Prime.Minister. 
Mr J.Z. Fuku was among the Ndabeni representatives who addressed 
Hertzog on this occasion. He said that 
As far as we can see we see nothing that will help 
us unless perhaps that the door of Parliament be 
opened. You say no one can be.taxed without being 
represented, but we are being taxed from pillar to 
post because we have no representative. 
Emphasizing that Africans had no quarrel with "Coloureds", he 
submitted that there had never been any trouble in the docks until 
the recent substitution of African labourers, and called for the 
abandonment of the Coloured Labour Preference policy, declari'ng 
that "We claim Cape Town as our home just as we claim Idutywa. 
In fact we claim the whole of Africa". The Reverend Matshiqi 
· noted that the Coloured Labour Preference policy was simply a 
refinement of Hertzog's ncivilized Labour11 policy which had resulted 
II 11 
in the replacement of African labourers by whites on for example 
the Rand. He warned the Prime Minister that 
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If you dont consider the future of your children 
things may happen. In course of time the natives 
will find their power and ability and will use it. 
It would be very unfortunate if it were said 
during coming years that it started in your time. 
I 
In his dismissive reply (quoted in the previous chapter), Hertzog 
remarked that the deputation's tone was hardl~ calculated to elicit 
sympathy and assistance. He told the African representatives that 
''If you come with resolutions of this kind then you must not be 
surprised if you are not as successful as the seriousness of your 
complaint would lead you to think you should be 11 (120). 
The Increasing Complexities of Local Resistance-Politics 
The introduction of Hertzog's "Native Bills'' during the 1926 
session of Parliament, and registration under the Urban Areas Act 
(') 
(see chapter 4) stimulated more .militant forms of resistance, 
which in turn polarized the lock1 African community still further. 
This section discusses these ~oader political currents among 
local Africans, while the following section returns to 
developments within the locations. 
The Cape African Congress held a meeting on the Grand Parade in 
mid-February 1926 to protest against the 11 Colour-Bar Bills" and 
their underlying principle of segregation(121). The local ANC was 
however increasingly troubled by a growing contradiction between 
its "old guard" and a more militant and radical tenden.cy. This 
gave rise in August to an eruption of violence in the ANC hall in 
Waterkant Street at a meeting which was chaired by Thaele and 
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addressed by Superintendent Cook(122). Then in November, national 
President-General Mahabane issued a Proclamation from Ndabeni, 
saying that a recent meeting there of the Western District branch 
of the Cape ANC had been unable to elect a new Chairman because 
of the split within its ranks. Using his powers as national 
leader of the organization, Mahabane therefore appointed Thaele 
as Acting Chairman of the local branch(123). This was hardly a 
popular move, and when the new branch leader "attempted to address 
a crowd of one thousand in the location on 21 November, he was 
heckled and mobbed, and had to take refuge at the police station11 (124). 
Within the ICU, the other major populai organization locally 
active at that time, internal contradictions had by the beginning 
of 1927 led to the e~pulsion of communists. The expelled members 
agitated(125), but they do not seem to have had much support(126). 
Crowds flocked to ICU mass-meetings on the Grand Parade, to protest 
against the ''Native Bills1 which national secretary Kadalie said were 
"permeated with a spirit of hatred and savagery11 (127). Towards 
the end of March, the ICU organized a demonstration in which at 
least 1,200 Africans marched to Parliament to protest against the 
"Native Bills"(128). 
Wracked by internal dissention, both the ANC and the ICU seem then 
to have lapsed into inactivity until (per~aps stimulated by the 
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inflammatory rhetoric of the Communist Party(129)),a young and 
militant faction rose to prominence within the local ANC. The two 
factions began to agitate separately, with rival meetings being 
held simultaneously on the Parade(130). At meetings there in mid-
1929, militant ANC speakers declared that "we preach here a black 
South Africa 11 (131) and urged the people to organize and overthrow 
the government(132). In February 1930, it was reported that 
Following the example recently set in Johannesburg, 
where a committee representative of political and 
industrial organizations has been formed for the 
purpose of conducting a campaign against the Native 
Bills which the government intends to introduce, a 
similar committee of action was formed this week in 
Cape Town. 
Among the organizations represented on this committee were the 
ANC, the ICU and the Communist Party(133). A march on Parliament 
organized by this action committee to protest against the proposed 
amendment of the Riotous Assemblies Act was baton-charged early 
the following month(134), but within a week an even larger 
procession.objecting to the enfranchisement of "white" women 
managed to reach the House, only for Hertzog to refuse its leaders 
an audience(135). 
The two factions of the ANC continued to hold rival meetings on 
the Grand Parade, and Thaele's supporters began attacking communist 
meetings(136). Eventually in November 1930 the militants broke 
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away to form the Independent ANC, which aimed to establish a 
"Black Republic" by means of agitation and mass demonstrations 
leading up to 11 a general storipage of work and civil 
• 
disobedience 11 (137). ANC supporters marched behind their brass 
band through a meeting of their rivals during the following 
month(138). 
Overt political activity among local Africans seems then to have 
declined dramatically until early 1932, presumably due to the 
harsh effects of the Great Depression. Then in January 1932 1 a 
meeting of the apparently communist-inspired Unemployed and 
Unskilled Workers Union on the Parade was attacked by ANC members, 
leading to a pitched battle involving 200-300 men armed with 
stones, sticks and knobkerries(139). 
The publication shortly thereafter. of, the. draft "togt" .. registration 
regulations which were eventually promulgated under Government 
Notice No 1700 at the end of 1932 united the warring factions of 
local resistance. The City Council's Native Affairs Committee 
held a special meeting in February 1932 to hear protests against 
the proposed regulations from interalia the Vigilance Committees 
of Langa and Ndabeni; the ANCi the Independent ANC\ the ANC 
(women's section); the Communist Party; the Teachers' Association; 
and su~h labour organizations as the Cape Town Stevedoring and 
Dock Workers Union; the Laundry, Dyers•and Cleaners• Union and 
the African Unemployed Workers' Union. A "deputation of Natives" 
protested against the draft regulations to the Mayor in June, and 
a Cape Town Native Grievances Committee seems to have been formed 
-
in 1932, and to have submitted objections to the regulations to 
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the Council early in November, as did the local ANC(140). 
After the new registration regulations had been issued and were 
beginning to be implemented, the Cape Town Native Grievances 
Committee held a public meeting at which it was decided to 
petition the Minister of Native Affairs. The resulting "statement 
from Native Citizens of Cape Town" reminded the Minister that the 
Native Reserves were inadequate to support their growing population, 
and that Africans were forced by t~is circumstance, together with 
the imposition of interalia hut-taxes, poll taxes, road taxes, dog 
taxes, stock-rate taxes, customs duty taxes, quitrent, dipping 
fees and other indirect taxes "to migrate to the towns to seek 
employment". The statement declared that "this registration is 
nothing else but introduction of Pass System in Cape Town11 , and 
discriminated against Africans in favour of "other communities not 
falling under these regulations'', whiie also imposing an 
additional direct tax on poverty-stricken casual labourers(141). 
A Native Affairs Department official who interviewed representatives 
of this committee in February 1933 "with a view to ascertaining in 
., 
detail their objections to the regulations'' was told that employers 
who had not simply replaced their African workers with "Coloureds" 
had in many cases reduced employees with long service-records to 
the status of casual labourers in order to escape the monthly fee 
payable by employers for the registration of service-contracts. 
(The casual-labourers' registration fee was, as shown in the 
previous chapter, payable by the labourers themselves and not by 
their employers(142)). Superintendent Cook de~ied that many 
Africans had lost their jobs as a result of the regulations, but 
he conceded that a large-scale change from waged to casual status 
had in all probability taken place(143). The detailed objections 
to the registration regulations raised by the Grievances Committee 
in its petition and in its interview with the departmental officer 
were nevertheless dismissed out of hand by the authorities(144). 
Severe repression on a national scale under Minister of Justice 
Pirow had by that stage rendered sustained resistance impossible, 
and the Grievances Committee (unable to obtain redress for ita 
constituents) apparently dissolved shortly thereafter. Organized 
local opposition to Government policy seems then only to have 
re-emerged during the second half of 1935, with the resurrection 
in Parliament of Hertzog's "Native Bills". The further 
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development of local resistance politics is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but the fact that the renewed resistance was 
apparently divided at its inception must be noted. The Cape 
Peninsula African Rights Protection Association (to which no 
previous reference has yet been located) held a public meeting, for 
Africans only, in the City Hall in December 1935, to popularize 
alternative "Native Bills" envisaging a colour-blind franchise 
restricted to those who had attained Matriculation or higher 
educational qualifications. The fact that these ''al.ternative 
bills" had been drafted by advocates D.B. Holteno and D.M. Buchanan 
shows that this Association was not aver§e to co-operation with 
"whites" per' se. One can only presume that the racial exclusivity 
of this meeting was designed to exclude as many communists as 
possible from the discussion of its proposals(145). A mass meeting 
that had been convened by the Langa Vigilance Committee in that 
location during August had, on the other hand, heard at least one 
communist speaker condemn the "Native Bills" from a presumably 
very different perspective(146). 
The remaining section concludes this chapter with a discussion of 
political developments in the local locations during the decade 
after 1926, when the Urban Areas Act was first applied to Cape 
Town. 
Further Political Developments Within the Local Locations 
The introduction of the "Native Bills" and of registration under 
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the Urban Areas Act stimulated increased militancy and polarization 
within Ndabeni, in keeping with the broader political currents 
among local Africans discussed in the previous sectionw 
Condemnation was heaped on the Bills at a Bantu Union meeting in 
the location in June 1926, at which Mgabadeli and Fuku were 
prominent speakers(147), while registration was denounced at 
meetings convened by the Vigilance Committee(148). 
Superintendent Cook was apparently quoted in the local press in 
June 1926 as saying of the Ndabeni Advisory Board that 
it was only through the moderate thinking and 
attitude of these people that we were able to get 
the ~egistratio~ regulations through. They 
deserve all the credit. Of course there is a 
certain section against it, but the Native 
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Advisory Board has given expression to .the v~ew of 
the majority of the Natives(149). 
The latter contention was denied by all present at a meeting called 
by the Vigilance Committee (or Association) at Ndabeni in mid-July, 
which rejected registration and denounced the Superintendent(150). 
The split between the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee 
widened with the passage of time, reflecting the growing 
contradiction within the local ANC between the "old guard" and the 
younger, more militant tendency. 
Despite the fact that ANC leader James Thaele sent a letter to the 
City Council expressing his complete confidence in the location 
Superintendent(151), the Vigilance Committee called a further 
meeting at which a vote of no confidence in Superin~endent Cook 
was passed. This was communicated to the City Council, and the 
Committee complained to the Native Affairs Department about Cook's 
harsh administration of the location. The complaints were backed 
up by the submission to the Department of a petition signed by 
1,276 Ndabeni residents, alleging that they suffered from 
unsympathetic general treatment at the hands of the Superintendent 
and his staff, who showed partiality (particularly with regard to 
the payment of rent and the settlement of disputes and complaints) 
and misrepresented the views of the residents on the question of 
the "Pass Regulations''. The location's "Native Police" force was i-
moreover accused of committing "brutal assaults" on residents and 




The petitioners called for a commission of enquiry, and although 
the Department's senior l~cal representative reported that the 
dissatisfaction at Ndabeni was due to the Superintendent's 
suppression of the illicit liquor trade, as well as to overcrowding 
and political factionalism, the Department decided to hold the 
requested inquiry in order to clear Mr Cook's name. The consent 
of the City Council was secured in December, and the inquiry was 
conducted during January 1927 by a single commissioner. This was 
the same Dr Loram who had originally suggested Cook's appointment 
by the Council(152). 
Although the Vigilance Committee expressed its "appreciation and 
extreme gratification for so readily granting our humble request" 
in arranging the inquiry, and looked forward to Ndabeni becoming 
a "comfortable happy home"(153) 1 Loram on the whole cleared the 
Superintendent of the charges against him and attributed the 
opposition in large part to his having been more active than his 
predecessors, especially in the collection of rent, and his having 
to introduce the unpopular Urban Areas Act(154). The only real 
criticism that Loram levelled against Cook in his twenty-four page 
report concerned the Superintendent's too-cordial relationship 
with the location's 11 old guard11 ANC faction, whereby he had "laid 
himself open to the charge of partiality 11 (155J, and the only real 
recommendations were that the Advisory Board, the location police 
and the Superintendent's staff should be strengthened(156). It 
was also suggested "That 'raids' either for liquor or for non-
payment of rent be carried out at reasonable hours and always 
under the direction of a European constable 11 (157). The City 
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Council undertook to follow this suggestion 11 as far as practicable1' 
and also decided aa a result of this inquiry "to discontinue the 
practice of summary arrest, and henceforth rent defaulters will 
. II 
be served with a summons to appear at court(158). 
Administration of the location in a more humane manner seems to 
have temporarily pacified its residents, and there is apparently 
no evidence of overt resistance at Ndabeni until 1929, when the 
City Council (having removed all the "bachelors" from the city 
slums to Langa) turned its attention on the residents of Ndabeni, 
and increased their rentals in order to persuade them to move to 
the new location. The Ndabeni Vigilance Committee informed the 
City Council that the people of Ndabeni had no confidence in the 
location administration and could see.no justification for 
increasing their rents in view of the deplorable conditions under 
which they were forced to live. Superintendent Cook, who was 
accused of "openly flouting the wishes of the people and (their) 
accredited representatives 11 was requested at a meeting of the 
Advisory Board (which by that stage was composed entirely of 
Vigilance Committee members) to resign from his position as 
chairman(159). Legal advice was taken and "After a great deal of 
discussion •••• with the Responsible Committee and the Tow~ Clerk, 
it (was) agreed that a chairman other than the superintendent should 
in future control the Advisory Board". The Vigilance Committee 
nominated Mr William MacGregor, the landowner who was shown in the 
previous chapter to have allowed Africans to live on his property 
at Grassy Park, for this position(160). This was not, however, 
acceptable to the Council, which decided during the following year 
--· -f-----··-··----·-·. -
,., 
"to reintroduce nominated members as before 1926, hoping in this 
,,,.,,, 
way to obtain a more compliant body. Cook was now replaced as 
chairman by W.G. Bennie, a veteran African educationalist 11 (161). 
Hundreds of Ndabeni residents, led by the Vigilance Committee, 
refused to pay more than their normal rent for April and May of 
1929, resulting in a test case which was won by the Council but 
lost on appeal, as the rent increase was found to be retrospective 
and hence ultra vires(162). The courts also ruled in favour of 
the occupants of the 100 most dilapidated huts for married people 
and 92 of the Nissen huts housing "bachelors", when they chose in 
mid-1929 to defy notices ordering them to move to Langa(163), 
Towards the end of June, before this matter had come before the 
courts, the Vigilance Committee's legal representative wrote to 
the Town Clerk demandirig an inquiry into the "chaotic state" of 
affairs at Ndabeni, where Superintendent Cook was said to have 11 by 
his actions and attitude, wholly alienated himself from the good 
feelings and the sympathy of the residents of the location"(164). 
The Mayor, Mr Lewis, was appointed to conduct this inquiry, which 
was held in January 1930. Mayor Lewis' inquiry into Cook's 
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administration of Ndabeni predictably exonerated the Superintendent 
of all the charges against him(165). 
Prior to this inquiry, a second petition of Ndabeni residents, 
this time addressed to the Governor-General, had been drawn up by 
the Vigilance Committee and sighed by over 1,400 residents. Its 
despatch was however delayed until April, on the advice of the 
committee's legal advisor and of William McGregor (or MacGregor). 
/ 
By that stage new eviction notices had been issued ordering the 
occupants of the Nissen huts to move to Langa by the.end of 
April( 166). 'rhe petition called on the Governor-General "to 
help us righten the injustices we are suffering at the ~ands of 
our Superintendent and the City Council of Cape Town 11 (167). 
The authorities had already received a petition drawn up by the 
Langa Vigilance Committee dated February 1930 and signed by 
hundreds of Africans from Langa and from the back-streets of town 
calling on the Minister of Native Affairs to institute a ''full 
enquiry" into the position of Africans in Cape Town. The high 
rents at Langa, which were said to be beyond the means of the vast 
majority of the people, were identified as a central issue, which 
had not only resulted in 11 tremendous numbers of prosecutions" for 
non-payment, but had also given rise to 
the fact that there are approximately 5,000 Natives •••• 
unlawfully residing in and about the area surrounding 
the Locations who will not under any circumstances 
occupy Langa because of the prohibitive rentals and 
train-fares(168). 
The Assistant Native Commissioner, commenting on this petition, 
advised his department that 
complaints originate chiefly from natives who have 
their wives here; the economic conditions fall 
hard on them; the women come here because their 
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men folk remain away for long periods and fail to 
send money home; they are also attracted by the 
town life and gradtially become detribalized(169). 
The Langa Vigilance Committee's legal representative complained 
the following month that a new scale of rentals had been 
promulgated which the residents of Langa were unable to pay(170). 
Asked to comment on the two most recent petitions(171), the· Town 
Clerk explained that the Council's efforts to implement 
Government policy by closing down Ndabeni and concentrating the 
local African population at Langa was being stubbornly resisted 
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by the residents of both locations, who were being encouraged by 
legal advisors to resist law and order. The Council denied having 
any "desire to treat the native community with harshness or undue 
severity"(172). 
The "native community" clearly thought otherwise, and the Langa 
Vigilance Committee set out in July 1930 to prove by means of a 
test case that the residents of the new location could not.afford 
to pay the stipulated rentals(173). The outcome of this case 
remains unclear, but (as was shown in chapter 4) rentals at Langa 
were eventually reduced quite substantially towards the end of 
that year. This was, however, clearly more the result of official 
representations than of legal pressure from the residents. 
The residents of Ndabeni again resorted to the courts in December 
of that year, to challenge eviction orders that had been served 
on the "bachelors 11 living in that location. The Supreme Court 
ruled towards the end of the following year that the orders were 
valid, paving the way for the final clearance of Africans from 
Ndabeni(174). Despite their failure to secure protection' from 
the courts, Superintendent Cook reported as late as 1934 that 
"The natives at Ndabeni are still scrapping us, another appeal 
case coming on11 ( 175). 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has indicated the extent to which early capitalist 
development in Cape Town was dependent on predominantly Xhosa-
speaking migrant labour. It has traced the development of state 
policy towards Africans in Cape Town, and has outlined the ways 
in which local Africans attempted to resist these policies. 
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By systematically working through the available archival and 
secondary material, the thesis has provided some insight into the 
material conditions under which these people were forced to live, 
and into the complexities of the social problems and political 
conflicts which originated and developed locally and nationally 
during this crucial period of South African history. On the whole, 
these material conditions have hardly improved. The social 
problems and political conflicts discussed here have likewise 
never been resolved, but have (on the contrary) intensified with 
the passage of time. 
A primary motivation for embarking on this historical analysis is 
the conviction that the present situation cannot be understood 
without taking account of its aetiology. This is hopefully borne 
out in the thesis, which suggests (particularly in terms of state 
policy) that local politics has hardly moved beyond the 
parameters laid down during this period. 
The conceptual implications of the thesis are clear. If work of 
this nature is accepted as sufficient demonstration of the significance 
of the hist9rical process, the a-historical or structura~ist approaches 
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characteristic of different variants of functionalism must be 
rejected. The centrality of conflict made evident in.this thesis 
is a further argument against functionalism(1). 
Chapter 1 noted functionalism's replacement by a 11 conflict 
pluralism", with its emphasis on racial domination, as the 
prevailing academic orthodoxy within South Africa's English-
speaking universities, and discussed a number of "conflict 
pluralist" analyses of the position of Africans in Cape Town. 
But the political, social, cultural and economic conflict 
characteristic of this formative period were shown in this thesis 
not to have been simply a matter of "black" versus "white". A / 
·' 
more nuanced approach is employed here. Chapter 6 hinted at some 
of the class-based divisions within the local African community(2), 
while Chapters 3 and 4 outlined the important role played in the 
segregation-process by "white" workers(3) and "white" women(4). 
At least one "white" women's organization supported the 
implementation of influx control ,as documented in Chapter 5(5). 
Chapters 4 and 5 also highlight the leading role of a third group 
of "whites", the liberal religious leaders and philanthropists, 
in the crystallization of the policies of segregation and influx 
control(6). This account supports Legassick's contention that 
~.liberals both acted as"agents of social contro~as well as 
precursors of the apartheid state"(7). 
- .. - -~ __ ./, 
The thesis thus ber,ins to uncover some of the real complexities 
of the developing situation, and in so doing it casts doubt not 
only on the functionalist and "conflict pluralist" perspectives, 
but also on the more simplistic Marxist formulations that have 
been propounded within the field of South African urban studies. 
It is difficult to discern within thi contradictory process 
portrayed here "fractions of capital 11 neatly dominant at different 
levels of the state apparatus(8). Neither does it seem justified 
to dismiss the determined struggles of local Africans against the 
developing policies of the state as being of a uniformly petty-
bourgeois nature. What is suggested here, rather, is the 
necessity for a conceptual disaggregation of the state and for 
sensitivity towards different class-based tendencies within the 
resistance. 
As for the more sophisticated 11 cul turalist" orientation within 
Marxism(9), which has strongly influenced the work of Koch(10) and 
La Hausse(11), one can only stress at the outset that the 
strengths of the contributions made by these two scholars are 
obvious. Their work embodies a significant disaggregation of 
monolithic conceptions of the state and racial capitalism. They 
emphasize· the specificity of regional experience and the depth of 
local popular struggles. But at the same time, these two studies 
dQ contain.a number of weaknesses. The ongoing theoretical debate 
between for example the Oxford-based History Workshop group and 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham should 
perhaps have alerted these pioneering South Africans to the 
difficulties of cultural analysis in a context in which political 
factors played such a significant role. Koch and La Hausse both 
tend to trivialize the concept of "culture" by restricting it for' 
the most part to escapist leisure-pursuits , such as drinking 
and dancing. They fail to explore the realms of religious, 
educational and political ideology, and seem largely oblivious of 
culture as the "common-sense" of classes and social groups. 
The present preliminary investigation of the early complexities 
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of the African urbanization process in Cape Town builds on the key 
contributions of Koch and La Hausse, but in contrast to their work 
it emphasizes the material and political rather than the cultural 
dimension of the uneven process of struggle. As Bozzoli has 
pointed out, however, South African urban historiography must 
incorporate a more rounded conception of "class",. moving from 
economic identification to ''the political, social, culturil and 
ideological character of classes that renders them real and 
recognisable social categbries''( 12) in order to achieve "the 
synthesis of materialist, cultural and regional understanding that 
is needed" ( 13). 
Future research could usefully build on such foundations, by 
combining the factors and issues identified in this thesis with 
those emphasized by Koch and La Hausse. More specifically, there 
is cle~rly much scope in the local context for a more contemporary 
focus. The methods of oral history (while difficult to apply in 
such an early period) would certainly enhance the account of 
resistance provided in Chapter 6, and should not be neglected by 
scholars covering the more recent local past. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1 Wilson and Mafeje's focus on the adaptation of in-migrants 
(see p2), Swanson's early "sanitation syndrome" (p6), and 
Wilkinson's initial concern with the abstract requirements of 
the capitalist system (p25ff) are examples of functionalist 
perspectives, 
2 see particularly pp192, 194, 212 and 228. 
3 ' pp75-6 and 79. 
4 pp 126-8. 
' 5 p 157. 
6 pp 123-6, 128, 155 - 7. 
7 Rich, 1~?6:9; citing Legassick, 1974. 
- ·-. _,. ·----- -
8 This is exemplified in the conflict (discussed in Chapters 
4 and 5) within and between the different levels and branches 
of the state over the implementation of the Urban Areas Act. 
Such evidence as exists fails to specify the precise interests 
' 
involved, and one is left with the present tentative account. 
9 The programme of this school in the South African context is 
most usefully seen in Bozzoli (1983). 
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( 10) Koch, 1984. 
(11) La Hausse, 1984. 
(12) Bozzoli, 1979:5. 
(13) Bozzoli, 1983:42. 
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